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Abstract In this introduction to Research, Ethics and Risk in the 
Authoritarian Field, we explain why and how we wrote this book, who we 
are, what the ‘authoritarian field’ means for us, and who may find this 
book useful. By recording our joint experiences in very different authori-
tarian contexts systematically and succinctly, comparing and contrasting 
them, and drawing lessons, we aim to give other researchers a framework, 
so they will not need to start from scratch as we did. It is not the absence 
of free and fair elections, or repression, that most prominently affects our 
fieldwork in authoritarian contexts, but the arbitrariness of authoritarian 
rule, and the uncertainty it results in for us and the people in our fieldwork 
environment.
Keywords Authoritarianism • Field research • Reflection • Uncertainty 
• Qualitative research • Fieldwork methods
Why This Book
We wrote this book, in the first place, because we needed it and it did not 
exist. In 2014 we came to the discovery, as a comparative research group 
preparing for fieldwork, that there was practically no written guidance on 
how to handle the challenges of authoritarianism research. There were 
reams of literature on anthropological fieldwork, and some good texts on 
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how to do research on political violence in conflict areas (for instance, 
Sriram et al. 2009; Mazurana et al. 2013; Hilhorst et al. 2016). But the 
image they painted of their field did not mirror our experience, and the 
advice they gave was only partially applicable. Country-based texts were 
also an imperfect fit: we found some interesting discussion on navigating 
the party-state in China (Heimer and Thøgersen 2006), or on circum-
venting the prohibition on mentioning ethnicity in Rwanda (Thomson 
et al. 2013), but the extensive reflections on Chinese language and cul-
ture, or on what it means to be a white researcher in the African Great 
Lakes region, did not travel. Fortunately, more explicit reflection on 
research in authoritarian contexts per se is just beginning to emerge. In 
recent years, two special issues have appeared on ‘closed’ and ‘authoritar-
ian’ contexts, respectively (Koch 2013; Goode and Ahram 2016), as well 
as some shorter pieces focusing on fieldwork challenges in China (Shih 
2015), the Middle East (Lynch 2016), and Central Asia (Driscoll 2015), 
explicitly approached as authoritarian contexts. We have learned from, and 
draw on, this recent literature. But it still consists largely of collections of 
individual experiences, placed side by side rather than in conversation with 
each other. By recording our joint experiences in very different authoritar-
ian contexts systematically and succinctly, comparing and contrasting 
them, and drawing lessons, we aim to give other researchers a framework, 
so they will not need to start from scratch as we did.
A second trigger for writing the book was the death of Giulio Regeni. 
Regeni was a PhD student at the University of Cambridge, who was tor-
tured to death while doing fieldwork on trade unionism in Egypt, in early 
2016. Regeni’s killing sent shockwaves through the community of Middle 
East scholars, reminding us of the risk involved in research in the authori-
tarian field. It affected us quite personally, because some of us knew people 
close to him, one of us had done research in Egypt only few years earlier, 
and others were PhD students about to embark on their own fieldwork. At 
the same time, Regeni’s death and the responses to it also highlighted the 
rarity of such an extreme act of repression against a foreign scholar, and 
reminded us of our relative safety in comparison to our respondents and 
collaborators in the countries we study.
A final consideration for writing this book was the controversy that 
arose among political scientists, primarily in the United States, around the 
so-called Data Access and Research Transparency (DA-RT) statement. 
DA-RT asserted that ‘researchers should provide access to … data or 
explain why they cannot’, and led to the adoption of a joint transparency 
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statement by a number of journal editors in 2014  (https://www.dart-
statement.org). As we describe in detail in Chap. 6, these statements have 
become subject to increasing controversy, and a lively debate has since 
ensued on the merits and limits of transparency, especially for different 
types of qualitative research. As noted by Shih (2015), Driscoll (2015), 
and Lynch (2016), tensions between transparency obligations and protec-
tion of respondents are particularly acute when it comes to fieldwork 
research in authoritarian circumstances. While these and other contribu-
tions have thrown open the debate by critiquing DA-RT, the tension 
between transparency and protection remains unresolved, and few alterna-
tive models have emerged. More recently, European policy-makers have 
developed even more sweeping proposals to improve ‘the accessibility of 
data and knowledge at all stages of the research cycle’ (Directorate-General 
for Research and Innovation 2016, 52), making it all the more urgent to 
develop a considered response to such calls for transparency from the per-
spective of authoritarian field research.
There are no easy fixes either for the tension between transparency and 
responsibility towards respondents, or to the issues of risk raised by 
Regeni’s death. Without simplifying, this book aims to contribute to 
improving the practice of authoritarian field research, by laying bare some 
of the dilemmas and trade-offs we encountered, examining our own deci-
sions with hindsight, and discussing strategies we developed, to make it 
easier for others. We also want to open the space for reflecting on themes 
that we believe are too little discussed, let alone written about, by political 
scientists: our fears, insecurities and mistakes during fieldwork, the mental 
impact it has on us, and the possibility of coming home with little in the 
way of publishable findings.
The book is structured in the following way: in this chapter, we explain 
who we are, define our subject matter, and try to dispel some prejudices 
and dichotomous ways of thinking. We describe how we wrote the book, 
and for whom we believe it will be useful. In Chap. 2, we discuss how we 
enter the field: navigating institutional ethics requirements, getting per-
mission to enter, and preparing for the particularities and risks involved in 
authoritarianism research. In Chap. 3, we explain the concept of ‘red 
lines’: topics that are sensitive or even taboo to discuss in authoritarian 
contexts, how we learn what they are, and how we navigate them. In 
Chap. 4, we discuss how we build and maintain relations in the field: how 
we relate to local collaborators, how we approach respondents and con-
duct interviews, and the responsibilities we have towards our contacts in 
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the field. Chapter 5 discusses the mental impact of authoritarian field 
research, which is always stressful, often stimulating, and sometimes 
involves dealing with surveillance, fear, betrayal, or the suffering of others. 
We also reflect on adverse consequences of pressure to get results. In 
Chap. 6 we describe the constraints of the authoritarian field when ‘writ-
ing up’, and our practices concerning anonymization and off-the-record 
information. We make some concrete proposals on how to deal with the 
tension between protecting respondents and scientific transparency. In the 
final pages of the book, we give a carefully qualified list of ‘do’s and 
don’ts’, distilled from our reflections in each chapter.
Who We Are
This book is a product of the ERC-funded research project Authoritarianism 
in a Global Age, based at the University of Amsterdam, which comprises 
four postdoctoral researchers, two PhD candidates, a junior researcher, 
and the principal investigator. For this project, we have done field research 
on aspects of authoritarianism in China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and 
Morocco, and on subnational authoritarianism in India and Mexico, from 
2015 to 2017. Our inclusion of India and Mexico in this volume requires 
some explanation: after the transition to democracy of many countries of 
Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, political scientists came to the 
realization that in many of these contexts, the transition remained geo-
graphically uneven. Regions and states within a national federation suc-
ceeded in remaining authoritarian, even while national-level politics 
became pluralist and more respectful of civil and political rights. This 
insight spawned the concepts of ‘subnational authoritarianism’ or ‘subna-
tional undemocratic regions’ (O’Donnell 1993; Gibson 2005; Durazo 
Herrmann 2010; Gervasoni 2010), which have since also been applied to 
regions in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (McMann 2006), the Philippines (Sidel 
2014), and India (Tudor and Ziegfeld 2016). When we refer, in this book, 
to India and Mexico as authoritarian contexts, we specifically have Gujarat, 
India, and Veracruz, Mexico, where our fieldwork took place, in mind. 
But these are not the only subnational authoritarian regions in these two 
countries, and indeed there are many such regions worldwide. While there 
are some important empirical and theoretical differences between national 
authoritarian states and subnational regions, we have found that as field-
work contexts, they are not so different, and we believe that many of our 
experiences and recommendations are applicable to such regions more 
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generally. In other words, such regions within formal democracies should 
be treated as ‘authoritarian fields’. Indeed, as will become clear, the 
Veracruz context was probably the most brutally repressive one we inves-
tigated in this project. In our broader project, we also investigated the 
effect authoritarian rule continues to have on its citizens beyond borders 
(Glasius 2018; Dalmasso 2018; Del Sordi 2018; Michaelsen 2016), and 
we occasionally refer to this field of research in Europe too. We also draw 
on our collective fieldwork experience from previous projects, in the coun-
tries mentioned above as well as in the authoritarian or transition contexts 
of Cameroon, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Tunisia, and the short-lived 
‘Tamil Eelam’ controlled by the Tamil Tigers. Hence, we bring together a 
tremendous amount of fresh, cross-regional experience in the authoritar-
ian field, as well as rich knowledge of the relevant political science and area 
studies literature. We have devoted frequent group sessions both to pre-
paring for our fieldwork, and to reflecting on our experiences afterwards. 
We were helped tremendously with this by the three ethical advisors we 
sought out to think through our dilemmas: Marcel van der Heijden, pro-
gram manager at HIVOS and an expert on Central Asia and the Middle 
East; Dirk Kruijt, professor emeritus at the University of Utrecht and an 
expert on Latin America and the Caribbean; and Malcolm Smart, a human 
rights professional who has managed various regional and other programs 
for Amnesty International, Article 19, and Human Rights Watch. We take 
this opportunity to thank them for their advice and support. These discus-
sions between ourselves and with our advisors, and the realization that in 
previous projects we had not had the benefit either of written guidance, or 
of an exchange of experiences and practices, gave rise to this book.
Our reflections and recommendations in this book are based on our 
individual experiences. Where many of us have very similar experiences, 
not only during the fieldwork for this project but also in previous field-
work episodes, we have taken the liberty of abstracting from these inci-
dents or practices and formulated more general findings. Wherever 
possible, we have engaged with the existing literature so as to be on firmer 
ground in our quest for generalization. In many other instances in this 
book, where our experiences are more varied, contradictory, or even 
unique, we just describe what our practice is or what has happened to us 
as an individual experience. Importantly, we want to emphasize that one 
should not read the experiences of, for instance, our China or Iran 
researcher, as ‘this is what it is like to do field research in China’, or ‘this 
has been the experience of political scientists going into Iran’. It is not just 
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the country context but also the political timing of our research; our 
research agenda; the kinds of respondents we seek out; characteristics such 
as our gender, age, and nationality; and even our personality that feed into 
the experiences we have. Nonetheless, even where we are reluctant to gen-
eralize from our experience, we believe the collection of incidents and 
routines we put forward here will be helpful to others in orienting them-
selves on future fieldwork, or reflecting on past fieldwork, and contributes 
to building up a sedimentation of experiences in the authoritarian field.
WhAT is The AuThoriTAriAn Field?
The expression ‘authoritarian field’, which we used for the title of this 
book, has two different meanings. First of all, it is a field of academic 
research. As such, it denotes the study of authoritarian rule as an object of 
research, and those academics, primarily political scientists, who are its 
students. There are different ways of studying authoritarianism: histori-
cally, empirically with quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods, or 
(more rarely) purely theoretically. Second, the ‘authoritarian field’ is a 
place where academics and others spend time to gather research data. As 
such, it refers to territories under the jurisdiction of governments that are 
authoritarian in the senses outlined below: they fail to conduct fully free 
and fair elections, they curtail freedom of expression and freedom of asso-
ciation, and most importantly for our experience, there is some arbitrari-
ness to their governance, resulting in various forms of insecurity for those 
who reside in or enter such territories. As we already mentioned, authori-
tarian jurisdiction is not always coterminous with the borders of a state, 
and in fact authoritarian power need not be strictly territorial (Glasius 
2018; Cooley and Heathershaw 2017), but mostly what we discuss in this 
book does concern conditions within the borders of an authoritarian 
polity.
We as authors are ‘in the authoritarian field’ in both senses: we gather 
data in places that are under authoritarian rule, and our object of study is 
also authoritarian rule. For the purposes of this book, we use the expres-
sion ‘authoritarian field’ in the second sense: as a geographical space struc-
tured by particular sociopolitical features. When we discuss the authoritarian 
field as an object of study, we use ‘authoritarianism’ or ‘authoritarian rule’. 
Along with the rest of the political science profession, we tend sometimes 
to think of our field as divided into quantitative and qualitative, and to 
equate the latter orientation with going into the ‘authoritarian field’ in the 
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second sense. This is an unhelpful oversimplification. It overlooks the 
 contribution of historical studies, which may be desk-based, but may also 
involve fieldwork to get to relevant archives (see, for instance, Thøgersen 
2006; Tsourapas 2015, 2016). Equally, quantitative research can be based 
on surveys or statistics that can only be gathered in the field. Three of us 
have experience with conducting surveys in the authoritarian field, and we 
will reflect on those experiences here. Nonetheless, most of our fieldwork 
revolves around conducting interviews, which we believe also reflects the 
most prevalent source of data among our fieldworker colleagues. We 
therefore focus particularly on interviewing (in Chap. 4) and handling 
transcripts (in Chap. 6).
hoW We experience AuThoriTAriAnism
Definitional matters get surprisingly little attention in authoritarianism 
research, but that is a topic for another publication (Glasius Forthcoming). 
A minimum definition that political scientists subscribe to is that authori-
tarianism is characterized by the absence of free and fair competition in 
elections. The contexts we investigate do indeed have in common the 
absence of fully free and fair elections. However, for understanding the 
specific challenges of authoritarian fieldwork, this is not a particularly help-
ful point of reference. A broader, less universally agreed definition of 
authoritarianism insists that apart from the lack of free and fair elections, 
authoritarian regimes are also characterized by violations of the right to 
freedom of expression and access to information, and freedom of associa-
tion. This begins to give us some better clues as to the specificity of the 
authoritarian field, but it too provides limited insight into what the 
authoritarian field is like as a research context.
In other publications, we have provided analyses of many aspects of the 
various authoritarian regimes we study. Here, we want to take the oppor-
tunity to share something we cannot fully communicate in our substantive 
work: how we experience authoritarianism in our fieldwork. While a focus 
on elections simply is not relevant for understanding everyday life, a focus 
on civil rights violations might cause us to envisage authoritarian-ruled 
states as giant prison camps. We may get fixated on a notion of agents of 
the state who are constantly and single-mindedly involved in arresting dis-
sidents, harassing journalists, closing down websites or breaking up dem-
onstrations. Indeed, some of us have found that by using authoritarianism 
as an analytical lens, we unintentionally constructed a monster in our 
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minds called authoritarian regime. The monster, we imagined, is out to do 
nasty things to its citizens, and perhaps to us. All of the governments we 
study do curtail freedom of expression and association, but they also pur-
sue educational policies, regulate export licenses, and worry about the 
economy; and their officials also attend summits, give rousing speeches, 
and attend to personnel matters. While there are examples of authoritarian 
regimes in which all citizens live in fear of their governments all the time 
(North Korea is the paradigmatic example), the twenty-first century 
authoritarian governance we study is more subtle, and uses repressive 
measures more sparingly. As first-time visitors, some of us needed to expe-
rience that most people are not being arrested most of the time, before 
being able to discern the more subtle ways in which the environment is 
authoritarian. This has not been our universal experience, however. Our 
Kazakhstan researcher, by contrast, having lived in Kazakhstan before she 
became an academic, was inclined to separate the analytical lens of ‘author-
itarianism’ from everyday experiences in the country, and only gradually 
became more aware of the potential risks attached to her research. Our 
China researcher, having grown up in the People’s Republic, did not need 
to discover the multidimensional realities of China, having experienced 
them from birth.
Our initial prejudices may also have led us into truncated moral judg-
ments, assuming that (all) agents of the state are the bad guys, corrupt and 
repressive, and (all) activists are the good guys. We needed to discover that 
agents of the state can be conscientious, well-informed, and willing to 
discuss the problems of their political system with us, as well as sometimes 
inviting us to look critically at the policies of democratic countries. 
Activists, we found, are often brave and impressive but can also at times be 
vain, petty, and invested in criticizing their peers as much as the govern-
ment. Another bias some of us have had to shed relates to the aspirations 
of citizens of authoritarian countries. Some citizens of authoritarian states 
do think that life is ‘better’ in democratic countries, and they would like 
to live there if they could, but many do not. Our Kazakhstan researcher 
found that for Kazakhstani students who went to study in democratic 
countries, being in an environment where civil liberties are respected was 
not automatically relevant and important to most of them. Our Iran 
researcher found that even for Iranian citizens who do deeply value human 
rights and personal freedoms, this does not necessarily mean they would 
like to go and live in the west if they could. They want to stay and change 
their own country, and if they have to leave, it is with a heavy heart.
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The feature of authoritarianism that most prominently affects our field-
work is not its repressive aspect as such, but its arbitrariness, and the 
uncertainty that results in for us and the people in our fieldwork environ-
ment. In democratic contexts, without knowing in detail all the laws of the 
land, we have a reasonable understanding of what is legal and what is 
criminal behavior. In authoritarian circumstances, it is never quite so clear 
what you can and cannot do. There are laws, many laws, but they are not 
consistently applied, they contradict each other, and executive behavior 
without legal sanction is also a possibility. This results in a sense of uncer-
tainty: you never know whether you are crossing a red line or not (for a 
longer discussion of the concept of ‘red lines’, see Chap. 3). In fact, the 
insecurity cuts both ways. People within the regime also suffer from uncer-
tainty, about the level of popular legitimacy and robustness of their regime, 
even in ostensibly very stable circumstances (an insight reflected in the 
title of Andreas Schedler’s book The Politics of Uncertainty, 2013). Our 
presence as researchers is probably a low priority within the constellation 
of self-perceived existential threats to the regime, but we cannot take this 
for granted. Most of the time, we probably will not be crossing a red line, 
but the lines are not fixed; they move, for us and for our respondents. In 
all probability, nothing will happen. But the latent threat that something 
can happen, to you or your respondents, is what is specific about authori-
tarian regimes, and hence also authoritarian fieldwork. Finally, the author-
itarian field may have a cultural element: authoritarianism is not only about 
what the state or the party does but also about how people have internal-
ized self-limitation, even while the concrete limits of free speech are set by 
the leadership, and subject to change. The arbitrary behavior of the state 
brings about feelings of mistrust, powerlessness, and uncertainty in people 
which can affect their social relations, with each other and with us.
Beyond ‘WesTerners’ And ‘locAls’
In a book like this, reflecting on our fieldwork experiences, we tend to fall 
into thinking in terms of a stereotypical dichotomy: us, westerners, who go 
to visit them, the locals, in their field. It is true that the authors of this book 
all are, or have been, employed at western universities, and we do go on 
fieldwork in authoritarian contexts, sometimes for months, but we do not 
live there. But our identities and relations to the field are a bit more varied 
than the dichotomy would suggest. As already mentioned, our China 
researcher grew up in the ‘field’ she researches. She needed time to acclima-
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tize to the culture and politics of Europe, and now approaches the field 
with more of a sense of distance, but she is not ‘a westerner’ any more than 
she is ‘a local’. Our Iran researcher, ostensibly a ‘westerner’ with his German 
passport, in fact also grew up in an ‘authoritarian field’: the German 
Democratic Republic. Our Kazakhstan researcher feels that growing up in 
Southern Italy, while certainly not authoritarian, does not fit stereotypical 
ideas of western liberal democracy either. The crucial importance of infor-
mal networks in her region of origin resembles that in the Kazakh political 
field. We mention these biographical details because we see them reflected 
in the often complex identities and relations to the field of many of our col-
leagues: some are nationals of the fields they study, many have dual nation-
ality (this seems to be especially prevalent among Iran scholars), some have 
spouses with origins in ‘the field’, some have grown up in it, and so on.
Conversely, as anthropologists have long noted, the ‘locals’ are not 
invariably rooted to the soil of the authoritarian field. We are acutely aware 
of this because the mobility of nationals of authoritarian countries is part 
of our substantive research agenda. Many of the Iranian journalists and 
bloggers who came to form our Iran researcher’s local network a decade 
ago have fled the country after the 2009 crackdown on election protests, 
and now live all over the world. Our Kazakhstan researcher has inter-
viewed Kazakhstani students during a period of study abroad, or after their 
return, and our China researcher does survey research on Chinese stu-
dents’ experience abroad. Our Morocco researcher has done research 
among Moroccans in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Hence, we 
do not find colonial images of us, intrepid travelers, who go to visit the 
natives and report back on how they behave, to correspond to our actual 
experiences. Nor do we suffer much from postcolonial guilt. In some 
cases, we experience that we are in a relation of economic privilege in rela-
tion to our respondents, but mostly, we do not. Most of the authoritarian 
countries we investigate are not particularly poor countries, and our 
respondents are not usually the marginalized in society, but members of 
the middle class, sometimes even the elite. We recognize that this may be 
different for researchers in other authoritarian contexts, or with different 
research agendas. Researching the authoritarian regimes of extremely poor 
countries, such as Eritrea or Tajikistan, or vulnerable groups, such as 
undocumented migrants, religious minorities, or indigenous people, may 
throw up ethical questions that we have not had to face. Nonetheless, we 
are privileged in a political sense: our affiliations to western universities, 
and for most of us our passports, often give us greater protection from the 
authoritarian state than its residents have. Moreover, if we ever feel that 
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the authoritarian field gets to be too oppressive or dangerous to us, we can 
get on a plane, usually from one day to the next, and get beyond the reach 
of the state we study. None of us have had to exercise that option, but it is 
there. For most of the people we come into contact with, it is not.
hoW We WroTe This Book
Writing a book with eight people is not like writing alone or with a small 
number of co-authors, but it can be done. In fact we recommend the 
experience for research groups that have worked closely together, as a way 
of capturing the accumulated knowledge. Since we all use interviews as 
our primary material in our own research, we naturally turned to inter-
views as the most appropriate way to structure the writing process: we 
interviewed ourselves. We first brainstormed about what topics should be 
covered in the book and came to a provisional table of contents. Then, the 
project leader and the project assistant came up with a list of interview 
questions, which was amended by the six other researchers, who have 
done all the fieldwork in this project. The project assistant proceeded to 
have in-depth interviews with the six researchers, often over two sessions, 
yielding about eighteen hours of interview material. The six field research-
ers edited the project assistant’s interview transcripts and cut and pasted 
them into the table of contents. The project assistant also placed relevant 
passages from existing literature into this format. The project leader then 
produced first drafts of each chapter, which were in turn discussed with, 
and edited and commented on by, the six field researchers. We also com-
missioned comments from a number of our colleagues at the University of 
Amsterdam, all experienced fieldworkers, on different draft chapters. We 
would like to thank Julia Bader, Farid Boussaid, Marieke de Goede, Julian 
Gruin, Imke Harbers, Beste Isleyen, Vivienne Matthies-Boon, Polly 
Pallister-Wilkins, Abbey Steele, and Nel Vandekerckhove for their com-
ments. After a second round of edits, the full text was submitted for review. 
We gratefully acknowledge our anonymous reviewer for the helpful com-
ments, both on the proposal and on the draft manuscript of the book.
Who This Book is For
This book should be essential reading to those readers who, like the 
authors, are in the authoritarian field in both senses. For academics who 
study authoritarianism on the basis of desk-based research, this book will 
help them to better understand the ways of working of their colleagues 
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who do fieldwork, and perhaps consider it for themselves, or in collabora-
tion, in mixed-methods projects. Fieldwork research has in the past some-
times been treated as an art form rather than a method, something that 
cannot be taught. While we do think it involves a certain amount of learn-
ing by doing, we do not want it to be approached as an occult pursuit. We 
expect this book to be especially useful for junior scholars, such as PhD 
researchers or researchers exploring the topic of authoritarianism for the 
first time, but we aspire to speak to senior scholars as well. Even if the 
recent reflective turn in qualitative methods comes too late for you to be 
‘trained’ in them, it is never too late to explicitly reflect on the merits and 
drawbacks of one’s approach to field research, and our work can serve as a 
source of comparison in this respect.
The first four chapters of this book will also be valuable to academics 
who (aim to) spend time in the authoritarian field but whose research does 
not revolve around authoritarianism. Social scientists who study agricul-
tural or trade policy, forest management, gender, or religion in authoritar-
ian contexts are likely at some point to find themselves confronted with 
the sensitivities of the authoritarian state. Even beyond the social sciences, 
scholars of archeology, climate change, or epidemiology who are in the 
authoritarian field will need to have some engagement with local policy- 
makers, and will profit from having a social awareness of the context in 
which they find themselves. Researchers may find themselves caught in 
politics, even though they never intended to investigate the political 
aspects of a given topic. We can think, for instance, of a linguist studying 
the Tamazight languages of North Africa, who suddenly finds that her 
extensive contact with the people who speak it is a source of suspicion to 
the authorities, or a biologist who is interested in the fish population in 
the Yangtze river and discovers that the disappearance of certain species 
due to pollution is a politically sensitive topic.
Chapters 5 and 6, which deal with mental impact and with anonymiza-
tion of sources respectively, will be of interest to other categories of schol-
ars. Academics who work with vulnerable groups in society, such as drug 
users, sex workers, or undocumented migrants, or with groups that engage 
in illegal or controversial behaviors, such as criminal gangs or racist move-
ments, may be confronted with the negative mental impact of living 
through traumatic incidents or hearing hard stories. The same may be true 
for scholars who investigate the repressive or secretive aspects of demo-
cratic states, such as the practices of secret services, anti-terrorist policies, 
or counterinsurgency training. Scholarship on all these topics also faces 
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the challenge of how to deal with anonymity in the face of an increasing 
call for transparency, just as we do, and they may consider to what extent 
our practices and recommendations are applicable for their fields.
Finally, beyond the academy, we expect some chapters of this book to 
make useful reading for policy-makers, civil society practitioners, business 
people, or journalists who find themselves in the authoritarian field, or 
dealing with authoritarian state authorities. Some may have a more diffi-
cult experience: as we describe in more detail in Chaps. 2 and 4, there are 
important differences between our work and that of journalists and human 
rights investigators in particular, which may cause them to have a harder 
time. On the other hand, valued technical experts or cultural journalists 
may experience much less in the way of political impediments or sensitivi-
ties than we have done. Nonetheless, for anyone who expects to have 
significant interactions with locals in the authoritarian field, there is rele-
vant guidance in this book regarding the need to spend time getting used 
to the sociopolitical as much as the physical climate (Chap. 2), to develop 
a sensitivity to the ‘red lines’ (Chap. 3), and to build trust with interlocu-
tors (Chap. 4). Chapter 5 may be of interest to human rights and humani-
tarian workers, to compare our experiences and recommendations to the 
practices that have been developed in their own fields. Chapter 6 may be 
of interest to journalists, who face similar trade-offs between protecting 
sources and being transparent.
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Abstract In this chapter, we deal with authoritarian field research in rela-
tion to ethics procedures (or lack thereof!), visas, and permits, and what 
we do in advance to prepare for an optimal, and optimally safe, fieldwork 
period. We acknowledge that fieldwork in authoritarian contexts is mostly 
not very dangerous for researchers, but it can be. We discuss the particular 
nature of authoritarian fieldwork risks, the concrete risks we ourselves and 
others have faced, and what we can do to assess and mitigate those risks. 
We conclude that while we should be aware of risk and try to minimize it, 
we need to accept that risk cannot be eliminated if we want to engage in 
authoritarian fieldwork.
Keywords Authoritarianism • Field research • Risk • Fieldwork ethics 
• Safety • Access
In this chapter, we discuss our preparations for entering the field and our 
handling of the risks associated with authoritarian fieldwork. In terms of 
preparations, we deal with experiences with the ethics procedures (or lack 
thereof!) of universities and funders, the vagaries of visa requirements, and 
what we do in advance to prepare for an optimal, and optimally safe, field-
work period. We discuss the particular nature of authoritarian fieldwork 
risks, the concrete risks we ourselves and others have faced, and what we 
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can do to assess and mitigate those risks. We will conclude that while we 
should be aware of risk and try to minimize it, we need to accept that it 
cannot be eliminated if we want to engage in authoritarian fieldwork.
Ethics ProcEdurEs
Authoritarian field research poses a number of ethical challenges. The 
most prominent of these is undoubtedly the potential risk to our respon-
dents, but risk to ourselves, issues of informed consent, and potential mis-
use of findings by authoritarian regimes are also among them. We deal 
with such issues, and with what we hold to constitute ethical behavior, 
throughout this book. But we also operate in institutional environments, 
which sometimes come with their own ethical review procedures. We have 
found great variance in the appropriateness and comprehensiveness of 
such procedures. We recognize a general reflex among academics to con-
sider ethical review as just another bureaucratic nuisance. However, it is 
our shared experience that, when well-designed, ethical reviews can be 
extremely useful in pushing us to reflect on ethical implications of our 
research. Our Kazakhstan researcher, for instance, asked colleagues who 
had done fieldwork research in Central Asia before what they had done to 
keep interview material confidential, and whether they had trained research 
assistants on ethical matters, in order to meet the ethics requirements of 
her co-author’s US university, which funded the research. She would 
never have asked colleagues these questions if the Internal Review Board’s 
questions had not required her to describe the procedures she would use. 
We also have some experience with less appropriate ethical review proce-
dures, and considerable experience with a complete absence of ethical 
review procedures.
We have on occasion experienced ethical review as a bureaucratic nui-
sance ourselves: our current funder, the European Research Council 
(ERC), for instance insisted, after most of the fieldwork had already taken 
place, on receiving a copy of the interview protocols of each our field 
researchers. We dutifully supplied sample protocols for each researcher, 
but we do not believe these to be particularly meaningful. As every quali-
tative researcher knows, every interview is slightly different from the last, 
and we never stick precisely to the script. We also have some doubt as to 
whether the ethics auditors who asked for the interview guides actually 
went on to peruse them. This example, we would put in the category of 
harmless bureaucratic nuisance: we do not think the request was  particularly 
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useful, but it did not cost us a huge amount of time, and it did not in any 
way interfere with our own views of what is ethical.
Ethical review procedures can become really problematic, however, 
when their existence actually causes us to behave less ethically than we 
otherwise would. This can come about in response to ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
procedures, without an understanding of the particularities of qualitative 
social science research in general, or of the specific challenges of authori-
tarian field research. Much depends on who conducts the review. Thus, 
our funder, the ERC, uses a form that asks whether ‘the proposal meets 
the national legal and ethical requirements of the country where the 
research will be performed’ and whether ‘approval of the proposed study 
by a relevant authority at national level’ will be sought. Fortunately, our 
ethical auditors ticked both boxes as ‘yes’, while indicating in writing their 
acceptance of our explanations why we could not guarantee to always be 
in compliance with national law, or get formal approval from state authori-
ties (see also below). They also accepted our argument that under the 
circumstances, oral consent was more appropriate than signatures on con-
sent forms (see also Wall and Overton 2006, 64). Had the ethics review 
been conducted by someone with less understanding of the particularities 
of authoritarianism research, we might have had difficulties getting clear-
ance. We do not know of any instances where an ethical review procedure 
actually prohibited a scholar from undertaking authoritarian field research 
(but see Matelski 2014, who mentions a case relating to Myanmar). A 
more frequently encountered problem is that, by making impossible 
requests, review boards may actually ‘encourage obfuscation’ rather than 
transparency (Wall and Overton 2006, 62). We know of a colleague work-
ing in African contexts for instance, who had been taught by his well- 
respected PhD supervisor to produce counterfeit informed consent forms, 
because their university required them, even in contexts where they would 
be quite inappropriate and perhaps even unethical.
While we have no personal experience of ethical reviews making impos-
sible demands, we have considerable experience of operating in universi-
ties that have no ethical review procedures whatsoever. Three of the four 
postdoctoral researchers in our project encountered neither ethics proce-
dures nor any ethics training during their PhD trajectory. Our Morocco 
researcher went on to work for two other European universities without 
encountering any institutional engagement with research ethics. The 
researchers in question do not believe they have made fatal ethical mis-
takes in their research, but the lack of institutional awareness of ethical 
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concerns did sometimes make them feel unprepared for problems and 
dilemmas they encountered in the field. Moreover, it meant that there was 
no obvious person or body to consult on these matters; they were left to 
figure them out on their own, without much experience.
In general then, we would argue for engaged ethics procedures, prefer-
ably with an element of human interaction, that force us to reflect on ethi-
cal challenges we might encounter without turning into a bureaucratic 
box-ticking exercise. We would urge academics to push for such proce-
dures, not only when they face procedures that are too rigid but also 
where they encounter an absence of either training or clearance reviews.
GaininG Entry: PErmits and Visas
As part of the ethics procedures described above, some universities and 
grant-making institutions insist that researchers should seek prior permis-
sion to do research from some authority in the country where their field-
work is to take place. There may, in general, be circumstances in which 
requiring such permission is quite justified, for instance, when doing 
research related to a country’s natural resources or conducting medical 
trials. When it comes to the social sciences, we believe that there is no 
general justifiable need for such permission, but there may be circum-
stances in which it is reasonable for the state to limit entry. Loyle (2016, 
927), for instance, describes how Rwanda instituted a permit system ‘in 
part as a response to rampant and unchecked social and scientific research 
that was conducted in the country post-1994 with limited regard for the 
health and psychological well-being of research participants’. Today how-
ever, Loyle points out, the ‘process serves as a high-cost barrier to research 
in Rwanda’, and severely constrains research on subjects of sensitivity to 
the government.
Below we describe some of our own practices when gaining entry, and 
the restrictions and ambiguities in state policies on permission for research 
we encountered. With one exception, none of us have ever sought govern-
ment permission for our research on authoritarianism, or applied for a 
research visa. Such an official request, if there is even a dedicated proce-
dure to process it, would only serve to attract the authorities’ attention to 
our research, arouse suspicion, and most likely result in a denial. For 
Morocco, for instance, there is a procedure, and one is formally required 
to ask for permission to do research in the country. But getting permission 
can take months and sometimes it is just not given. To our knowledge, 
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most Maghreb researchers do not apply for it. India officially requires a 
research visa, but despite being formally democratic, it is very restrictive in 
giving out visas for any politically sensitive research, such as in our case 
repression in the context of subnational authoritarianism, but also, for 
instance, on the Maoist insurgency or other armed groups, or any research 
on Kashmir.
Our first visit to the field was often different from subsequent experi-
ences in terms of our purpose for going. Our Iran researcher came primar-
ily to study the language, our Kazakhstan researcher was working for an 
international organization, and our India researcher felt that, as a master 
student, the line between just ‘hanging out’ as someone who is interested 
in the country and being there as an academic researcher was still quite 
fluid. Once we were set on our career course, this kind of convenient 
ambiguity has tended to dissipate. Even our China researcher, a Chinese 
national who grew up in the country, now clearly goes as a researcher, not 
just someone visiting home.
So, how do we enter the country nowadays? Sometimes, we go on 
tourist visa. Tourist-friendly countries like Malaysia, Morocco, or Mexico 
make it very easy to enter the country—indeed Europeans can stay in 
Morocco for three months without even applying for a visa. There is 
something uneasy about doing research on a tourist visa or without a per-
mit, especially where a research visa or permit does in fact exist. But a 
tourist visa does not imply that we are treating the purpose of our presence 
as a secret. We all carry letters from our home universities, signed by a 
head of department or university official, explaining our research, but we 
have rarely had occasion to produce them. Our Morocco researcher writes 
‘study, work and tourism’ or ‘work and tourism’ on her immigration form. 
Our India and Mexico researcher has conducted interviews with local 
policemen and magistrates while on a tourist visa. The experience is that 
state officials are not in the habit of questioning whether one has a research 
visa or permit: how you came into the country is not really their concern. 
Nonetheless, the lack of an official stamp of approval can make us vulner-
able, or at least make us feel vulnerable. Our Morocco researcher applied 
for official approval for her research on Salafists after experiencing intru-
sive surveillance, an experience detailed in Chap. 5. She applied not 
because she expected to get permission (and indeed she never received a 
response to the request) but simply in order to signal that she was not 
doing clandestine research.
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For other countries, such as China, Iran, or Kazakhstan, getting any type 
of visa requires more bureaucratic effort, and moreover, there is a realistic 
risk of being denied entry. To some of us, the restrictive visa policies seem 
like part and parcel of the system of authoritarian control: the government 
wants to strictly monitor who enters, and who does what in the country. In 
post-Soviet countries in particular, it is not just the entry visa. One needs to 
regularly register one’s exact whereabouts, with a hotel or with the migra-
tion police. Having said that, as western researchers we may too easily read 
authoritarianism into such requirements, and forget the often draconian 
procedures of our own authorities vis-à-vis non- residents. Our China 
researcher, when she first came to the United Kingdom from China, also 
had to register with the local authorities at the police station.
An important commonality in our experiences with gaining entry is ambi-
guity: the rules are unclear, they keep changing, or they are applied unevenly. 
Our Iran researcher is pretty certain that the lack of response to his request for 
a study visa in 2015 was not politically motivated, but just a matter of sloppi-
ness, the application had been delayed or forgotten somewhere, and he was 
quickly issued a tourist visa instead. At the same time, Iran researchers do 
regularly have their visa denied on what are likely to be political grounds. Even 
some researchers with long-term relationships and networks have still been 
denied. Our China researcher can freely leave and enter the country, but she 
has seen that the treatment of foreign scholars by the Chinese government 
appears quite arbitrary: a colleague whose visa application was rejected reap-
plied two weeks later and was accepted. A US-based scholar working on Tibet 
was rejected, which seems unsurprising in itself, but then another researcher 
working on the same topic was accepted at almost the same time. In 
Kazakhstan, entry has actually become easier in recent years, with visa-free 
regimes offered for short stays. But the bottom line, in Kazakhstan as in other 
authoritarian contexts, is that the bureaucratic requirements are never quite 
stable and transparent, and this in itself creates the kind of legal uncertainty 
that appears to be one of the hallmarks of authoritarian rule. Most authoritari-
anism scholars gain access to their fieldwork sites most of the time, but denial 
of entry is always a possibility, and even expulsion is never unthinkable.
constrainEd choicEs
Our choices of fieldwork countries, and of research topics, are in part 
determined by what is possible, and safe. Little is in fact known about what 
drives fieldwork choices. Clark’s (2006) valuable survey of difficulties 
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faced by researchers in the Middle East and North Africa only showed 16% 
of respondents specifying ‘the political situation’ and safety as contributing 
to their country choices, and did not distinguish between repression and 
other safety risks. A more recent study on the political risks of field research 
in Central Asia found that ‘(s)everal respondents reported that they no 
longer work in Uzbekistan’ and a ‘few respondents singled out 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan as sites where they have experienced signifi-
cant censorship/restrictions, chosen not to go, or experienced difficulty 
going’(CESS 2016, 7). Goode (2010) initially discerned a relation 
between Russia becoming more autocratic and a decline in fieldwork, but 
qualified his conclusions in a later study of the broader region (Goode 
2016). Nonetheless, we would logically expect the most repressive regimes 
within the authoritarian universe to be less likely settings for field research: 
either because it would be too dangerous, or simply because it is impossi-
ble to gain access. Similarly, assessments of feasibility and risk are likely to 
constrain the choice of research topics and research questions. We do not 
expand on this point, since it has been dealt with extensively by the contri-
butions to Observing Autocracies from the Ground Floor (Goode and 
Ahram 2016). At the level of our own considerations and observations of 
colleagues, the notion of constrained country choices, and associated 
knowledge gaps, seems to have validity. Our Kazakhstan researcher for 
instance made a clear choice, within Central Asia, not to do research in 
Uzbekistan for safety reasons. We know no one who has done fieldwork in 
Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, or North Korea. We know colleagues who 
have started doing research in Myanmar only after it democratized from 
2011. And more dramatically, we know many colleagues who have abruptly 
stopped doing research in Egypt when it became much more repressive in 
recent years.
not so danGErous
Field research in authoritarian settings is by no means the most dangerous 
kind of social science research one can imagine. Research on organized 
crime, or in the middle of civil war, is likely to be more dangerous. The 
risks that a foreign academic runs in an authoritarian country are also 
incomparable to the risks run by local activists, because of both compo-
nents, ‘foreign’ and ‘academic’. We write academic books and journals, 
the tone is balanced, the jargon complex. We do not usually express out-
rage in our academic work. Moreover, more often than not, we write in 
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English and not in a local language that is easily accessible to the popula-
tion. Both foreign journalists and local academics are typically more at risk 
than we are. A different matter is the risk we may pose to our respondents, 
an issue we consider in more depth in Chaps. 4 and 6.
Gentile distinguishes between two types of security risk in authoritarian 
contexts: ‘crime-related risks, [in which] the state is, or at least should be, 
your “friend”’ and ‘risks in which the state (the secret services, internal 
security forces and the like) is your “enemy”’ (Gentile 2013, 427). We 
would add two further categories: risks resulting from crisis situations and 
risks that are related to the authoritarian contexts in more indirect or 
ambiguous ways. We do not discuss the first type of risk, which does not 
specifically relate to our position as researchers in the authoritarian field. 
Along with all other preparations, researchers should of course make 
themselves aware of the crime profile of the places where they are to do 
research and take relevant precautions. We devote most attention to the 
first, ‘classic authoritarian’ type of risk, but will also address ‘crisis risk’ and 
‘indirect risk’.
Depending on which county one investigates, and especially which 
topic, a researcher may need to prepare for being under electronic or phys-
ical surveillance (see also Chap. 5), for being interviewed by security 
agents (see Gentile 2013), and for being warned off certain activities or 
topics. All these things have happened to us. It is rare for a researcher to 
be arrested, detained, or expelled, and slightly less rare but still unusual to 
be denied entry. These things have not happened to us. Clark’s (2006) 
survey, mentioned above, despite the modest number of responses (55) 
gives some insight into the frequency of such events, at least in the Middle 
East and North Africa: ‘22% of the researchers noted that they at one 
point had difficulties gaining entry to the countries of research or obtain-
ing research visas due to the perceived political sensitivity of their topics by 
the host governments. Others reported that they had experienced the 
threat or actual seizure of their research data (5%), surveillance and moni-
toring by security (4%), arrest and/or detention (4%), and police harass-
ment (2%)’. The recent Central Asia survey, without giving exact 
percentages, similarly reports ‘ten first-hand accounts of arrest and 
 detention by state officials and a further seventeen of various forms of 
harassment of the researcher or assistants’ among a few hundred respon-
dents (CESS 2016, 8).
Ahram and Goode (2016, 839) discuss the case of 13 China scholars 
who were denied visas after publishing a book on Xinjiang province, as 
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well as the arrest of Alexander Sodiqov, a PhD student who was arrested 
on suspicion of treason and held for over a month in Tajikistan (Goode 
and Ahram 2016, 828). Another incident that has attracted much atten-
tion is that of the immediate expulsion of Davenport and Stam (2009) 
from Rwanda after presenting findings on the genocide that were uncom-
fortable to the government. There have also been a few recent cases of 
expulsion of Russia scholars, specifically those who study archives, but 
according to the US embassy in Moscow, the incidents concern a ‘very 
small minority of the large number of Western academics who travel and 
study in Russia’ (Schreck 2015). While it is difficult to generalize about 
visa denials, expulsion remains a matter of relative rarity, and arrest even 
more so, in most authoritarian contexts.
and yEt it can BE danGErous
There have been some very worrying recent cases of arrest and detention of 
social scientists in Iran. Homa Hoodfar, an anthropologist, was held for 
almost four months and then released in 2016. She coped with prison bru-
tality by dealing with the situation as unintended ‘fieldwork’ (Kassam 2016). 
Most recently and dramatically, Xiyue Wang, a PhD student in history at 
Princeton University, was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment on charges 
of spying after having already spent a year in prison (Gladstone 2017).
So far, we have not distinguished between foreign visitors such as 
Davenport and Stam, and dual nationals or nationals investigating their 
own country, such as Sodiqov or Hoodfar. Since we are dealing with rare 
occurrences, we cannot systematically compare, but it seems likely that the 
latter two groups and especially nationals are likely to be more vulnerable 
to the risks we have outlined, since their treatment is less likely to lead to 
diplomatic intervention, even though their home university might exert 
itself on their behalf. Moreover, even apart from the risk of arrest, the 
impact of expulsion or visa denial on them may be much greater, entailing 
not just an enforced change of country specialism but being cut off from 
homeland and loved ones. As for local academics, they fall into a different 
category altogether, which is not the subject of this book. For them, many 
research topics are likely to be proscribed, and in most cases, research on 
their country’s authoritarian system as such will not be possible.
The death of Giulio Regeni, a PhD student at the University of Cambridge 
who was tortured to death whilst doing fieldwork on trade unionism in 
Egypt in 2016, sent shockwaves through our community of researchers. It 
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was one of the reasons that propelled us to write this book. He was killed 
for doing exactly what we do. Contrary to some portrayals in the press, 
Regeni was neither a clueless student, nor did he have a subversive political 
agenda. He was in close touch with academics who had tremendous local 
knowledge and made no obvious mistakes. Regeni became the victim of a 
rapidly deteriorating situation, in which mid-level security agents may 
have had, or seized, more autonomy than is usual in authoritarian settings. 
Regeni’s death and the responses to it highlight the rarity of such an 
extreme act of repression against a foreign scholar, and reminds us of our 
relative safety in comparison to our respondents in the countries we study. 
Generally, it continues to be true that it is a terrible publicity for a regime 
to harm a researcher from a western university, and therefore highly 
unlikely. But Regeni’s death is also a reminder that in doing authoritarian 
field research, we must accept a small risk that things go horribly wrong. 
The likelihood of such incidents is very low when the regime is stable, but 
increases in crisis times when the regime feels threatened and needs to 
reassert its power, such as in the aftermath of the Arab revolts, the Iranian 
Green Movement protests, or the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan. Of 
course if we can predict looming periods of instability in advance, we may 
(despite the fascination such periods hold for us as political scientists) opt 
to refrain from doing fieldwork at such times. But one of the hallmarks of 
authoritarian rule is its apparent unassailability, sometimes followed by 
sudden collapse, and scholars have had notorious difficulty predicting 
such collapse. So, we must accept the chance of unexpected crises, and 
concomitant uncharacteristic behavior from state agents, as one of the 
known unknowns associated with authoritarian field research.
Possibly the most dangerous work within our group was carried out 
within an ostensibly democratic context (at least at the national level): in 
Veracruz, Mexico. The research focused on the subnational authoritarian 
rule of this region, and in particular on the repression of critical journal-
ists, several of whom had been found murdered in the previous years. The 
risks he anticipated were only in part connected to the subnational author-
itarian context and the researcher’s plans. A white young man could be 
taken for an oil executive (lucrative for kidnapping purposes), or, more 
connected to politically sensitive interviewing, for a US Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) official. An important generalizable point here is that there 
is no obvious correlation (nor, we hasten to add, an inverse correlation) 
between how authoritarian a state or regional context is and how vulner-
able a researcher may be to criminal violence.
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assEssinG risk in adVancE
One obvious source of information in preparing for fieldwork in authori-
tarian contexts is human rights reports, or conversations with human 
rights activists. A problem with this kind of information, however, is that 
it reports on only one dimension of a multidimensional political system: its 
human rights record. The purpose of human rights reports is not to give a 
would-be researcher a balanced and personalized sense of risk. It is impor-
tant for researchers to know about censorship and about dissidents in 
prison but also to get past identifying a regime solely with its censors and 
prisons, especially when their research questions focus on issues other than 
repression. When a human rights organization uses an expression like ‘cul-
ture of fear’, for instance, we should take it seriously, but not assume a 
priori that we will indeed find all our potential respondents terrified. Only 
particular groups will come in for harsh repression, and our likely respon-
dents may not belong to such groups. As Pepinsky has written about 
Malaysia, in many contexts, ‘(m)ost not-very-vocal critics will live their 
lives completely unmolested by the security forces’, and will find living 
under authoritarianism ‘tolerable’ (Pepinsky 2017).
A similar caveat should be made about the security briefings of our 
foreign ministries. They are typically written with tourists, perhaps busi-
nesspeople in mind, and tend to err on the side of caution in case of any 
political instability. At the same time, they are not geared towards the very 
particular risk assessments we need to make. While it is a good idea to 
contact one’s national embassy upon arrival, it is important to be aware 
that the duties of embassy staff are (a) to maintain good relations with the 
host country and (b) to be responsible for their nationals when there is any 
kind of difficulty. Both of these roles may cause them to be conservative in 
their advice, and not overenthusiastic about political science research 
undertaken by their nationals. Just like the information from human rights 
NGOs, the advice from embassies should be seriously considered, but 
there are good reasons not to make it your primary behavioral guide (see 
also Loyle 2016, 928).
The best source of information for first-time visitors may be more expe-
rienced academics, especially those who have recently been in the field 
themselves. While some may display gatekeeper behavior, most will be 
encouraging and helpful. Loyle (2016, 929) also recommends ‘works of 
fiction and journalistic non-fiction’, and especially fiction by local authors. 
If they exist in a language accessible to you, such sources can be great for 
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conveying a sense of the culture (including, sometimes, the political cul-
ture) you are about to enter. Of course, they should not usually be relied 
on for topical analysis of recent political developments.
Our Malaysia researcher initially overestimated the dangers of his field 
research, which involved interviews especially with social movement activ-
ists. Describing himself as ‘starting from zero’, he discussed the risks of 
this fieldwork with various social scientists and a human rights activist 
about before going. He asked them what with hindsight seemed to him 
naïve questions: are activist leaders known by name, can you openly e-mail 
them? Nonetheless, he soon discovered that in Malaysia too, there are 
limits to how openly one can investigate anti-government protest.
The Iran researcher’s preparations were very much colored by the 
events that had occurred towards the end of his PhD research: many of the 
activists he had interviewed and befriended had been forced into exile 
after the failure of Iran’s Green Movement. Moreover, he had not returned 
for five years and had published critically on Iran in western media in the 
meantime. The advice he received from Iranian contacts was ambiguous. 
He went ahead with his visit, which turned out to be not very dangerous, 
but not very productive either, as we will elaborate in later chapters.
Because of the heightened security concerns, our Mexico researcher 
proceeded with his research in stages: starting in the capital and taking 
time to take advice from a relevant human rights organization, before 
proceeding to the more risky subnational context of Veracruz. When he 
arrived, both the human rights organization in the capital and the local 
representative of an international security consultancy were aware of his 
whereabouts and the nature of his research. This did not guarantee that 
nothing would happen. But it did mean that if there were an arrest, a 
threat, an assault, the local actors with the most appropriate local exper-
tise, and with at least some clout, could immediately be involved.
Our repeat visitors, now country experts, all prepare in similar ways: 
they read local news and keep up their network, speaking to local friends 
and colleagues on a regular basis. In this regard, there is not a clear distinc-
tion between continually updating their substantive knowledge of the 
political developments and assessing the risks associated with the next 
fieldwork trip. Even our China researcher, born and bred in China, con-
stantly updates her sense of the trends and patterns in how much space 
there is for social scientists to do their work. She talks to trusted friends 
and colleagues on Chinese social media, practicing her interview questions 
and honing her sense of what can be said to whom.
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GoinG thE anthroPoloGist Way
And yet, until you go you cannot really prepare. Our experience is that, for 
a first visit especially, it is best not to want too much, too soon. Take time 
to adjust to your environment. Read local papers; have some conversations 
with the proverbial taxi drivers. Take a language class. Exploratory talks 
are necessary, background conversations to orient oneself on what is safe 
for oneself and others. Visit your embassy, perhaps an international orga-
nization. Talk to some foreign journalists, some local academics.
More than in relatively democratic settings, authoritarian fieldwork 
requires caution, patience, and the willingness to accept that it is not 
always possible to interview those one wants to speak to, or ask them the 
questions one had planned to ask (see also Loyle 2016, 930–932; 
Malekzadeh 2016, 863–864; Markowitz 2016, 900–901 on creativity and 
flexibility in research design). The first few weeks, perhaps the entire first 
visit, may not yield immediate results. You have to go and see what is pos-
sible and slowly develop a plan to relate what you want to find out to what 
seems possible on the ground. In some contexts one can contact relative 
strangers via e-mail, but more often one depends on introductions from 
friends (see also Chap. 4). It is also important at this stage to shed assump-
tions that turn out to be oversimplifications, for instance, that demonstra-
tions are either for or against the government, or that the general 
population is either apolitical or deeply political.
Generally, we try to keep multiple people aware of our whereabouts. 
Many of us have one or more trusted local contacts, who know what we 
are doing almost on a daily basis. We stay in frequent touch with parents 
or partners, and we make sure that people at home and in the fieldwork 
country have each other’s contact details, so they can consult in case of an 
emergency. About once a week, we discuss our progress, strategy, and 
potential security risks, with a colleague at our home university.
EncountErinG thE sEcurity aPParatus
The need to take it slow, especially on a first visit, is illustrated by an early 
experience of our Malaysia researcher. In his first few days, he discovered 
that students or taxi drivers spoke much more openly about both the gov-
ernment and the main protest movement, Bersih, than he had expected. 
After five days in the country, an apparently golden opportunity fell into 
his lap: a protest was planned against a free trade agreement. Two local 
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contacts thought it would probably be fine for him to attend the demon-
stration and talk to participants—although his own embassy advised 
against it. He prepared a short survey, online as well as on paper, and 
proceeded to the demonstration bright and early. After a brief chat with 
two youngsters who planned to demonstrate, he sat down on a bench with 
one of them and pulled his survey out. Within minutes, two bulky plain-
clothes security agents sat down next to him and demanded to see his 
papers. They asked whether he had a permit, told him repeatedly that they 
could not guarantee his security, demanded his passport and proceeded to 
photograph it. They then told him to go back to his hotel, where he stayed 
the rest of the day, abandoning his plans for the survey. Two reflections 
follow from this early encounter: if this protest had not come quite so 
soon after arrival, the researcher would probably have known to keep a 
lower profile during the demonstration. At the same time, he might have 
been less intimidated by the incident, and might have had the phone num-
ber of a lawyer on hand. On a repeat visit, he successfully attended a Bersih 
demonstration.
As a PhD student, our China researcher never considered what she 
might do if security agents would want to interview her. But as a postdoc 
in our project, after hearing that various Chinese scholars and some for-
eign scholars’ Chinese students had been approached by the security ser-
vices, for a ‘cup of tea’, she began to prepare, and make, a mental list of 
what to do in such a situation. Before the second fieldwork trip for our 
project, a Chinese colleague in China told her that he had been invited to 
meet two local security agents. After talking about his own research on 
China and the EU, they asked him questions about our funder, the 
ERC. According to the colleague, it was a civil meeting and he did not feel 
any sense of threat; they did not warn him or force him to do anything. 
The agents were curious about social science research in the west in gen-
eral, but appeared to be to have two specific concerns. First, they wanted 
to understand whether the ERC was comparable to funding institutions 
(e.g. the Ford Foundation) that fund human rights activists and frequently 
touch the ‘red lines’ (see next chapter) of the Chinese government. 
Second, they wanted to understand the purpose and intentions of our 
project: why did we want to understand things about Chinese politics? 
Did we want to use our knowledge of China to instigate revolt against the 
Chinese Communist Party? Did we want to use the experience and lessons 
from the Arab spring and use social media for rebellion in China? It was 
clear that they were not worried about western social science research on 
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China in general, but concerned about certain topics that might be funded 
by ‘suspicious’ sponsors or touching ‘red lines’. Such a ‘friendly visit’ to a 
third party, indicating that a research project has somehow gotten onto 
the radar of the security services, appears to fit with the experience of some 
researchers in the post-Soviet sphere (Gentile 2013, 430) as well as 
Malekzadeh’s experience in Iran (2016, 872).
We contacted our advisors and various China scholars, western and 
local. Their and our assessment was that the inquiry into our project did 
not constitute an unacceptable risk to our China researcher. We did, how-
ever, think through likely questions that security agents might ask. The 
answers, we agreed, should be truthful, but have an apolitical slant (see 
Chap. 3). Just as Gentile (2013, 430) advises, politeness and diplomacy 
should be observed as much as possible, and in the best case, an interview 
might actually present ‘an opportunity to clarify possible misunderstand-
ings’. Only the identity of our researcher’s respondents, and details of 
what they said, should be sacrosanct. As it turned out, her fieldwork was 
entirely uneventful. She received no invitation and did not notice any 
surveillance or intrusion at all.
Some of the risky situations we have experienced are not directly but 
indirectly related to the authoritarian context. Our Iran researcher under-
went an incident of attempted extortion (which we will detail in Chap. 5), 
the motive of which may just have been personal gain, but the act was com-
mitted by a person connected to a security agency. Such a person may have, 
or at least feel they have, a higher degree of impunity in engaging in such 
behavior. Likewise, the risk of sexual harassment is something familiar to 
any solo-traveling female, but may take on a more menacing aspect when 
the agent is a state official in an authoritarian context. Our Morocco 
researcher had such an experience. She was invited by an official to a formal 
dinner where she could meet many relevant contacts, but he refused to give 
her the name of the restaurant and insisted instead that she should meet him 
for a drink at his place. Our researcher resolved the dilemma by pretending 
to accept, but a few minutes before they were supposed to meet, calling him 
to say that a previous appointment had lasted longer than expected and that 
she was too far away to make it to his home. Thus the official had no choice 
than to pick her up where she was and go directly to the restaurant. During 
the dinner, the official kept on filling her glass. Understanding what was 
happening, she realized that the last thing she wanted was to find herself 
alone with him in his car. A good tip to the waiter made it possible to have 
a taxi ready for her in front of the restaurant. Thus when he offered her a 
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lift, it took her only few seconds to politely refuse and jump into her waiting 
taxi. The incident illustrates the particular interface between gender-based 
and authoritarian risk that female researchers may face. When in doubt, it 
may be wisest to sacrifice a spontaneous research opportunity if there is a 
clear risk of harassment. The episode also suggests, however, that for a 
researcher familiar with the context, some skillful navigation can make it 
possible to grasp the opportunity whilst staying safe.
data sEcurity tradE-offs
We do not know to what extent any of us are under electronic surveillance 
from security institutions from authoritarian or indeed democratic states. 
In Chap. 5 we discuss our actual experiences with electronic surveillance; 
here we describe our preparations for it. We take it as given that, as Gentile 
puts it ‘(w)hen doing fieldwork in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes 
it is possible that phone calls, emails and letters are monitored’, and fur-
ther assume that any online activity, or documents on online servers or in 
virtual clouds, may be subject to scrutiny. Our most elaborate fieldwork 
preparations as a group related to data security, in particular contact details 
of respondents and interview transcripts. Before our fieldwork, our project 
had organized a few digital security training sessions from an expert in this 
area. With hindsight though, we have come to second-guess some of our 
initial learnings from these sessions, which were very much inspired by a 
post-Snowden focus on digital surveillance and online intrusions at the 
expense of thinking through more traditional security threats and basic 
travel precautions. One common device we had agreed on was to take two 
laptops into the field: one for web browsing, e-mails, and so on and one 
secondhand laptop that never went online, but acted almost as a type-
writer, for transcribing interviews. We would keep these separate from the 
actual contact details of these respondents.
We have found, however, that applying high levels of digital security 
also has disadvantages. Now, we tend to think data security more in 
terms of trade-offs. The first is that it is simply time-consuming and 
cumbersome. In Kazakhstan, our researcher initially used two comput-
ers and two phones, with three SIM cards. Both the China and the 
Malaysia researchers took no less than three laptops into the field, a 
heavy load. Transcribing interviews on an offline laptop protects respon-
dents from electronic surveillance and would make their identity hard to 
detect, but of course it does not offer absolute security. It also increases 
the chances of losing transcripts. Indeed, our researcher in Gujarat, 
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India had a terrible experience of this kind. Having done quite a few 
sensitive interviews with opponents of Narendra Modi, he had meticu-
lously stuck to the strategy of keeping anonymized transcriptions only 
on the offline computer, and separately on USB sticks. On his trip back, 
transferring through Abu Dhabi airport, he kept both in his hand lug-
gage. This bag was stolen—or possibly confiscated, we’ll never know—
during baggage screening at the airport. It was never recovered.
Another trade-off is that extreme security measures can actually draw 
suspicion. If you behave like a spy or agent provocateur, you are more 
likely to be suspected of being one. Our general policy has been to rely on 
the notion, accepted in most but perhaps not all authoritarian contexts, 
that social science research is a legitimate enterprise (see also Chap. 3), and 
we engage in it openly, but we have a professional duty to protect our 
data, and usually also the identity of our respondents. Indeed, our Iran 
researcher was advised against bringing a second laptop because it might 
raise suspicion, and decided not to bring one. Likewise, our Kazakhstan 
researcher gave up using the second laptop after a while. She came to the 
conclusion that, given that her research topic was not particularly sensi-
tive, the risk of raising red flags during passport control by having a second 
laptop actually outweighed the benefits of better protection from elec-
tronic surveillance. A final trade-off relates to how taking digital security 
measures makes us feel, an issue we will return to in Chap. 5. Precautionary 
routines may increase our sense of comfort during stressful fieldwork, but 
it can also end up making us feel unnecessarily paranoid.
The lengths we went to protect respondent identities and transcripts 
depended in part on the sensitivity of the questions we were asking, and in 
part on what was considered appropriate in the context. Our Kazakhstan 
researcher used pseudonyms for her interviews with students who had 
been on a state-sponsored study-abroad scheme, but did not encrypt them. 
In Kazakhstan, the use of encryption is subject to legal restrictions, and 
would immediately signal that one has something to hide. Moreover, some 
experts believe that the introduction of a mandatory ‘national security cer-
tificate’ for Internet users in 2015 has actually made encryption more vul-
nerable to surveillance by the security services. Since her respondents came 
from a relatively select group of people, she thinks that if somebody would 
have gotten hold of her computer, they would surely have found a way to 
connect transcripts to respondents. However, she did not ask particularly 
sensitive questions, so if a state agent had somehow come to read or listen 
to the interviews, respondents would still not have been endangered. In 
the case of Malaysia, many of the activists interviewed were well-known 
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public figures, who were comfortable going on record with everything 
they said, so there was no reason to keep the transcripts concealed offline, 
or separate them from names and contact details.
Our Iran expert by contrast, who has also interviewed activists, has taught 
himself to routinely use encryption. When he first started doing research in 
2008, he had concerns about his transcripts getting physically impounded. 
However, he did not know much about Internet surveillance at the time, 
and he would simply e-mail his transcripts to his partner back home before 
erasing them. In 2015, he erased all data from his laptop before traveling to 
Iran. Less sensitive interviews he kept on his laptop, a bit hidden away with 
nondescript file names, more sensitive ones he would encrypt.
Some of us never record interviews but rely exclusively on extensive 
notes. Notes, they say, can have the advantage of making respondents 
more comfortable but also of making the interviewer more attentive to 
what she is hearing. Others do use recordings, but not for the most sensi-
tive issues. All of us make copious notes, often in a mix of languages and 
even scripts, which are not readily intelligible to others. In case of extremely 
sensitive confidential information, we sometimes write nothing down at all 
but try to commit it to memory. There is an obvious tension here, which 
we will revisit in Chap. 6, between accuracy and transparency on the one 
hand, and protecting ourselves and our respondents on the other hand.
We went through a learning curve, from having little awareness of data 
security issues to assuming that rigorous measures like the use of offline 
laptops and encryption provide the most safety to thinking in terms of 
trade-offs between greater digital security on the one hand and the risks of 
arousing suspicion, physical theft, or becoming caught up in paranoia on 
the other hand. Our general experience has been that it is worthwhile to 
learn and practice a range of digital security routines before going into the 
field, so that we know how to use them if we find that the context requires 
it. If we then find that the routines we had envisaged are unnecessary or 
even inappropriate, we can relax or abandon them. The other way around, 
ratcheting up one’s digital security routines once in the field, could be 
technically and practically much more difficult.
chaPtEr conclusion: PlanninG ahEad 
and accEPtinG risk
Preparing as well as we can may improve our judgment when faced with a 
sensitive situation, and—not unimportantly—give us some peace of mind. 
Ethics procedures, when well designed, can actually help us prepare by 
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pushing us to think about challenges we might face. We prepare in advance 
by reading up from various sources, and by talking to politically minded 
people who live in our fieldwork country, or have visited recently. Visa 
procedures sometimes give us our first taste of the vagaries of authoritarian 
bureaucracies. We should take some time to acclimatize on arrival, espe-
cially if it is a first visit, the situation has changed, or our topic is particu-
larly sensitive. We scenario-plan how we might handle an encounter with 
security agents. We can develop and practice digital routines. But even for 
experienced country experts, or people who are nationals of the state they 
investigate, unexpected situations may come up, and there is no fail-safe 
way to prepare and to figure out exactly what is and is not dangerous for 
oneself and others. Having assessed and minimized our risk, we accept 
that it exists.
rEfErEncEs
Ahram, A.  I., & Goode, J.  P. (2016). Researching Authoritarianism in the 
Discipline of Democracy. Social Science Quarterly, 97, 834–849. https://doi.
org/10.1111/ssqu.12340.
Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS). (2016, March 5). Taskforce on Fieldwork 
Safety. Final Report. Retrieved July 19, 2017, from http://www.centraleurasia.
org/assets/site/cess-task-force-on-fieldwork-safety_final-report-march-2016.pdf.
Clark, J. (2006). Field Research Methods in the Middle East. PS: Political Science 
& Politics, 39, 417–424. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096506060707.
Davenport, C., & Stam, A.  C. (2009, October 7). What Really Happened in 
Rwanda? Miller–McCune Research Essay. Retrieved June 20, 2017, from 
https://psmag.com/social-justice/what-really-happened-in-rwanda-3432.
Gentile, M. (2013). Meeting the ‘Organs’: the Tacit Dilemma of Field Research in 
Authoritarian States. Area, 45, 426–432. https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12030.
Gladstone, R. (2017, July 17). Colleagues of Princeton University Scholar 
Convicted of Spying in Iran Express Shock. New York Times.
Goode, J. P. (2010). Redefining Russia: Hybrid Regimes, Fieldwork, and Russian 
Politics. Perspectives on Politics, 8, 1055–1075. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S153759271000318X.
Goode, J. P. (2016). Eyes Wide Shut: Democratic Reversals, Scientific Closure, 
and the Study of Politics in Eurasia. Social Science Quarterly, 97, 876–893. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12343.
Goode, J.  P., & Ahram, A.  I. (2016). Special Issue Editors’ Introduction: 
Observing Autocracies from the Ground Floor. Social Science Quarterly, 97, 
823–833. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12339.
Kassam, A. (2016, October 10). Canadian-Iranian Professor: I Survived Imprisonment 
by Studying my Captors. The Guardian.
 ENTERING THE FIELD 
36 
Loyle, C. E. (2016). Overcoming Research Obstacles in Hybrid Regimes: Lessons 
from Rwanda. Social Science Quarterly, 97, 923–935. https://doi.
org/10.1111/ssqu.12346.
Malekzadeh, S. (2016). Paranoia and Perspective, or How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Start Loving Research in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Social 
Science Quarterly, 97, 862–875. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12342.
Markowitz, L. P. (2016). Scientific Closure and Research Strategies in Uzbekistan. 
Social Science Quarterly, 97, 894–908. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12344.
Matelski, M. (2014). On Sensitivity and Secrecy: How Foreign Researchers and 
Their Local Contacts in Myanmar Deal with Risk Under Authoritarian Rule. 
Journal of Burma Studies, 18, 59–82. https://doi.org/10.1353/jbs.2014.0008.
Pepinsky, T. (2017, January 6). Everyday Authoritarianism Is Boring and Tolerable. 
Retrieved July 21, 2017, from https://tompepinsky.com/2017/01/06/
everyday-authoritarianism-is-boring-and-tolerable/.
Schreck, C. (2015, March 31). Western Scholars Alarmed by Russian Deportations, 
Fines. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved June 15, 2017, from 
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-western-scholars-alarmed-deporta-
tions/26929921.html.
Wall, C., & Overton, J.  (2006). Unethical Ethics?: Applying Research Ethics in 
Uzbekistan. Development in Practice, 16, 62–67.  www.jstor.org/stable/4029860.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in 
any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indi-
cate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright 
holder.
M. GLASIUS ET AL.
37© The Author(s) 2018




Abstract In this chapter we, as scholars of authoritarianism, discuss the 
‘red lines’, a term used in authoritarian contexts to denote topics that are 
highly politically sensitive. We first describe commonalities in what the red 
lines are in different contexts, distinguishing between hard red lines and 
more fluid ones. We describe how we navigate red lines in fieldwork by 
offering a depoliticized, but not untrue, version of our research; how we 
adapt our wording and behavior to remain within the red lines, but still 
give us meaningful research results; and how we respond when the red 
lines shift, and words and behaviors previously acceptable become taboo, 
or vice versa.
Keywords Authoritarianism • Field research • Red lines • Sensitive 
topics
Observers of Chinese politics use the term ‘red lines’ to denote topics that 
are highly politically sensitive, the idea being that these are lines that must 
not be crossed. A red line does not necessarily mean that a topic cannot be 
discussed at all, but great care must be taken how it is discussed, and with 
whom. The term ‘red lines’ is also used in Morocco, and in Farsi there is 
also such an expression. In other contexts, we have not come across the 
phrase as such, but we adopt it here as a useful shorthand for topics or 
issues that are sensitive in the sense that investigating them is considered 
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threatening or forbidden by the regime (see also Ahram and Goode 2016, 
840). Thus, our notion of ‘red lines’ is distinctly political. We do not dis-
cuss primarily cultural dimensions of what constitutes appropriate or inap-
propriate topics and behaviors. Of course a field researcher also needs to 
be aware of cultural taboos but that is not a matter restricted to authoritar-
ian contexts.
In this chapter, we first describe what we know of what the red lines are 
in different contexts. We distinguish between hard red lines and more fluid 
ones. With respect to the hard red lines, we find considerable commonali-
ties across countries. For us as scholars of authoritarianism, understanding 
the red lines is our bread and butter, but we believe it is important for any 
professional visitor to an authoritarian-ruled state to at least gain an under-
standing of the hard red lines. The fluid lines are much more context-
specific, more dependent on who we are interacting with, and more subject 
to change over time. The main commonality here is this ambiguity itself, 
which keeps us in uncertainty about precisely what is permissible.
We devote the bulk of the chapter to discussing how we navigate the 
red lines. Our primary strategy, and that of others, has been to be open 
and honest about the fact that we are social science researchers, and to 
explain the nature of our research in terms that are approximately accu-
rate, but stripped of their politically sensitive import, so as to stay within 
the red lines. We give many examples, from our own experience and that 
of others, to elucidate what we mean by a ‘depoliticized version’ of our 
research, giving special attention to the wordings we use, and how local 
contacts can help us adapt our wording. We also give some examples of 
behaviors that, while far from being outrageous, came close to or crossed 
the red lines. Finally, we devote some attention to how the shifting of red 
lines over time can affect research.
Hard red Lines
While the hard red lines are taboo subjects, it is not particularly difficult to 
discover, even before entering the field, what they are. What they have in 
common is that they are directly connected to regime stability, or the 
regime’s core legitimizing narrative. In Iran, it is always the Supreme 
Leader: you cannot criticize him or question his position. In Morocco, 
likewise, his Majesty the King is a red line topic, and in Kazakhstan, it is 
the President who has been head of state for the last 28 years. In China, 
members of the Politburo Standing Committee can never be criticized.
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Corruption is an important political topic in many of the contexts we 
investigate, and it is not necessarily controversial to discuss corruption as 
a societal problem. But investigating corruption in relation to the current 
top-level leadership is almost always taboo. This is true for the top leader-
ship of the Chinese Communist Party and for the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard. There is ample evidence of how sensitive investigating top-level 
corruption in authoritarian contexts is and of how regimes respond to it. 
An investigation by The New York Times journalists on the wealth of then 
Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao’s family resulted in the blocking of the 
newspaper’s website in China (Barboza 2012; Branigan 2012). In 
Malaysia, a deputy public prosecutor was killed after investigating a cor-
ruption scandal in which the prime minister was embroiled, and allegedly 
leaking information about the case to the press (Sarawak Report 2015). In 
a decentralized country like Mexico, certain states are notorious for attacks 
on journalists who investigate the involvement of state-level officials in 
corruption scandals. None of us has done field research on the 
authoritarianism- corruption nexus, and we know relatively few academics 
who do so. A recent book that does focus on the nefarious financial net-
works of Central Asian leaders relies primarily on desk research (Cooley 
and Heathershaw 2017, 20–22), especially from court cases, leaked docu-
ments, and NGO sources.
Two other common red lines are ethnic or religious cleavages in soci-
ety, and occupied or secessionist territories. These issues are red lines 
because openly discussing them can put into question the societal and/or 
territorial cohesion of the authoritarian state. In Malaysia, the ‘special 
rights’ of Malays in relation to primarily Chinese and Indian minorities are 
a red line and cannot be questioned. On the one hand the government 
exploits the fears and tensions between the different groups to some 
extent, positing itself as the guarantor of peaceful relations; on the other 
hand, it may genuinely fear large-scale ethnic unrest, as well as Islamic 
radicalism. In Kazakhstan discussing ethnic relations is problematic, unless 
framed in terms of the official discourse of harmony and tolerance. In 
China, focusing on conflicts between the Uyghur minority and other eth-
nic groups is unacceptable. In Rwanda, as reported by Loyle (2016, 925), 
asking questions about a person’s ethnic identity is actually proscribed by 
law. Questioning Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara, or sug-
gesting that the rights of the local population are being violated, is a red 
line for Morocco, as is questioning whether Tibet or Taiwan belongs to 
China in the Chinese context (see also Reny 2016, 916).
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FLuid Lines
Beyond the hard red lines, it is clear who is in power, but it is never certain 
what exactly is possible. As Loyle (2016, 924) writes about Rwanda, 
authoritarian regimes create ‘a gray area around certain research topics. 
Restrictions are vague and punishments appear random. As a result, schol-
ars may be unclear about what is or is not permitted and confused about 
the potential consequences of asking different types of research questions’. 
There is always a margin of error. Citizens of authoritarian countries, espe-
cially those who operate in political contexts, whether they are officials, 
critics, academics or students, corporate executives, or journalists, care-
fully assess their navigation of the fluid lines. If they cross them, even in a 
private, anonymous interview with a foreign scholar, they will not be 
doing so unwittingly. Local journalists in particular consider the red lines 
every day. For them, the lines are different, more restrictive, than for us, 
because what they write or say is read or heard by a broad local audience 
immediately, rather than by a narrow English-speaking academic audi-
ence, many months later. They can be a good source for us precisely 
because they may sometimes want to express to us privately what they 
know but cannot communicate openly in their own work.
A fluid line, for instance, is the degree to which government institu-
tions and politicians below the leadership can be discussed and criticized. 
In Kazakhstan, there is some, and in China, Malaysia, and Morocco, even 
considerable leeway to critically discuss and investigate specific ministries, 
local authorities, or government policies. Intra-elite rivalries sometimes 
increase the space for sensitive research, but there can also be a danger of 
getting caught up in them: in Iran, for instance, contact with westerners 
can in itself be the subject of intra-elite mistrust and slander.
Likewise, there is great variation in the degree to which anti- 
governmental activism is sensitive. In Iran, the topic of political prisoners 
is a red line, as is the Green Movement to some extent. In Malaysia, the 
main protest movement campaigning for clean and fair elections, Bersih, 
operates quite openly. Today, while not everyone feels comfortable partici-
pating in the protests, discussing them is not experienced as problematic. 
But the religious and ethnically based anti-governmental Hindu move-
ment (‘HINDRAF’) is much less openly tolerated and a more sensitive 
topic of discussion. In China too, the degree to which one can discuss 
protests publicly really depends on topic and context. Our China researcher 
found her online posting of information on protests in Hong Kong 
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 censored; but when she posted or forwarded international news coverage 
of a mass protest against a proposed factory in Northeast China, nothing 
was blocked. We can approach these differences analytically, thinking of 
reasons why a minority movement is more sensitive than a cross-ethnic 
movement, or why Hong Kong is more of a red line than a local protest in 
the far north, but we also believe that when it comes to the fluid lines, 
distinctions can be more arbitrary and do not always lend themselves to 
logical explanation.
depoLiticizing tHe researcH
One of the clearest, most commonly agreed recommendations in the 
emerging literature on fieldwork in authoritarian circumstances is to 
‘frame the research topic in a way that has the best chance of reducing any 
sensitivity around it’ (Art 2016, 980). This appears to be a common prac-
tice among scholars of the post-Soviet region, as reported in the Central 
Eurasian Studies Society’s recent task force report on fieldwork safety. 
According to their survey, ‘(m)any respondents admitted to adjusting the 
presentation of their research topic to decrease risk. Some respondents 
indicated that they either do not disclose their real research topics to any-
one or change how they describe their work depending on the context, 
whether a government institution, university, etc.’ (CESS 2016, 6). The 
report also mentions that a ‘small minority reports outright misrepresent-
ing their purpose for being in-country, a practice that we [the taskforce] 
find ill-advised’ (CESS 2016, 7) because of the risk it poses to local helpers 
after publication of the real research. Making research sound ‘bland and 
gray’, avoiding ‘phrases that hint at political curiosity or other sensitive 
topics’ (Turner 2013, 398) is apparently also a usual approach to field 
research in socialist East Asian states including China, Laos, and Vietnam 
(Cornet 2013; Petit 2013; Sowerwine 2013, all cited in Turner 2013; 
Reny 2016). Country specialists on Iran (Malekzadeh 2016), Kazakhstan 
(Gentile 2013), and Rwanda (Loyle 2016) all refer to similar strategies. 
While most accounts recommend depoliticizing research for pragmatic 
reasons such as gaining access and reducing risk, Malekzadeh (2016, 866) 
adds the important insight that an interest in the mundane may actually 
improve research validity. While initially ‘looking for dramatic or expressed 
bursts of opposition or bouts of justice seeking under authoritarian rule’, 
he learned instead to seek out ‘how people negotiate with what can be a 
suffocatingly tedious and impenetrable bureaucratic setting in order to 
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improve their own lives’. This chimes with Pepinsky’s (2017) plea for 
attention, in the Malaysian context, to ‘everyday authoritarianism’ rather 
than looking for spectacular repression.
Just like these other scholars in the authoritarian field, we do not tell 
lies about what our research is about, and we do present our plans in ways 
that are neutral, non-specific, and depoliticized. But depoliticizing politi-
cal science research is easier said than done. Below, we elaborate on our 
own practices and the examples given by others in order to give practical 
substance to what it means to ‘make it boring’ (Malekzadeh 2016, 865).
First, there is the term ‘authoritarianism’ itself. The common research 
project that we mainly draw on for this book is called ‘authoritarianism in 
a global age’. It is no secret that we investigate authoritarianism. If you 
google any of us, you will come across the term, and it is likely that all our 
publications, some more prominently than others, will feature the term 
‘authoritarian’. In China, interestingly, authoritarianism itself is not a red 
line, or at least until recently it was not. Government officials do not 
themselves refer to the regime as authoritarian, but foreign and even 
domestic scholars openly do so in conversation, if not in Chinese publica-
tions. It is not considered a term of opprobrium, just an analytical distinc-
tion from democracy. In Morocco by contrast, where the regime likes to 
see itself described as ‘democratizing’, authoritarian as an adjective applied 
to the Kingdom is a red line.
But regardless, in explaining what we do during fieldwork, most of us 
never use it. It is not even that it would necessarily be dangerous to do so, 
it is just unhelpful. Speaking of authoritarianism (or democracy for that 
matter) invites abstract discussions about ideologies, cultural differences, 
or western hypocrisy. Some respondents might react badly to the sugges-
tion that their government is authoritarian; others, especially activists, 
might actually embrace it. Either way such discussions often lead us away 
from the concrete things we want to find out. We might refer to the gen-
eral project as being about comparing different state responses to global-
ization, and then go on to describe our specific research interest.
Our Chinese researcher when introducing herself, especially to officials, 
gives them her business card—which has her name and affiliation in 
Chinese and English, but not the name of our project (see also Loyle 
2016, 929 and Malekzadeh 2016, 867 on business cards as symbols of the 
legitimacy of our status as researchers). She gives them many details, lots 
of answers to any questions they may have, so they are not left with the 
feeling that she is hiding anything. In her recent research on the  interactions 
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between Chinese companies and government agencies over big data, she 
would not mention concerns about privacy, surveillance, or censorship. 
Instead, she would refer to US companies and government- corporate rela-
tions to initiate conversations. Taking the United States both as a com-
petitor and point of reference allowed government officials as well as 
company managers to talk easily about the Chinese situation.
Our Iran researcher, when interested in online censorship, surveillance, 
and harassment by the Iranian authorities, framed this as an interest in 
Iran’s Internet policies, or recent developments regarding the Internet in 
Iran. Even in interviews with activists, he would not introduce the term 
‘censorship’ into a conversation himself but follow the lead of a respon-
dent in terms of the wording and the depth of discussion.
Loyle, in the context of Rwanda, also gives some very concrete exam-
ples of how to depoliticize research topics: ‘it may be unwise (or prohib-
ited) to ask questions about government corruption in distributing 
natural resource contracts but alternate wording of the research question, 
such as “contract allocation” or “indicators of governance effectiveness,” 
can provide similar answers without drawing unwanted attention to your 
research. Concepts such as “state violence” or “repression” can easily be 
replaced with words such as “conflict” to suggest general patterns of vio-
lence instead of research directed toward abuses by the state’ (Loyle 
2016, 930).
Sometimes, with a particular type of respondents, we find that there 
are advantages to dropping the depoliticized version that we crafted. Our 
Malaysia researcher, after initially being cautious, discovered that much 
more could be discussed openly than he expected, and it worked to be 
very forthright. He began to introduce himself to activists as doing 
research on Internet and protests in authoritarian regimes—usually add-
ing that it was debatable how authoritarian Malaysia was. This was also 
the experience of our researcher on the subnational contexts of India and 
Mexico. He found that using the word ‘authoritarian’, which is not 
exactly commonplace in these formally democratic states, was actually 
helpful when speaking to local opposition figures and journalists. These 
illustrations just go to show how context-dependent the appropriate 
ways and degrees of depoliticizing one’s research are. In most other 
authoritarian contexts, such an opening would be most alarming to 
respondents and kill any chance of a good interview. But in these specific 
contexts, with this particular group of respondents, it was actually an 
icebreaker.
 LEARNING THE RED LINES 
44 
Wording
Knowing the red lines is not just a matter of knowing what can be dis-
cussed but also how to discuss it and with whom. In referring to the vari-
ous heads of state above, we instinctively remained within the red lines: to 
refer to the Supreme Leader or his Majesty the King as plain Khamenei or 
Mohammad VI would be disrespectful. Not dangerous, but inappropriate 
and therefore unhelpful, especially in conversations with officials, but 
sometimes also with ordinary people. We have learned this by listening 
carefully, in formal and informal conversations, to how locals spoke of 
their leaders.
Just as there are appropriate and inappropriate forms for referring to 
the head of state, there may be commonly understood neutral terms for 
sensitive topics, as well as terms that raise alarm bells. Matelski found that 
in Myanmar before democratization, ‘people often referred to “the situa-
tion” to describe the general conditions they had to live in under military 
rule without having to go into detail’ (Matelski 2014, 64, 67). Many 
Iranians will refer to the Green Movement’s large-scale post-election pro-
tests, and the subsequent regime repression of the movement, obliquely as 
‘the events of 2009’. Our Kazakhstan researcher found when she worked 
for the United Nations that, while many citizens engaged in what we 
would call volunteering, it was very difficult to find an acceptable vocabu-
lary to talk about these activities. There are two words in Russian for 
‘volunteering’. The one with a Latin root (volonterstvo) was connected 
with the English-speaking world, foreign NGOs, and aid programs. People 
then reacted negatively to the notion of Kazakhstan as a third world coun-
try in need of foreign aid, and government accusations that foreign NGOs 
were ‘importing’ protest caused further suspicion. But her conversations 
fared no better with the other word for volunteering, which has a Slavic 
origin and was used in Soviet times for obligatory ‘volunteering’ for com-
munist party-affiliated organs. How to talk about volunteering was not 
just a cultural or linguistic conundrum; it had political implications. From 
the government’s perspective, the line between what is acceptable volun-
teering and what is not is very thin, revolving around the distinction 
between political and apolitical activities.
When speaking to officials, we sometimes adopt their discourse to 
some extent. Members of a constitutional reform commission in Morocco, 
for instance, were keen to describe the reform as a participatory process. 
Instead of questioning this, our researcher took up the notion of 
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 participation and asked to know more about who participated and how. 
Tailoring the wording of research to fit the preferences of respondents is 
not in itself unique: Art, for instance, described his research on radical 
right parties in Europe to party officials as an interest in parties ‘very 
concerned with preserving the distinctive political and cultural values of 
their societies’ (Art 2016, 981). What is distinctive about the authoritar-
ian context in comparison is the element of risk involved (see Chap. 2), 
which can go well beyond being unfavorably received by potential 
respondents.
getting LocaLs to Vet Your Wording
In case of doubt as to what wording of research questions may be more 
acceptable, while still conveying enough to elicit meaningful responses, 
the advice of trusted locals can be extremely helpful. When our Kazakhstan 
researcher first prepared for fieldwork, a diplomat turned researcher from 
the region helped her with the wording of letters to officials she wanted to 
interview, making the research sound harmless and interesting to them, 
and even flattering. Instead of asking after the authoritarian functions of 
the government party, he suggested she should ask officials how the party 
contributes to government effectiveness. Our Mexico researcher showed a 
human rights worker in the capital his list of proposed questions before 
traveling to the region, and was advised not to use the stark word ‘repres-
sion’, but speak of ‘control’ instead, or ‘safeguarding information’. Reny 
describes the even more finely tailored advice she got from local collabora-
tors in her research on underground churches in China. With pro-regime 
respondents, ‘(s)entences referring to house churches as “suppressed” (bei 
yazhi) or “controlled” (bei kongzhi) would automatically be replaced by 
“supervised” (bei guanli). These discursive subtleties would help reduce 
possibilities that interviewees interpreted my words as a critique’ (Reny 
2016, 919).
Having trusted local people consider one’s wording is even more 
important when doing surveys. Contrary to what one might think, survey 
research is possible in authoritarian contexts—on some topics, in some 
countries. Three of us have conducted surveys. In survey research, one 
typically has no direct contact with one’s respondents, no way of gauging 
their reactions and no chance to course correct. Surveys, moreover, leave 
an electronic or paper trail. Therefore, it is even more important than in 
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face-to-face interviews to stay within the red lines, in terms of wording 
and topics. Our Malaysia researcher discovered that—while the political 
implications of ethnicity are in themselves a red line—it was considered 
crucial, in a telephone survey, that respondents were approached by inter-
viewers of the same ethnicity, in their own language. Otherwise, he was 
told, respondents would not feel comfortable discussing political views or 
concerns at all. Our Kazakhstan researcher, despite extensive experience in 
the country, relied on local survey professionals to get her question about 
political activities phrased correctly. Our Chinese researcher ran her survey 
questions by some Chinese survey experts, and found that what she 
thought of as acceptable, neutral questions, relating to Chinese students’ 
attitudes to democratic countries, or their views on the values of freedom 
or justice, could not be asked directly at all. The experts laughed and told 
her she had been abroad for too long.
BeHaViors
While most of our advice about navigating red lines revolves around choice 
of words, other forms of behavior too may be shaped and constrained by 
the ‘red lines’. In the authoritarian field, a course of action that would 
appear completely natural in a less constrained context may entail a risk of 
exposing self or respondents. In the Chinese context, Reny (2016, 919) 
describes taking public transport with two missionaries for whom it might 
have been better not to be seen with her: ‘(b)y the time we got there, I 
realized we should have taken a taxi instead. Not only were we in a suburb 
where locals were not accustomed to seeing foreigners, but also we had to 
walk 10 minutes on the main street to reach their apartment … (l)ocals on 
the street had enough time to notice me’. Our India researcher similarly 
found that he needed to course correct to avoid exposing respondents. 
Having gotten quite comfortable with the political setting after three 
months of fieldwork, he was conducting interviews in a coffee house well- 
known to be frequented by left-wing activists, and hence—but he was not 
aware of this at the time—also by government agents. After firing off some 
sensitive questions about the Maoist insurgency, he was warned by one of 
his interlocutors: ‘if I were you I would ask your questions a little bit more 
discreetly’. No difficulties ensued for respondents either in the Chinese 
public transport incident reported by Reny or in the Indian coffee house, 
but as always in these contexts, we constantly need to reflect on our behav-
ior, because there might be consequences.
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Constant reflection on his own conduct, in relation to the ‘red lines’, 
was also the mode that our Malaysia researcher found himself in when 
attending an anti-government demonstration in 2016. Foreigners are not 
allowed to demonstrate, and his own embassy had advised against attend-
ing. Despite a bad experience during previous fieldwork (see Chap. 2), he 
decided, based on his own assessment and local advice, to go. During the 
demonstration he was continuously assessing whether to best be alone, or 
visibly part of a group; what he would do if anyone wanted to take a photo 
with him; what if anyone gave him the movement’s yellow t-shirt to wear; 
what if the police would ask him what he was doing there. The demonstra-
tion, and his participation in it, passed without incident, but by the end of 
the day, he was exhausted by the constant self-assessment.
A very different fate befell Clotilde Reiss, a master’s student who was in 
Isfahan, Iran, during the Green Movement protests in 2009, participated 
in the protests and took pictures, and apparently sent a brief report to the 
French research institute in Tehran (Ayad 2009). She was arrested and 
spent nearly a year in an Iranian prison. While our Iran researcher would 
think twice about giving information to western embassies and diplomats, 
especially by e-mail, reporting back to a research institute under these 
extraordinary circumstances is not a behavior beyond our comprehension. 
But in Iran, especially at that time, the accusation of ‘spy’ attached very 
easily to westerners, and she paid a heavy price. In terms of our behavior 
then, we sometimes walk a fine line between becoming overconfident and 
touching a red line, and being overcautious and sometimes a little para-
noid. In Chap. 5 we will discuss the mental impact of such preoccupations 
in more detail.
sHiFting red Lines—cLosures
The political fields we study do not stand still. Our China and our 
Kazakhstan researcher have both experienced that since they did their 
PhDs, there has come to be less scope for critical political discussion, 
whereas our Iran researcher has first witnessed a more liberal environment 
becoming very restricted and then again somewhat more relaxed in recent 
years. In China in recent years, the domestic academic climate has con-
tracted. There used to be considerable leeway for—relatively abstract—
discussions about political values, such as the meaning of citizenship or the 
value of democracy, in university classrooms. Currently, it appears to be 
the case—although it is difficult to verify conclusively—that students are 
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encouraged to report about what teachers tell them in the classroom, a 
practice that has not occurred since the Cultural Revolution. This directly 
impacts on what can be done during fieldwork. Previously, the accessibility 
of information directly from policy-makers might fluctuate, but academics 
were always an easy source of comments and analysis. Nowadays, it is get-
ting increasingly difficult to talk with officials even with appropriate intro-
ductions (see next chapter), and even the utterances of academics depend 
on longstanding relations of trust. In Kazakhstan, the red lines have not so 
much shifted as hardened. In the years 2007–2011, the authorities were 
trying really hard to open up the system to respond to the requests of 
international organizations (the OSCE in particular, of which they were 
trying to get the chairmanship for 2010), which did have a liberalizing 
effect. Nowadays, both online and offline media appear to be more con-
trolled, and there is less tolerance of dissent. In the more factionalized 
political environment of Iran, the supreme leader was always a red line, but 
since 2009, the institutions that harbor political hardliners, the 
Revolutionary Guard and the judiciary, have also become more sensitive as 
topics.
Beyond our own experiences, it is important to recognize that, while 
there may usually be a correlation between increasing authoritarian prac-
tices in a particular country and conditions for field research becoming 
more challenging, the two trends are analytically distinct and do not always 
move together. The Central Asia task force cited in the previous chapter, 
for instance, writes that ‘many respondents commented on the increasing 
authoritarianism in Azerbaijan, but the threat is much more acute for citi-
zens of the country than for foreigners’, and appears not to have had a 
direct impact on the research environment so far (CESS 2016, 7).
sHiFting red Lines—openings
In transition contexts by contrast, researchers have had the experience of 
finding their customary caution suddenly unnecessary, and actually a hin-
drance. One of us, a regular visitor to Egypt in the 2000s, interviewed a 
range of activists in Cairo when Morsi was president. While the situation 
was volatile, she found respondents utterly unrestrained in what they said 
and where they said it. One took her to a famous graffiti wall in a busy 
street near Tahrir Square and began, in broad daylight, to interpret the 
political imagery, pointing and speaking. The wall has since been destroyed, 
and such behavior would again be unthinkable today. Analogously, 
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Matelski (2014, 72–73) relates how, working on civil society in Burma 
during the junta period, she had taught herself to speak in the idiom of 
oblique references that her respondents used. On a return visit after transi-
tion had been announced, she found that researchers new to the context 
‘did not seem as bothered by warnings and sensitivities and seemed able to 
discuss issues that I had been hesitant to bring up’. She attributed this 
discrepancy, not to ‘oversensitivity on my part, or lack of context sensitiv-
ity on their part. It was simply the context that changed more quickly than 
any of us could have imagined’.
cHapter concLusion: naVigating tHe red Lines
We have tended to stay away from the hard red lines in our work on 
authoritarianism. We have been open about being political science 
researchers doing fieldwork. Perhaps there are circumstances in which it is 
both ethical and productive to act otherwise, but we find such circum-
stances difficult to imagine, and would be very reluctant to undertake 
‘undercover’ research. Like others in the field, we do believe it is ethically 
justified, and mostly fruitful, to present our interests in a neutral and 
depoliticized light, as long as what we say is not beside the truth. We are 
professionals who have no sinister intent to destabilize the government. 
We present our research as analytically driven, perhaps a little technical and 
boring, and we strive to keep our behavior away from the red lines too. We 
typically err on the side of caution, especially in the early stages of our 
fieldwork, but sometimes find that we rapidly need to change gear to 
respond to unexpected openness.
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CHAPTER 4
Building and Maintaining Relations 
in the Field
Abstract In this chapter, we discuss the centrality of personal connections 
and trust in the authoritarian field. We consider our relations with local 
collaborators, the responsibility we have towards them, and the consider-
ation of risk in such relations. We also discuss relations with interview 
respondents, the ways in which we approach them to try and maximize 
our chances of building trust, and how we ‘work with what we have’ in 
terms of our ascriptive characteristics, presenting a version of ourselves 
that helps us get information. We reflect on having been subject to manip-
ulation by local contacts and respondents. Finally, we consider the debt we 
owe collaborators and respondents in the field, and the limited ways in 
which we can do something in return.
Keywords Authoritarianism • Field research • Trust • Research assis-
tants • Respondents • Interviews
Societies everywhere run on social networks. Even in the Netherlands or 
in the United States, connections make social science research much eas-
ier. But in North West Europe and in Anglo-Saxon societies, networks 
may be a little less central than in most other societies, and it is sometimes 
possible, for instance, to get an elite interview based purely on a profes-
sionally worded e-mail and some follow-up phone calls. In non-western 
societies, networks of trust are typically much more important to everyday 
54 
interactions, and getting meaningful information from strangers is much 
less likely. In authoritarian contexts, where the cost of having an even 
slightly politically loaded conversation can be high, trust and willingness 
to help come from who recommends you, and from how much effort you 
invest in assuring your respondent of your trustworthiness and respect for 
them.
In this chapter, we discuss how we have built our networks in the field 
and reflect on the centrality of personal connections and the currency of 
trust. We consider the relations we have with local collaborators, the 
responsibility we have towards them, and the (sometimes mutual) consid-
erations of risk in such relations. Then, we hone in on one of the most 
important relations in authoritarian fieldwork: relations with potential 
interviewees, or as we will consistently call them in this chapter, respon-
dents. We will discuss why interviews are often not refused outright, but 
evaded, in authoritarian contexts. We describe the ways in which we 
approach potential respondents to try and maximize our chances of build-
ing trust and discuss our experiences with encountering—and sometimes 
overcoming—three frequent obstacles to trust in authoritarian contexts: 
suspicion, ideological hostility, and fear. Our ascriptive characteristics (i.e. 
nationality, ethnic background, age, and gender) partly determine how we 
are perceived by respondents, but we describe how we ‘work with what we 
have’, presenting a version of ourselves that helps us build trust and get 
information. We explain how we navigate interviews with officials and 
activists, respectively, and reflect on a few cases where we have been sub-
ject to manipulation by local contacts and respondents. Finally, we con-
sider the debt we owe collaborators and respondents in the field, and the 
limited ways in which we can do something in return.
Building ConneCtions
We all come by our respondents via the ‘snowball method’, but a snowball 
is really the wrong metaphor, since it is the warmth of the connections that 
matters. People meet you, not necessarily because they are very interested 
in your research, but more because they trust you or the friends who 
introduced you to them. How warm these connections need to be depends 
on the kind of respondents, the topic, and the authoritarian context. In 
the least repressive context we work in, our Malaysia researcher found it 
relatively easy to meet activists who were public figures. The main concern 
was getting them to make time in their busy schedules. Talking to  ordinary 
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people who had occasionally attended demonstrations about their experi-
ences was even easier. But even here, speaking to people who sympathized 
with the protests, but were for various reasons fearful of attending them, 
did really require personal introductions from their friends.
Practically, getting an introduction may just mean getting a phone 
number, but symbolically, it means much more. A certain capital of trust 
comes with the introduction. They take responsibility for us, providing a 
kind of safety check on behalf of their contact. In the experience of our 
China and our Kazakhstan researcher, a conversation with a potential 
respondent will almost always start with them getting a sense of the 
warmth of our connection with the liaison person: how do you know this 
person? How did you meet? For how long have you known each other? 
They may also try to discover whether anyone else in their circle is a friend 
of ours. According to a colleague of North African descent, someone with 
local roots may need even more time before the interview can start. Much 
more than in the case of a foreign researcher, the respondent needs to 
make a detailed assessment who is in front of him or her, and to what net-
works they belong. Are they linked to anyone in the regime or the opposi-
tion? These things will influence the extent to which the respondent will 
trust and help us.
Sometimes, the centrality of personal recommendations makes a 
respondent impatient with our habit of explaining our project and getting 
informed consent: a trusted person has vouched for us, the respondent 
feels, so let’s skip the formalities and jump to the questions you have. They 
may express it in so many words: so and so is a friend, so tell me what I can 
do for you. Occasionally, an institutional contact may be a functional 
equivalent of a personal connection. Our Mexico researcher got various 
journalist contacts via a human rights organization, and found its name to 
be a magic word among potential respondents: it was the one organization 
they completely trusted. As always, there are exceptions to our rules, also 
to our ‘networks are everything’ axiom. One of our colleagues working in 
the Arab world has great experiences with going through secretaries or 
personal assistants to make appointments with officials. More than their 
bosses, they may be under the impression that we are ‘important’ because 
we come from abroad, and if they have a return favor to ask, it may be 
something small related to our knowledge of the western world.
In circumstances where being introduced by someone really means 
coming with their stamp of approval, contacts may not always be willing 
or able to make the introductions we desire. Our Iran researcher has 
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experienced that people mention names of potential interview partners, 
but they may say ‘maybe it is not so helpful that I introduce you because 
there are differences, we have a different political orientation’. Or they will 
just say ‘it would be good for you to talk to this state secretary and I can 
give you his mobile number, but if you call him just like that it will not 
help you to get an interview’. Our China researcher has also come across 
such reluctance. Sometimes she is given contact details, but without the 
all- important personal introduction, sometimes they introduce her to 
another connection who could link her to the interviewee, and sometimes 
even after a potential interviewee has agreed to talk, they behave reluc-
tantly: they reply to SMS very slowly or not at all, or remain evasive about 
a concrete meeting. It is not always possible to glean why our existing 
contacts are reluctant or unable to make forward introductions. It may 
just be that they are cultivating their own social capital carefully, and see a 
potential risk without advantage in making the connection for us, or it 
may be because the contact is not warm enough to successfully establish 
the connection. Or, as was most likely the case in Iran a few years ago, it is 
a sign of a contracting political climate and shifting alliances. Finally, there 
may be a gender dimension to a reluctance: some men may be considered 
inappropriate for a female researcher to meet, or vice versa.
When a local contact does make a connection for us, we may not fully 
know what goes on between them and the respondent. It may be that we 
unknowingly become an asset for the contact, who is trying to impress 
someone with their international network. Or the other way around, the 
respondent may extract something from the contact for having been 
exposed to us. It may not always be necessary to fully understand what 
exchange is going on, but we should at least be aware of the possibility 
that either we or our contact are being put in an awkward position of 
owing someone a favor, especially if the interview does not in fact go well.
There is a tension, in authoritarian contexts, between the need to rely 
on local contacts and snowball sampling and the need to be discrete about 
who our interviewees are (see also Ahram and Goode 2016, 843). When 
we rely on local contacts and respondents to provide us with further con-
tacts, it is quite natural for them to be asking who else we are speaking to 
or have interviewed. In some contexts, giving this information may be 
entirely innocuous, but in other cases who we speak to may actually be 
sensitive information that might get respondents into trouble. It may not 
always be possible or appropriate to be entirely silent about interviewees 
while soliciting further contacts, but discretion can be exercised, especially 
M. GLASIUS ET AL.
 57
about names we think might be sensitive, unless our local contacts are 
trusted friends. In general, a policy of openness should not extend to tell-
ing respondents details about each other.
loCal CollaBorators
Sometimes, ontacts may do much more for us than just act as go-betweens. 
Both our Morocco and our Iran researcher nowadays rely on a few people 
they know well, who will not only share contact details but help assess who 
will be useful to talk to, whether they are easy or difficult to approach, and 
whether approaching them might have consequences for the rest of our 
research, making it better to meet them towards the end of their stay. 
They also give their advice on security issues, on wording, or on how to 
interpret some initial impressions.
Some of these people come to work with us on a more sustained basis, 
because they are interested in learning social science methods, because 
they want to put their work for us on their CV, because they are simply 
curious or willing to help, or because they have become friends. Others are 
paid by us, as research assistants, translators, survey experts, or local super-
visors. Mostly, the relationship is beneficial to both sides. Our Kazakhstan 
and Malaysia researchers have both had great experiences working with 
local survey companies, the staff of which were very skilled and profes-
sional as well as genuinely interested in the research projects in question. 
The Kazakhstan researcher also worked successfully with paid research 
assistants. Apart from simply saving time, she finds that they can help with 
wording things appropriately (see Chap. 3) and have their own networks 
and knowledge that facilitates the accessing of information. Apart from 
payment, she has helped them by discussing and commenting on their 
PhD theses or job applications. The seniority relation was the other way 
around when our India researcher did his first fieldwork: in accordance 
with the customary procedure in his master’s program, he had a paid local 
supervisor. This payment allowed him to make use of the local academic’s 
contacts, and use him as a sounding board, without feeling that the rela-
tionship was exploitative (see Carapico 2014, 27–28 on the sometimes 
shameless imposition by foreign scholars on local researchers). Since then, 
he has had occasional help with translating, both in India and Mexico, 
from people his own age who offered their help, and for whom he has paid 
travel expenses but no fees. He has been reluctant to pay these people, 
whom he considers as friends and stays in touch with. In China, students 
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typically get paid for research assistance to foreign scholars, but also see it 
as an important opportunity for research training and experience. Our 
China researcher has used an assistant once, to find and interview a few 
people in Cantonese. Payment would have been considered offensive since 
this was a friend of a friend who volunteered to help, but our researcher 
wrote her a reference letter for study abroad in return.
The relationship with local collaborators can raise ethical concerns, 
however, when local collaborators are either inexperienced, or dependent 
on us, or both. Inexperienced collaborators, especially people with no 
social science or advocacy background, may not be fully aware of the pos-
sible risks connected with the collaboration. Even collaborators who are 
aware of the risks might agree to do more than it is safe for them because 
they feel a sense of obligation, either in the name of friendship and col-
laboration, or because they are being paid. Our Kazakhstan researcher felt 
greatly responsible, for instance, for volunteers who undertook a door-to- 
door survey for her and a colleague, something that is not very usual in 
Kazakhstan, and can make the police nervous. They took all the measures 
they could think of to make sure the volunteers were safe, gave them secu-
rity training, passed on advice from professional survey-takers, and pro-
vided them with letters on university letterhead, stating that the researchers 
took sole responsibility for the survey in case they were stopped by the 
police, and so on. The survey was taken without incident.
Our general view is that we bear responsibility for research tasks under-
taken for us, whether paid or not. While relying to some extent on our 
local collaborators’ judgment, we also need to make our own assessment 
of whether what we are asking is safe for them to undertake, being aware 
that their position is different from ours because they have to continue to 
live and work in the country, while we can leave. Most of us feel that we 
can undertake such risk assessment, and working with local collaborators 
is a valuable way to save time, get the benefit of a local interpretation, and 
get access to additional material and networks.
While the greater concern should be whether our research causes risk 
to local collaborators, we should also be aware of the opposite possibility, 
that a local collaborator’s other activities and local status compromise 
our research. As Hilhorst et al. (2016, 19) write ‘researchers also need to 
consider the social position of their local colleagues, such as co-research-
ers, translators and drivers. If these people are controversial, the 
researcher will become controversial as a consequence’. Collaborators 
can get into trouble, not because of their research assistance to us but for 
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other reasons. Our Morocco researcher recently paid a local collaborator 
she had known for a decade, for what was meant to be joint research. She 
did not hesitate about hiring him because he was a journalist known to 
be critical of the regime, and the work he would do for her was innocu-
ous by comparison to his own publications. After showing her some ini-
tial work, he dropped out of contact for almost a year. She never 
discovered exactly why, but given the authoritarian context there is 
always the possibility that he may have received some sort of warning 
that caused him to cease all political activities. Having also had a compli-
cated experience with undertaking dangerous research herself at the 
beginning of her career (see next chapter), she is now quite reluctant to 
work with research assistants, because of the risks on both sides of the 
relation, and would only consider the possibility if she were to start 
afresh in a new country with no contacts. Even those of us who do some-
times rely on research assistance still undertake the bulk of interviews 
ourselves. Below we describe how we go about our interviews in the 
authoritarian field.
refusals
Even with introductions, chasing respondents for appointments is proba-
bly the most arduous aspect of fieldwork, and failure is not unusual. It 
happens that a potential respondent simply says no. Our India researcher 
once had a former rebel leader initially agree to an interview, but then later 
sending a text message simply stating ‘I don’t think this interview is in my 
benefit’. And our Iran researcher once found that a journalist and media 
scholar categorically refused to speak to him about a specific topic, despite 
the best possible introductions, because he found the topic too sensitive. 
But such frank, point-blank refusals are extremely rare.
For cultural as well as political reasons, the much more common experi-
ence is that respondents will agree to meet in principle but invent a series 
of excuses to make it practically impossible. Our Kazakhstan researcher 
experienced this while trying to speak to Kazakhstani students in the 
United Kingdom. She introduced herself to local university Kazakh societ-
ies and met apparently willing respondents there, but then when she tried 
to follow up, they were sick, they were busy, they had class, until she had 
left town. This may have been because she lacked the right introductions, 
or because she did not have enough time to follow up the group meetings 
with more informal personal chats to gradually build trust, or possibly 
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because being abroad actually made the students feel more under the radar 
of the government than they would have been at home.
Our Chinese researcher has had quite a few such experiences, especially 
with policy-makers: they are busy, not in town, not in the office. One 
eventually agreed, after being pursued for a month and a half, to speak by 
phone, but then went silent completely, no longer replying to SMS mes-
sages. Another, after many e-mail reminders, asked to see a list of ques-
tions in advance, and then never responded. In some cases, this may be to 
do with the sensitivity of the topic. But in certain contexts, in our experi-
ence especially in China and Iran, meeting someone from a foreign univer-
sity may in itself already be considered sensitive, whatever the subject, 
especially for officials. Such meetings may not pose an immediate risk to 
them, but they are on a career ladder, and meeting researchers may be held 
against them at some point. They are just trying to avoid doing anything 
that could be construed as wrong.
testing the Waters
When meeting our respondents, we do not get straight to the point. 
Instead, we invest time in building the relationship, discussing health, 
families, traffic, and mutual acquaintances if possible. Sometimes this just 
takes the first few minutes of a meeting, especially when people are busy 
and used to being interviewed; at other times the entire first meeting is 
devoted to testing each other out. Sometimes, interviewees will not 
engage in a first meeting without the presence of the people who intro-
duced us to each other, and only afterwards make an appointment for the 
second time. Thomson et  al. (2013, 6), who work in the Great Lakes 
region of Africa, explain why so much effort needs to be invested in build-
ing trust: ‘(a)s researchers we cannot expect people to respond to us with 
openness, nor expect that they will tell us their real opinions and experi-
ences when they have just met us. This is equally true for someone in a 
high-ranking government or rebel position as it is for someone in a remote 
rural area or someone meeting you in the centre of town. Why would 
anyone divulge sensitive information, that if known beyond the confines 
of your interview could get them into trouble with neighbours and local 
authorities alike?’
Knowing the local language is usually not an absolute necessity, but it 
can be an important asset, since most people are simply more comfortable 
in their mother tongue. Our Iran researcher believes that respondents are 
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more open with him speaking Farsi, in part because they appreciate his 
knowledge of the language and in part because it makes interviews feel less 
official. But for others, the choice of language can have complicated politi-
cal connotations, especially for researchers of local or dual heritage. Like 
our own Morocco researcher, a colleague of Moroccan descent who has 
grown up in Europe conducts interviews in French or English. This is not 
because he has difficulty speaking the local dialect of Arabic, but because 
his accent would lead a respondent to make immediate assumptions 
regarding his family’s regional background and social class. His fluent 
English and French and prestigious academic affiliations can offset this, 
but in turn cause him to be seen as more of an outsider. By contrast, a col-
league of Turkish descent who has spent most of his adult life in Europe 
finds that his accent gives him easy access to elite circles, but can cause him 
to be distrusted by ordinary Turks, and even more, Kurds. He prefers to 
use English in his engagement with Kurds in Europe.
Even when we get started with the real interview, there is always an 
initial part where you try to measure each other. As researchers, we try to 
assess how much we can push, not starting right out with the big ques-
tions. If we feel that there is a difficulty with a particular question, we may 
skip it and return to it later. Not all of this is about political sensitivities: 
not everyone is used to giving concise, to-the-point answers even to 
straightforward questions, and multiple approaches may be needed to get 
a question understood and answered. But when sensitive topics are being 
broached, it is all the more important to engage in a careful ritual dance. 
Showing up like a newshound, pen in hand and firing off questions will 
alienate even well-disposed respondents.
We have all experienced situations in which establishing trust was 
unusually difficult. We will illustrate three of the four most common rea-
sons, as we have encountered them: suspicion, ideological hostility, fear, 
and personality. An example of suspicion was experienced recently by our 
China researcher, who was exposed to a kind of reverse interview by a 
policy-maker. For half an hour, she was asked directly and indirectly what 
she wanted, why she does this kind of research, why foreigners are inter-
ested in the details of Chinese policy-making, why our project got a big 
grant, what the EU’s interest in providing such grants might be, and so 
on. Testing her patience, she must have given the desired answers, for she 
eventually got her interview.
In the survey of Middle East scholars undertaken by Clark (2006, 418), 
‘(t)wenty-seven percent of researchers specifically identified anti- westernism 
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(usually in the form of anti-Americanism) and the general suspicion and 
distrust of U.S. policies and perceived agendas as impeding their efforts to 
undertake field research’ (see also Carapico 2014, 27; Jourdan 2013). We 
have not been as pervasively exposed to ideological hostility to westerners 
as an obstacle in field research as Clark reports, perhaps because we are not 
US nationals, and have mostly worked in European universities, but we 
have also come across it. Our Morocco researcher got used to always hav-
ing to sit through a lecture on how Islam is not against women before 
being able to ask Islamist political actors the questions she was actually 
interested in. She once got a more than usually hostile reaction from a 
female Islamist activist, who attributed a question she did not like to the 
researcher’s ‘Judeo-Christian culture’, and ended the meeting soon after-
ward, despite the researcher’s protestations that her interest in the reform 
of Morocco’s Family Law had nothing to do with her personal background. 
Our Kazakhstan researcher experienced ideological hostility in a spontane-
ous encounter with young party officials. After being briefly introduced by 
her contact, an intern, she was left to introduce herself. As soon as she 
started explaining that she was a PhD student in political science from Italy, 
a young man started talking about western scholars who go around criticiz-
ing other countries while neglecting the study of their political problems at 
home. He kept standing and declaiming these ‘truths’ in a loud voice and 
accusatory tone. While it was an unpleasant experience, and it made any 
actual interviews impossible, the incident could be considered as ‘relevant 
data’ in her research on the party’s role in the authoritarian governance of 
Kazakhstan. Other encounters she and local researchers had with young 
party cadres confirmed that this aggressive way of arguing is something at 
least some youth branch leaders use against pro-democracy organizations 
or activists, to delegitimize their claims as something foreign, alien, and 
potentially destabilizing harmony in society.
Fear of reprisals nearly caused an intriguing interview for our Mexico 
researcher to be aborted: he had an initial chat via a mutual friend with 
someone who had an incredible story of state corruption—the building 
she had worked in was partly destroyed supposedly due to a gas explosion, 
but as an engineer who worked in the building she knew there to be no gas 
pipes in or under the building, and suspected self-sabotage. The respon-
dent’s indignation may have sparked her to initially tell the story, but she 
went on to cancel the planned second meeting in which she would discuss 
the incident in more detail, because she feared repercussions. Eventually, 
on a second fieldwork trip, and after another informal meeting, she opened 
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up and told the full story. Fear was the main obstacle to getting interviews 
with civil society organizations in Burma under the military junta, under-
taken by Matelski. She found that organizations that had no regular con-
tact with westerners were reluctant to meet her, and even those that did 
‘remained reluctant to share information’, as ‘it could raise suspicion of 
secret dealings with journalists or activists’ (Matelski 2014, 68–69). When 
we come across fear, we may try to put a potential respondent at ease, but 
it behooves us not to push too hard but to respect their judgment as to 
whether meeting us may pose risks for them.
Our experiences of respondents’ suspicion, ideological hostility and fear 
all relate directly to the authoritarian context. But respondents in authori-
tarian circumstances are also just people, who can be stand-offish, overbear-
ing, offensive, or dishonest for no particular reason. Sometimes, we just do 
not succeed in establishing a connection at a human level, and our interview 
experience remains frustrating. And sometimes, the ‘click’ occurs precisely 
when we give up hope and stop trying to fish for information. Our China 
researcher pursued a well-connected local scholar for over a month, only to 
be harangued for fifteen minutes about how ‘out of date' and 'pointless' her 
research was. Just when she was ready to give up and leave, the scholar 
unexpectedly said that she could try to arrange a meeting with a significant 
insider. She followed through, and the subsequent interview turned out to 
be quite important. Our India researcher experienced something similar 
when interviewing a supporter of the Maoist movement in India: not get-
ting substantive answers to questions, he let go and allowed the interview 
to turn into a free-floating conversation about historic revolutionary trajec-
tories, to which he contributed his own reflections. Somehow, these ideas 
enthused the respondent, and he started sharing precisely the personal 
information on his own motivations that he had previously been holding 
back. These are just two examples of a common experience, that when we 
relax because the interview, whether frustrating or fruitful, is over, our 
respondent also relaxes and shares something with us that turns out to be 
more meaningful than anything we had heard from them before. Markowitz 
(2016, 904) actually recommends ending an interview with a ‘concluding 
ritual’, such as ‘putting a pen cap on the pen and putting the pen on my 
notebook’, precisely because it ‘proved to be remarkably useful in relaxing 
informants and often they began a “side point” or “one more thing”’. 
Formally ending an interview but then asking ‘just one minor question’ is 
also advised by Art, who refers to Inspector Columbo in the classic TV 
series as the master of this stratagem (Art 2016, 981).
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Work With What You have
We think of relations with respondents as a kind of role-play: we do not 
pretend to be anything other than ourselves, but we do present particular 
versions of ourselves that we think will help us build the relation, and 
establish the best possible connection with our respondents. There are 
widely different strategies for this, which have a little bit to do with one’s 
personality, but actually more with how we are seen by others on the basis 
of ascriptive categories like nationality, age, and gender. Below, we set out 
some opposites to illustrate how different characteristics propel us towards 
different roles—but these are stylized foils. In reality, our interviewer per-
sona is not so entirely fixed: it may evolve over time, it partly depends on 
the type of respondent, and sometimes we may even change gear in the 
midst of an interview to get more traction.
Our researcher in India and Mexico, a young man doing research on 
forms of repression, typically tries to make the relation with respondents 
as informal as possible, often meeting people multiple times, looking for 
ways to break the ice, trying to make it ‘click’. This approach seems quite 
natural when meeting journalists or human rights activists, who often have 
values similar to our own. But he has also applied it with ‘agents of repres-
sion’: police or security officials. One of his most revealing interviews has 
been with a security agent in a bar, who was detailing how he harasses 
opposition politicians for a living, while drinking and using cocaine. For 
our Morocco researcher, a young woman operating in the Arab world, 
such an approach would be a recipe for disaster: diving into informality 
with a relative stranger, seeking repeat meetings, being in places where 
alcohol or drugs are consumed could all lead to misunderstandings. 
Instead, she stresses her professional persona, makes it clear that inter-
viewing people is ‘work’, and while engaging in the necessary small talk as 
described above, she deflects questions about her private life. Our 
Kazakhstan researcher, operating in a context less marked by stereotypical 
views about the sexual morality of western women, steers an in-between 
course. She would not meet respondents at a bar or in the evening, but her 
approach is a little more informal. She uses her nationality, making assump-
tions about respondent impressions of Italian culture, and emphasizing 
similarities like the importance of hospitality, late dinners, and big 
weddings.
Akin to the informal/professional divide, but a little different, is the 
choice to present ourselves as well-informed or naïve. Naivety is a 
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 commonly used interview strategy (Goode 2011; Solinger 2006; Henrion- 
Douncy 2013), typically more available to young women and foreigners. 
Our China researcher, while not actually foreign, uses both elements, 
especially with older men in senior positions (whether in government, 
research institutions, or companies) who often possess both stereotypical 
views of young women and valuable information. When it comes to gen-
der, the experiences of other China scholars we know include one that 
illustrates our sense that women are considered less threatening, and may 
sometimes have greater access to officials precisely in authoritarian circum-
stances: two foreign researchers both did research regarding the top lead-
ership of the party (i.e. the most sensitive kind there is, see our previous 
chapter) at roughly the same time. Both were given permission to do 
fieldwork, but when the male academic approached government officials, 
many people refused to speak to him. When the female researcher did, it 
was all green lights.
Apart from her gender, our China researcher also employs her partial 
outsider status, playing up the fact that she has been abroad for very long, 
which makes it possible for her to ask some relatively more sensitive ques-
tions that foreigners can usually ask, but that would not be available to a 
scholar who has remained in China. But she can switch from ‘naïve’ to 
‘professional’, showing her familiarity with relevant details, when she feels 
that a respondent is spinning her a line. As we already illustrated in rela-
tion to the use of language, there is great variation in the positionality, and 
strategies available to, researchers with local or non-western roots (see also 
Malekzadeh 2016, 867). A colleague of Moroccan origin finds that he can 
only feign naivety to a certain extent. It would seem disingenuous to act 
as if he does not understand how things work in Morocco, and sometimes 
even when he is really baffled, locals still expect him to understand. Yom 
on the other hand, an American Middle East scholar of Korean descent, 
often found himself inexplicably cast as more of an outsider to the field 
than white western academics, and hence considered either more ignorant 
or more objective than they are (Yom 2014, 18).
In contrast to the naïve stance, showing that you have ‘done your 
homework’ has been the strategy of our Malaysia researcher when 
approaching well-known activists, who are typically very busy, sometimes 
a little self-important, and in regular demand for interviews with research-
ers and journalists. Display of expertise worked for him, for instance, with 
an activist who had been elusive and eventually told him to come and meet 
outside a bar where he was drinking with friends. The respondent initially 
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took a rather abusive tone in front of his friends. Our researcher immedi-
ately launched into a detailed question about events twenty years ago, 
which eventually led to an in-depth one-to-one conversation and a follow-
 up at the respondent’s home. In line with her professional persona, our 
Morocco researcher, who interviews mainly officials, similarly prefers to 
set out her ‘case knowledge’ of a topic early on so as to be taken seriously. 
She also builds trust by showing that she knows what she is doing in pro-
cedural terms, for instance, discussing the status of the conversation as 
off-the-record, anonymous, and so on. But she has also experienced how, 
working as a pair with a researcher less steeped in local knowledge, they 
managed to have it both ways, using expertise and naivety in tandem. Her 
colleague, who had a more basic command of French, could at some point 
break into the interview, posing quasi-ingenuous questions that she herself 
did not feel able to ask, but the boldness of which could be attributed to 
her inability to express herself more subtly in French.
A final consideration is whether to present ourselves as an ‘important’ 
or a very junior person. Again, our choices are very much constrained by 
age, gender, and position, but each of us can work with what they have. A 
male middle-aged full professor may well find it easier to get an appoint-
ment with an official than a young female PhD student. But by being 
considered more consequential, he may also be more threatening and may 
have less fruitful interviews. While our Morocco researcher regularly uses 
her doctoral title to get in the door, our Iran researcher by contrast still 
sometimes introduces himself as ‘a student’ to diminish his importance, 
years after finishing his PhD.
Where to Meet
We generally like to leave it up to the respondent to suggest a venue for 
meeting, but again there is a considerable gender divide, almost regardless 
of the context. Our Iran, Malaysia, and India-Mexico researchers are all 
male and interview primarily activists and journalists. For them, cafés, 
bars, and shopping malls are obvious meeting places. All of them have also 
occasionally met respondents at their homes. The women among us by 
contrast will avoid meeting strangers at their homes, at a hotel, or late at 
night. Beyond the gender issue, meeting a respondent in a public place 
implies that neither they nor we are uncomfortable about being seen 
together. This fits with our general commitment to being open about 
what we do, and not behaving like spies. Both our China and our Iran 
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researcher have experienced that whether one meets in a café or restaurant 
or in someone’s office may affect the flavor of an interview. Going to 
people’s offices implies that the interview becomes more official, they will 
consider you more as a professional, and they use more official language; 
at a dinner people will be more relaxed and talkative. Going out to dinner 
does mean being seen together, possibly also by government agents, but 
both in China and Iran, people who are concerned about being associated 
with us would probably refuse a meeting in any case. Dinners with our 
liaison or others present are in a way also less political. Reny (2016, 918) 
describes, also in the Chinese context, how she was once refused an inter-
view by an official, and given the message that the contact person ‘should 
have invited him out to dinner’ and then have the researcher join, so the 
meeting could have been presented as spontaneous. Dinner meetings do 
pose challenges for note-taking or recording however: neither are very 
practical or appropriate while eating food, so the researcher must some-
how rely on her memory and write it all up immediately afterward.
triangulation, not Confrontation
While we have very different approaches to how we present ourselves and 
where we meet, we have considerable consensus on what to avoid during 
an interview: confrontation. Confrontation is a frequently employed style 
of interviewing in journalism. We do not know to what extent academic 
researchers in democratic circumstances ever employ confrontation as an 
interviewing strategy, but we do know that for researchers of authoritari-
anism, it is not a helpful approach to improving our understanding of how 
things work. It is not our job to influence the views of our interviewees, 
let alone change them, but to try and establish how they see things, or at 
least how they choose to present them. Our approach is markedly differ-
ent in this respect from the one recommended by Markowitz (2016, 905), 
who writes that in authoritarian circumstances, interviewers ‘need to be 
prepared to raise hard questions that bring tension into the room, to chal-
lenge informants when they are giving the official line and not their own 
viewpoint, and to identify discrepancies even to the point of calling him/
her out on a false statement’.
There are two elements to our stance. First, while we are obviously 
critical in many ways of the political systems we study, we do not arrogate 
to ourselves the right to prescribe to the locals how they could be improved. 
The western societies we belong to or have chosen to live in are also 
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flawed. Moreover, they may be directly or indirectly implicated, today and 
through a shared global history of exploitation and domination, in the 
authoritarian rule of the societies we study. The second reason is more 
pragmatic: confrontation is simply not productive to our line of work. It 
can lead to respondents shutting us out and spouting well-worn ideologi-
cal positions rather than answering questions.
That is not to say that we swallow whole everything respondents tell us. 
Regardless who we speak to, we always assume it is their perspective, 
informed by their worldview, and often their interest, that we get. Our job 
is not to push back during the interview—at least not aggressively—but 
rather to place it in context based on triangulation with other sources. 
While there is great variation in how much interesting information respon-
dents have, how much they want to share, and how well they can remem-
ber and tell us, there is no such thing as a bad interview. There is always 
something worthwhile about every encounter, even if it was not at all what 
we were looking for, and never makes it into our written work, it still adds 
to our overall understanding of things.
We are undoubtedly more at ease speaking to like-minded people, that 
is, people who in some way have a critical stance vis-à-vis the regimes they 
live under, than speaking to zealous or bureaucratic government officials. 
We quickly establish a friendly connection based on shared understand-
ings, and they may be happy to encounter someone they can have an open 
conversation with. There is a risk here though, perhaps more than when 
we speak to officials, of bias. Spending a lot of time with people who may 
already be closer to our worldview than many of their compatriots, we are 
likely to be influenced by their ideas, views, and discourse (see also Ahram 
and Goode 2016, 843). At the same time, being more similar to us than 
others does not always make them the most interesting respondents. In 
fact, some of us have the experience that people who see themselves as 
intellectuals can be difficult interviewees, because they like to speak in 
abstract terms and share their entire worldview, when we are looking to 
hear factual details, or personal experiences. We have also found activist 
views to be sometimes marked by vanity and bravado, at other times by 
excessive cynicism about their role, or by a predilection for conspiracy 
theories (to which we find authoritarian settings generally conducive).
In interviews with officials, we approach people with respect, knowing 
that just as we are doing our job, they are doing theirs. Even if somebody 
is literally telling us lies, we will not openly contradict them. This would 
only humiliate and alienate them. Instead, we treat their version of the 
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truth as interesting. To give an example, our Kazakhstan reporter inter-
viewed the director of an NGO. She knew from other sources that his was 
not a ‘real’ NGO but an organization reliant on state funding, without 
significant grassroots support. Instead of challenging him about the 
absence of a popular constituency, she asked him more neutrally about the 
organization’s collaboration with state agencies in its activities, more gen-
tly exploring with him why and how he chose to present his organization 
as an NGO, what its actual status was, and getting answers.
sensitive inforMation
Having made successful efforts to gain the trust of respondents, we will 
often be entrusted with sensitive information. While we take every possi-
ble care to keep our transcripts safe (see Chaps. 2 and 6), we cannot give 
an absolute guarantee that it will never fall into the wrong hands. In this 
context, we typically trust our respondents to make their own judgments 
about the information they entrust to us. We assume that they consider 
what they want to share with us, and that they are aware that there may be 
some risk in speaking to us, however minimal. We do this in the knowl-
edge that their judgment is not infallible, but ours would not necessarily 
be better. Some will err on the side of caution. Indeed, our Morocco 
researcher once had a respondent spell it out in so many words when she 
asked him about the religious legitimacy of the King: ‘if you can assure me 
that you can protect me I will give you my answer, I will tell you what I 
think—but since you cannot I will not answer your question’. Others may 
be less forthright but make the same call.
Our general experience with officials is that they are very much aware 
of exactly what they can and cannot say, they are used to weighing their 
words, and they will rarely be reckless. The experience with activists is a 
little more varied. On the one hand, they move in a complicated political 
setting, and we know they think about this a lot. On the other hand, they 
would not be activists in an authoritarian setting if they were entirely risk 
averse. Sometimes they can be too nonchalant, or too much affected by a 
stranger’s interest in hearing their views and experiences. Our India and 
Mexico researcher has had the experience that a respondent instantly 
began sharing some quite inflammatory information without making 
much effort to properly understand who was interviewing him, for what 
purpose, and with what safeguards. In such a case, we might reconsider 
whether it is actually responsible to use the information we have been 
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given, whereas when we feel that the respondent has carefully considered 
what they have told us on the record, we will have fewer qualms (see also 
Chap. 6 on how we write up and reference our sources).
Being Manipulated
As described above, we assume that respondents have a particular version 
of the truth that they want to share with us, perhaps even an agenda, and 
while it can be challenging to figure out how to value and triangulate dif-
ferent accounts, we consider this part and parcel of our craft. But occa-
sionally, we have encountered more blatant forms of manipulation. It is 
easy to suggest in the abstract that one should not fall for such attempts, 
but in practice it can, for different reasons, be difficult to avoid being 
manipulated. We describe a few of our experiences and try to draw some 
lessons.
One such pitfall is the ‘resentful respondent’, who may have valuable 
information to share, but has his own reasons (resentment against the 
system in general, or against a particular person) to speak to us. On one 
level, such a person can give us access to information that we would oth-
erwise not be able to get. However, precisely because such data cannot 
easily be triangulated, it is more than usually difficult to assess its veracity. 
A second risk is that, unless we can keep the contact entirely confidential, 
it may interfere with the willingness of others to trust and speak to us. 
Both our India and our Kazakhstan researcher have encountered a ‘resent-
ful respondent’. Whereas the India researcher has cultivated the contact 
while being aware of the risk of manipulation, the Kazakhstan researcher 
decided to forego the opportunity. The difference lay not so much in their 
ability to judge the veracity of the respondent’s account, as in their research 
topic, and the associated opportunity cost: the Kazakhstan researcher 
feared it would interfere with the relationship she was building with other 
party cadres, whereas the India researcher was already focusing on regime 
critics rather than insiders, so had little to lose.
Our Iran researcher has experienced the opposite situation: being 
manipulated by a former dissident turned regime informer. He met this 
young journalist, who wrote about films and had reformist leanings, on his 
first visit to Iran, spent time with him regularly, and developed a friendship. 
On a return visit, the journalist told our researcher he had been arrested 
before and feared another arrest. He instructed our researcher that if he 
should drop out of contact, the researcher was to deliver a  prewritten press 
release reporting the journalist’s renewed arrest to Reporters Without 
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Borders and other advocacy organizations. When the journalist did in fact 
disappear, our Iran researcher, concerned for the fate of his friend, did 
indeed send the press release. It later transpired that this second arrest was 
fake. During the first arrest, the journalist had been put under pressure and 
had become an informant for the intelligence agency. The pretend second 
arrest was intended to dispel suspicion among the fellow government crit-
ics on whom he was informing. With hindsight, our researcher believes he 
should have discussed the situation with other contacts before sending out 
the press release. If he had done so, he might have picked up on rumors 
already circulating that this person was an informer, and he would have 
reconsidered sending the press release. But it was precisely the authoritar-
ian context that caused him to be secretive and trust no one.
A third instance of manipulation, experienced again by our Kazakhstan 
researcher, involved her being invited to write (a very minor piece of) pro-
paganda for the regime. At the time, Almaty was bidding to host the 2022 
winter Olympics, a bid eventually won by Beijing. A warm contact, a young 
official she had known for many years, and had seen rise in various govern-
ment positions, called with a small request. She was asked to write an 
English-language article (in fact she was sent a suggested text but told she 
was free to write whatever she liked) for a website about what a nice city 
Almaty was, so that the local media could in turn quote this foreigner’s 
piece supporting the bid. Despite the fact that the article did not need to be 
overtly political, and might have been published on an obscure website, she 
decided that writing it would compromise her integrity as a scholar. But 
there was a price to pay. She attempted to limit the offense to her contact by 
citing her team leader’s prohibition as the reason, but her refusal nonethe-
less did irreparable damage to her relationship with a very helpful contact.
Since every situation of manipulation is different, it is difficult to draw 
general lessons. The last of the three incidents sketched here is perhaps the 
easiest to adjudicate: what we do for a living is write, and one of the rea-
sons our writings are valued by society is their independence. We do not 
necessarily take a ‘neutral’ stance, but straightforward advocacy either for 
or against the regime interferes fundamentally with our ability to form and 
disseminate autonomous views. For the other situations, an important 
suggestion is not to act precipitously, and to recognize that you do not 
have to be all alone in making these judgment calls. A decision taken after 
reflection and consultation both with trusted local contacts and academic 
colleagues at home (without unnecessarily divulging sensitive details) may 
be a better decision, even when we do not have as much information as we 
would like on which to base it.
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doing things in return
There are different reasons why respondents are willing to talk to us. At 
the simplest level, it is because we ask them, and most people like granting 
a polite request better than refusing it. Some respondents feel under an 
obligation to the people who introduced us. Many have an agenda of 
some sort, which may be their own or that of the organization they repre-
sent. Government officials may be flattered that their views and experi-
ences are deemed relevant to scientific research, considering it a boon to 
their personal prestige to be interviewed by a foreign researcher. Activists 
are often just happy that there is one person more who knows what they 
are doing. Without the willingness of all sorts of people to speak to us, 
share their time, their views and their knowledge with us, we would not be 
able to do our work. The same is not true for them. We may occasionally 
be in a position to do a respondent a favor, but overall, we cannot be as 
crucially useful to them as they are to us. This puts us in their debt. We try 
to handle that debt as best we can.
This begins with recognizing the debt, showing appreciation, and sig-
naling our willingness to do something in return. As Loyle (2016, 933) 
puts it, ‘acknowledging a basic responsibility to contribute in some small 
way goes far in demonstrating respect for the individuals who give of their 
own time for our research’. At the simplest level, after a good conversa-
tion, we can send a respondent a message to thank them. If we promise to 
share results with respondents, in the form of a published article, then we 
would normally need to keep that promise. But making such a promise 
and keeping it is not always possible, either simply because respondents 
may not be able to read English, or, more specific to the authoritarian 
context, it might be problematic for them to receive the text. One of us 
conducted interviews with activists in Cairo during the Morsi period, and 
intended to send them her findings, but by the time the research was pub-
lished, the situation in Egypt had changed so dramatically that she did not 
think it safe to send them the report or subsequent articles.
We try to stay in touch with respondents after the interview but it does 
not always happen; we are busy and perhaps they are too. While we will 
acknowledge our sources, they often need to be anonymized, and some-
times their contribution to our understanding needs to be downplayed for 
their safety (see also Chap. 6), making our acknowledgment appear inad-
equate. Our Iran researcher, for instance, ended up not acknowledging his 
Iranian tutor in his PhD thesis, published during the most restrictive 
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period after the Green Movement in 2012. Likewise, the research assistant 
and translator on the Cairo interviews mentioned above was never 
acknowledged by name.
When it actually comes to returning favors, there are often—very con-
textual—cultural as well as ethical constraints on what is appropriate. Our 
local academic contacts we can sometimes repay very appropriately, by 
offering to teach a class to their students. Even if we are wary about teach-
ing political science topics because they might be sensitive, we might teach 
on our home country’s politics, and there is always methods teaching. 
Some of us may be able to teach quantitative methods, but most likely, we 
have expertise in qualitative methods, such as interviewing and document 
analysis, which is a topic under-taught at most western universities, let 
alone non-western ones. At other times, we may be helpful to respondents 
by helping them navigate forms or websites or write in English. But we 
also need to be clear about what is not possible: we can help respondents 
fill out applications for visa or scholarships, but we cannot help them get 
the visa or scholarship.
We often meet respondents in cafés or restaurants. From a research eth-
ics perspective, we all consider it entirely appropriate that we should offer 
to pay the bill. We see it as a token of appreciation, not as any kind of remu-
neration. However, we have found that cultural norms are widely divergent 
on this matter, and unintended offense may be given if we get it wrong. In 
China, paying is completely acceptable: after all you have invited the per-
son, however senior they might be. Our Morocco researcher also frequently 
pays for a meal, and in fact finds the offer of lunch or dinner to be a useful 
response to officials who say they are too busy to meet during office hours. 
But our Kazakhstan and Iranian researchers’ experience is that most respon-
dents would be deeply offended by a paying researcher, taking it as a refusal 
of hospitality by a guest in their country. Students might be more willing 
to be treated, but even they might at least make a show of attempting to 
pick up the bill. Our Malaysia researcher found that, while he paid for 
drinks for ordinary young people as a matter of course, activists were ada-
mant about paying for themselves for a different reason. Possibly because 
of government allegations regarding foreign funding, they had a height-
ened sensitivity towards accepting even the smallest thing that might be 
construed as a bribe. When it comes to small gifts, our practices also 
diverge. Most of us might bring presents for personal friends to our field-
work, but not for people we meet for an interview; but in China, a book-
mark or some tea, worth less than 5 euros, is quite acceptable.
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None of us ever pay for interviews. We can imagine circumstances in 
which it might be appropriate to do so: with respondents who are particu-
larly poor and vulnerable, to the point that recording their material hard-
ship without doing anything to alleviate it would be unethical. This might 
make sense, for instance, when interviewing undocumented migrants, 
people in IDP camps, or slum dwellers. But our own research has not typi-
cally focused on the most marginalized. In the authoritarian field, we 
believe payment poses various problems. First of all, any significant sum 
would cause a power shift: the respondent goes from being a ‘creditor’, 
giving us their time and insights, to being in our debt. This might cause 
them to feel pressured to answer even when they are not comfortable to 
do so. Second, it can lead to ‘desirable’ answers, with respondents telling 
us what they think we want to hear, causing validity problems. Finally, in 
some contexts, payment would be considered suspicious by the authori-
ties. This could pose risk to the respondents as well as delegitimize critical 
findings (see also Loyle 2016, 933, who lists the same ethical and validity 
problems with paying respondents in authoritarian circumstances).
More of a conundrum is posed by interviews with respondents from 
non-governmental organizations. Since they represent causes beyond their 
own self-interest, they can be quite forward about requesting a ‘voluntary’ 
donation in exchange for their time. The ethical implications of complying 
with such requests depend a great deal on the circumstances: it may be less 
problematic when we interview staff than when the organization acts as a 
gatekeeper vis-à-vis members or beneficiaries we would like to interview, 
and less problematic when solicited after an interview than before it. We 
have sporadically made such donations but emphasized that these were 
personal contributions to a cause we valued, not a form of payment, and 
indeed we have not expensed them. More often, we try to fend off such 
requests without giving offense, saying we will think it over.
Chapter ConClusion: patienCe, trust, 
and reCognition
Building relations with respondents for primarily interview-based research 
is not fundamentally different in authoritarian contexts than in politically 
open societies. In all cases, it requires social intelligence: fine-tuned anten-
nae for the words and body language of people we interact with, and the 
ability to interpret and respond to these signals. It is just that, in authori-
tarian contexts, the need for these skills is further accentuated. Building 
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trust is both more difficult and more crucial. Getting to the nub of what 
we really want to know requires more patience. As we have shown in this 
chapter, it is useful to reflect explicitly on our relation with our respon-
dents, in both directions. This is even more so with local collaborators, 
where we must think through consequences of their possible dependence 
on us, especially in relation to risk. In interviewing, we have to find a bal-
ance between openness and presenting a persona that contributes to a 
constructive conversation. We also have to be accepting of the versions of 
the truth, some more plausible than others, that respondents share with 
us, and treat them as interesting and worthy of respect as well as in need 
of triangulation and critical analysis. While we are occasionally at risk of 
blatant manipulation, the more common situation is that we are indebted 
to our respondents, a debt that we acknowledge, but cannot fully repay.
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Abstract In this chapter, we describe our encounters with targeted sur-
veillance and intimidation, betrayal, and being confronted with hard sto-
ries of suffering, torture, and brutal murder. We consider the feelings of 
stress, fear, and paranoia that may result from operating in a repressive 
environment and what we need to do, individually and institutionally, to 
mitigate and manage the harmful mental impact of fieldwork. We then 
turn to how pressure to get results, and a sense of shame and career wor-
ries associated with not getting them, can compound negative impact of 
fieldwork. Finally though, we also record the positive effects of fieldwork 
on our psyche and worldview. We conclude with the importance of mak-
ing it possible to talk about mental impact, before, during, and after 
fieldwork.
Keywords Authoritarianism • Field research • Surveillance • Stress • 
Trauma • Career pressure
In this chapter, we will discuss a topic that we believe receives too little 
attention: the mental impact that being in the authoritarian field has on us. 
As in earlier chapters, we focus on the specificities of the authoritarian field 
while recognizing that some of our observations may well apply to other 
kinds of ‘difficult’ contexts too. We all experience fieldwork as times of 
excitement as well as stress. Being away from our home life, in the pres-
ence of some risk, and having to process things very quickly, is tiring but 
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at the same time gives us a lot of energy, because we get a lot of input. 
What is common to all kinds of fieldwork, and stressful in itself, is that we 
try to gather as much information and speak to as many relevant people as 
possible, always in a limited time. We often worry about whether we have 
done enough, and have the sense that we can always do more. For first- 
time researchers, an especially big question looms: will people talk to me 
at all?
Also common to all fieldwork far away from home, is our need to adjust 
to a context very different to our own. This extends to seemingly mun-
dane problems like pollution and traffic, that can nonetheless have a con-
siderable impact on our state of mind. Then there is the social and cultural 
adjustment. Even our China researcher, who is ostensibly visiting ‘home’, 
finds herself marveling at the hierarchy in the workplace and in the family, 
the way people treat each other in the street, and getting irritated by value 
differences even in conversations with friends. Our Iran researcher finds 
many of his close contacts depressed by the political and economic obsta-
cles they face, and in turn he finds their inability to realize their potential 
depressing.
As researchers in authoritarian contexts, we probably face more refusals 
and less openness than other researchers. This can come in the form of 
avoiding an interview, as described in the last chapter. Even when we do 
get the interview, especially with officials, we are always playing a game, 
where we do not cross the red lines, but skirt around the edges, trying to 
draw out as much information as we can. Our obstacles can also relate to 
documents that we know exist, but that our respondents do not want to 
share with us, perhaps because their bosses will not give permission, or 
more generally because it is better in authoritarian bureaucracies not to 
take such initiatives. As a result, we can feel frustrated, knowing the infor-
mation is there but we cannot get it (see Barros 2016, 964–965, on 
bureaucratic secrecy in authoritarian contexts). And while, as we have 
stressed before, authoritarian contexts are not unsafe for foreign research-
ers most of the time, they are marked by persistent uncertainty. We never 
know precisely what the regime knows and thinks of us and under what 
circumstances it might abruptly conclude that what we are doing is caus-
ing them a problem.
Below, we describe our encounters with targeted surveillance and 
intimidation, and the feelings of stress, fear, and paranoia that we have 
experienced as a result of operating in a repressive environment. We dis-
cuss the impact of either direct betrayal by, or a sense of disenchantment 
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with, people we had cordial relations with in the field, and the impact of 
being confronted with hard stories of suffering, torture, and brutal mur-
der, in the field or afterward. We consider the underdeveloped topic of 
what we need to do, individually and institutionally, to mitigate and man-
age the consequences of harmful mental impact of fieldwork: making 
mental impact a subject that can be discussed and made subject to a range 
of coping strategies; reflecting on the effects of stressful incidents and hard 
stories on validity and bias of our research; reconsidering after such events 
what fields, what subjects, and research questions we still can and want to 
investigate; and the physical impact of mental stress. We then turn to a 
broader issue in academia that can compound negative mental impact and 
complicate the usual mitigation strategies: the pressure to get results and 
the sense of shame and career worries associated with not getting them. 
Finally though, we also record the positive effects of fieldwork on our 
psyche and worldview. We conclude by emphasizing how helpful we have 
found sharing our fears and dilemmas. By doing so we hope to counter the 
academic predilection for focusing on achievements over discussing doubts 
and difficulties.
TargeTed Surveillance
Since the Snowden revelations, the idea that our transactions, communi-
cations, and even our documents may be monitored and analyzed by 
unseen entities without our knowledge or permission has turned from an 
outlandish conspiracy theory into an open possibility for most Internet 
users worldwide. Interestingly, we find that this seems to be making us 
rather stoical about the possibility of being under electronic surveillance 
from the authoritarian regimes we investigate. Since our overall policy is 
to be open about the work we do, we do not encrypt or hide away our 
documents, other than transcripts or respondent contact details, as 
described in the last chapter. Drafts of this book, for instance, have been 
edited and saved on various servers and clouds.
Our China and Kazakhstan researchers have never personally noticed 
signs of surveillance. They are cautious about contact with vulnerable 
respondents online, but mostly the idea of surveillance remains rather 
abstract and does not affect them. The Kazakhstan researcher used to 
work in a formerly government-owned building that was commonly 
believed to be wired, but did not really care, nor did her coworkers. The 
China researcher has noted how quickly her Chinese acquaintances adapt, 
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and develop language online that is mutually understood, but not picked 
up or blocked by automated censorship devices. She found that many of 
her interviewees happily contacted her via social media in the knowledge 
that there might be surveillance.
Our attitudes change when we get concrete indications that, rather 
than just being absorbed into general surveillance and censorship prac-
tices, we are specifically being targeted by security agents. Our Morocco 
researcher is certain that she was under electronic surveillance during one 
particular fieldwork period. Returning to her hotel after an interview, she 
opened her laptop and saw that her Google mail account had been accessed 
while she was out. She also received phishing e-mails that would appear to 
fit with what Moroccan activists and journalists have reported (Privacy 
International 2015). She has not had indications of electronic surveillance 
on subsequent field trips, but she is convinced that her phone is tapped 
when she is in Morocco and is careful about what she says on the phone. 
It took her time to come to terms with this. By repeating to herself that 
the people undertaking the surveillance were only doing their job, as she 
was doing hers, she regained her peace of mind. The electronic surveil-
lance episode to her mind has validated her approach of taking handwrit-
ten notes rather than recording interviews (see ch.6).
Our Malaysia researcher does not have similarly definitive evidence, 
but both activists and ordinary Malaysians have told him that they 
assumed the authorities were reading his e-mail and WhatsApp messages 
during his field research. The activists he interviewed were fairly certain 
that they were being monitored: after they had agreed via WhatsApp to 
meet each other at a particular coffee house, special branch people 
would typically  be seen at the coffee house at the appointed time. 
Initially our researcher was shocked to hear this and very cautious in his 
questioning. On reflection, however, he decided that if asked during an 
interview what he was doing, he would stick to our policy of openness 
and not lie but simply explain that he was conducting an interview. His 
respondents did not appear particularly intimidated, and for himself, he 
later thought, eviction was the worst thing that was likely to happen. 
One of the Mexico researcher’s respondents similarly told him during an 
interview that phone conversations were tapped, and it was likely that 
security agents knew that the interview was taking place. As we will 
detail below, they had much more reason to be afraid than their 
Malaysian counterparts. Our Iran researcher similarly suspects that when 
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he met journalists in their newspaper offices, these buildings were under 
surveillance, and notes may have been taken to document his visit. 
Giving in to this thought could make him feel somewhat paranoid from 
time to time, but he decided not to be deterred by a mere suspicion of 
surveillance.
In these cases, it remains ambiguous how pervasive the surveillance 
effort was, and also whether regime agents wanted us to know they were 
monitoring us, or tried to be subtle. While there may be exceptions, we 
should assume that in an authoritarian context, critical journalists and 
activists are likely to be under (online and/or offline) surveillance to some 
degree, and there is a good possibility that we as researchers may come 
under the radar if we contact them, even if we never notice it. None of this 
was ambiguous when our Morocco researcher was investigating human 
rights abuses committed against—real or supposed—Salafists. Soon after 
her meeting with relatives of Salafi prisoners (detailed below), she was 
conducting an interview in an otherwise empty coffee house, and two 
people came to sit at the next table, pretending to read a newspaper but 
clearly listening in to the interview. During the next two days, she was 
continually being followed. A man sat down next to her in a nearly empty 
train. She moved to another seat, but again she was followed. When she 
got out of the train, he was still there. When she arrived at the airport, the 
same person was in the queue behind her, but then magically appeared in 
front of her after security control. This was surveillance intended to intim-
idate, and it did.
For reasons detailed below, the Morocco researcher nevertheless 
returned to Morocco, but this time prepared a number of safety measures, 
making arrangements to meet friends at the airport, informing the Italian 
embassy of what she was doing, and asking for official permission to do 
the research. Faced again with intrusive surveillance, she met a friend at a 
coffee bar and, again with a security agent in a nearly empty café as audi-
ence, told her friend that she had no interest in the Salafi research; she was 
just doing it because she needed the money, her real interest was in wom-
en’s rights. When for months her request for authorization remained ‘in 
process’, she acted according to her own stated intentions, and gave up 
the research on Salafists. She experienced some more surveillance, but as 
it became increasingly clear that she was no longer following this line of 
inquiry, the surveillance melted away. She had encountered a red line (see 
Chap.3) and has chosen not to cross it again.
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STreSS, Fear, and Paranoia
Most of the time when we are doing fieldwork, we are not afraid, we feel 
comfortable in the environment in which we are staying. Indeed, it would 
be impossible to do our work, staying in the field for weeks and sometimes 
months, if it were otherwise. But we want to come out and say that some-
times, when doing research in the authoritarian field, we feel anxious, 
afraid, even a little paranoid.
For some of us, the most frightening incidents have been those where 
we were directly targeted, such as the intrusive surveillance experienced by 
our Morocco researcher, described above. Our Malaysia researcher was 
quite frightened after the incident, described in Chap. 2, in which plain-
clothes police had photographed his passport. It was at this same time he 
discovered that his e-mail was probably being read. Moreover, the inci-
dent occurred within weeks of the death of Giulio Regeni, and the Dutch 
embassy had helpfully told him that a Dutch person was sometimes 
arrested and held for weeks without the embassy being informed—possi-
bly to deter him from attending the demonstration. He spent a sleepless 
night expecting a knock on the door, and for the next few days continually 
considered the possibility of being arrested. After a few days, when noth-
ing happened, he recovered his calm and continued his fieldwork 
uneventfully.
Our Iran researcher has experienced a terrifying incident with a much 
longer tail. In Chap. 4, we described how he had been tricked by a former 
journalist turned informer into corroborating this man’s fake arrest, so as 
to bolster his cover. A year later, the same man (whom our researcher still 
believed to be his friend) showed up at his apartment, admitting that he 
worked for the security services and claiming that these had become very 
suspicious of the researcher. The man, whom we shall call Ramin here, 
could help close the file, but he needed money. Ramin then announced 
that ‘one of my colleagues will enter your apartment also and he will search 
your apartment, but I will protect you.’ Indeed, a second man came, and 
our researcher really panicked. Ramin wanted 4000 or 5000 euro, while 
the second person started searching the researcher’s wastepaper basket 
and computer, finding handwritten notes about the arrest of bloggers and 
some saved articles by an Iranian French scholar, about whom they pro-
ceeded to interrogate him, closing the curtains of the apartment. They 
tried to get him off-balance.
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He felt a mix of panic and amusement, because the situation was scary 
but also somewhat ridiculous, with both men behaving like movie script 
intelligence agents or interrogators. He remembers repeatedly thinking 
‘come on, now you are overdoing it’ as the incident unfolded. Eventually, 
they allowed him to call someone, ostensibly to get the money. He called 
a friend, who could tell from his voice that he was very scared, and imme-
diately called the French research institute with which he was affiliated. 
Eventually someone from the French embassy came to the apartment and 
took our researcher with him, to safety. Soon after, he left the country for 
a few weeks, in part for his safety, but especially also to calm down. In this 
case, it remains unclear whether the primary purpose of the plot was to 
steal money or to induce fear, but it certainly had that latter effect.
In overtly repressive contexts, we may also experience moments of fear 
that have nothing to do with us personally. Our Mexico researcher has 
been vividly aware during his field research of certain locations that have 
been the scene of horrific events. Coming to a shopping center for an 
interview, he experienced mental images of what had happened there a 
year earlier: a truck full of dead bodies had been dumped in the street. 
Another source of temporary bouts of fear or discomfort for him were the 
federal police at every street corner. Not only were they heavily armed, 
they are known to have been involved in various political murders.
As we have stressed in Chap. 2, instances of intimidation of foreign 
researchers are relatively rare. But they happen just often enough, in the 
broader context of what we know of the repressive side of the regime, to 
make us always a little apprehensive during fieldwork. As Malekzadeh 
(2016, 868) has related in the context of Iran, the likelihood was that he 
would not be in any danger, but he ‘could not be certain why agents had 
checked up on me or where it would lead. The problem, of course, was the 
uncertainty. Regimes like the Islamic Republic excel in sowing doubt’. It 
is quite clear who is in power, but there is always a residual uncertainty 
about what we are allowed to do, and what can happen to us.
BeTrayal and diSenchanTmenT
The emotional response of our Iran researcher to the intrusion into his flat 
and subsequent extortion attempt was not just one of fear. He also felt a 
sense of betrayal. When he had first come to know Ramin, he had come to 
consider him not just as a respondent but also as a friend, who had helped 
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him understand the political context of Iran and whom he trusted. When 
he sent out the press release about the man’s supposed arrest, he had been 
concerned for Ramin’s safety. When the intrusion occurred, he came to 
understand, from one moment to the next, that this was not his friend, 
this was someone doing him harm. He had difficulty believing that this 
was really true. But the sense of betrayal described here is not just personal 
betrayal, it has to be understood in its authoritarian context. As it happens, 
our Iran researcher grew up in East Germany and thought that his youth 
had taught him always to be suspicious. Instead, he had been too trustful 
and forgotten how ugly the intrusion of an authoritarian regime in per-
sonal relations can become.
Also characteristic of authoritarian circumstances is the lack of clarity, 
until this day, about the exact nature of the incident. Our researcher filed 
a complaint with the police, and it became clear that the police was not 
involved—they were furious and considered the incident as a criminal act. 
Nor does Ramin appear to have been working for the ministry of intelli-
gence: an Iranian lawyer made some informal inquiries and found that 
there was no file on our researcher. Later it transpired that Ramin had 
been involved in the arrest of bloggers and journalists; in the following 
years, he became an editorial writer for the hardline conservative press. 
But it remains unclear whether, at the time of the incident, he had been 
connected to any of the various parallel intelligence agencies and whether 
the incident was just a brazen attempt at extortion, or at least in part a 
political warning.
Without being personally betrayed as our Iran researcher was, others 
also have the experience of seeing people whom they believed to be ideal-
istic turn into regime apologists. Our Morocco researcher spent quite 
some time with journalists who used to criticize the regime but now work 
for pro-government media. She is careful not to judge them: these people 
were young when she met them and may at some point have decided in 
favor of having a family and a normal life. The price of being a regime 
critic can be very high, and we might make the same calculation in their 
position.
Our Kazakhstan researcher’s experience with a rising government offi-
cial over the last decade is slightly different: this man was never a demo-
crat, but he had previously been a believer in ‘changing things from the 
inside’ as well as a warm personal contact. The more he progressed in his 
career, the more his attitude toward our researcher became distant and 
bureaucratic, culminating in a meeting where he put on display the perks 
M. GLASIUS ET AL.
 85
of office, keeping her waiting for a long time, and then having her ushered 
in by an aide and served tea by a secretary. This was the same person who 
asked her to write a propaganda story for the Almaty Olympics bid (see 
Chap. 4). After her refusal, the relationship has cooled, and she would no 
longer ask him for contacts or other work-related favors.
hard STorieS
Many of us have spoken to respondents who have been in prison and who 
were in some cases tortured or raped. Perhaps surprisingly, these stories do 
not always deeply affect us. It depends very much on the way the respon-
dent tells the story. Our consistent experience, in Kazakhstan, Malaysia, 
and Morocco, is that when respondents themselves appear to have pro-
cessed what has happened to them, as a thing of the past, it is not shocking 
or traumatic for us to hear their experiences, even if they concern objec-
tively painful events. When they tell us things they have already spoken 
about many times, rather than personally opening their hearts and sharing 
their pain or fear with us, the stories more readily take on the form of 
depersonalized data.
Conversely, a story does not need to be particularly gruesome to shock 
us, if it challenges our preconceptions of how things work, and the reality 
is more harsh. This was the experience of our Kazakhstan researcher when 
hearing what happened to her contact Irina, the director of an NGO she 
had long known. The NGO dealt with multiple issues, some of which are 
considered sensitive, and had previously had some bureaucratic difficulties, 
but always worked hard to maintain a relationship with the authorities. 
The evening before traveling to West Kazakhstan for an NGO event, Irina 
was attacked outside her apartment and robbed of her big purse full of 
documents, money for grants, hard disks, and everything necessary for the 
event. According to Irina and her colleagues, the attacker clearly must have 
known what was in the purse. A witness in a car refused to call the police; 
he was probably implicated. The event in West Kazakhstan then ran into 
other difficulties, with permits being revoked, and local hotels and the 
university refusing to host the event, compounding the likelihood that the 
attack was political in nature. Despite the fact that Irina was not physically 
hurt, our researcher was quite shocked by the story. She had previously 
been conscious that targeted violence was characteristic even of the ‘soft 
authoritarian’ context of Kazakhstan and  had read of physical violence 
used by the regime before, but this was the first instance where it happened 
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to someone she personally knew, which was like a revelation of something 
that had always been there but hidden in the background.
When we see our respondents in pain or afraid, especially when we 
come upon hard stories unexpectedly, the impact on us is much greater. 
This was the experience, for instance, of our Morocco researcher, who 
spent an afternoon meeting the members of an association for the rights 
of Salafist prisoners. She sat in a room full of women, the daughters, 
wives, and mothers of these prisoners. Each woman in turn told her 
story, and it was just one atrocity after the other. One ended her story 
about her son with ‘and they condemned him to the death penalty’. 
Another appeared to have become mentally deranged as the result of the 
killing of her younger child and husband, and possible psychological tor-
ture. Had she been working for an organization like Amnesty 
International, our researcher might have been prepared to hear these 
stories, and would have known what to do with them: write a report. But 
she was unprepared, and felt alone against the ugliest part of humankind. 
During the meeting, our researcher remained clinical, asking questions, 
taking notes. She could not open the door to empathy because it would 
have overwhelmed her. The traumatic impact of these stories was com-
pounded by the intrusive surveillance, described above, that followed 
immediately afterward, and by the pressure to get results, which we dis-
cuss further on in this chapter. For a time, she could not stop thinking 
about the stories, the derangement of one woman, the lifeless voice of 
another. Hiking, eating well, and spending time on her own eventually 
helped her recover.
Stories that unsettle us do not always come from those directly affected 
by them. Our Mexico researcher was shaken by the account of a forensic 
journalist who investigates crime scenes, including political murders. She 
told a story of careful planning and tremendous professionalism in the 
implementation of deliberately gruesome murders, intended to send a 
message to others. He was told similar stories by other respondents as 
well. Just like our Morocco researcher, his initial response was to get on 
with his work, ask more questions, analyze the situation, without consid-
ering the horror of what he had been told, and how it affected him per-
sonally. In fact, it is difficult to start processing the mental impact while in 
the field, when there are too many other things going on. We oftentimes 
need the safety of home, and the distance in time and space, to evaluate 
and deal with the impact the field has on us. If coping in the field becomes 
too hard, then going home early should be the obvious solution. However, 
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as we will discuss below, the pressure to get results, and the shame of an 
unsuccessful trip can get in the way of such a sensible course of action.
The Field STayS wiTh uS
One might assume that, since we are field researchers, bad incidents or 
stories that emotionally affect us are things that we should be prepared for 
during fieldwork, and then we go home and relax. We know political life 
in the ‘field’ does not stop when we take our plane, and we typically stay 
in touch, but still, the physical distance typically also translates into some 
emotional distance. But not always.
One of the more upsetting experiences our China researcher has had to 
deal with, happened in the United Kingdom. She acted as translator for a 
group of visiting Chinese local government officials from a region whose 
main city is famous for its peacefulness, quality of life, and international 
flavor, a reputation she had found confirmed during fieldwork. In her pri-
vate conversation with one of the officials, she asked about a group of 
villagers who had occupied the highway in that locality, in a land-related 
protest. The protest had attracted a lot of attention, but then suddenly, all 
went quiet. She asked the local official what happened to the villagers, and 
he made an emphatic face and said: ‘we dealt with it’. She asked, ‘what do 
you mean?’, but she knew very well what he meant. Our researcher was in 
no personal danger whatsoever in this exchange and had not even known 
the villagers. Nonetheless, she was shocked and saddened to hear directly 
from an individual who had chillingly ‘dealt with’ the villagers’ rightful 
protest, even in this reputedly harmonious place.
Much more personal was the experience of our Mexico researcher. One 
of his main contacts during fieldwork had been a young photographer, 
Ruben Espinosa. Espinosa gave him several other contacts and sometimes 
came along to these other interviews too. Our researcher had interviewed 
him several times and also met him socially. He had been aware from the 
very first meeting that Ruben Espinosa had been threatened and feared 
being killed. A few months after the fieldwork, while he was at a confer-
ence, our researcher got a text message from another contact, telling him 
that Espinosa had been killed. It transpired that he had fled from the prov-
ince of Veracruz to Mexico City, where he and four flatmates had been 
tortured and murdered. While nothing has been proven, it is widely 
assumed that this was a political murder, connected to an unflattering 
photograph and article about the provincial governor (Watson 2015; 
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Goldman 2015). Less than a year later, a second contact went missing and 
was later found shot. This was not a respondent, but an acquaintance from 
an earlier trip, from whose parents our researcher had rented an apartment 
during fieldwork. The circumstances of his death are less clear, but it was 
a violent death, and the motive may also have been political. Initially, our 
researcher responded by having intensive contact with Mexican friends, 
and by writing two online articles for a broader audience (Bartman 2015a, 
2015b). This helped him feel that he was doing something to draw atten-
tion to the murder of journalists in Mexico. But it was not enough: he 
experienced trauma symptoms such as stress and insomnia and eventually 
sought counseling. This has taught him to approach traumatic events not 
just analytically, but to acknowledge the emotional impact: feelings of fear, 
anger, and guilt. He has also de-intensified his contact with people in the 
field, and does not contemplate going back to the same province in the 
near future. For the sake of optimal data-gathering, a repeat visit might 
have been desirable, but just as in the case of the research on Salafists in 
Morocco, it was deemed simply too risky to do so, even apart from the 
emotional strain.
aTTending To and coPing wiTh menTal imPacT
The lesson from the experience described above is certainly not that every-
one needs to seek counseling after authoritarian fieldwork, let alone before 
it. We should tread lightly, and not overburden first-time researchers with 
unnecessary expectations of getting traumatized. Most of us are not trau-
matized by the authoritarian field most of the time. Nonetheless, individu-
ally as well as collectively as an academic community, we should recognize 
that our fieldwork experiences can sometimes have a severe, perhaps even 
traumatic, emotional impact on us (see Loyle and Simoni 2017 for a more 
extensive plea for engagement with the possibility of trauma). This has not 
traditionally been a subject of academic attention, and the difficulty can be 
compounded by our sense that, compared to the suffering of some of our 
respondents, our own vicarious feelings are not worth mentioning. But we 
should attend to them, and we do not do our respondents a disservice by 
doing so.
NGO workers, whether they do human rights or humanitarian work, 
are trained in stress release and listening techniques, and typically debriefed 
after a stay in the field. We often go to the same places, and we also do 
difficult work. If stress release methods or debriefing works for them, we 
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should at least consider as researchers whether it can help us too. How 
exactly we need to respond will be different for each person and each situ-
ation. For some, professional counseling is in order, for others, spiritual 
(self-)help is the best answer. At a minimum, we should talk to friends and 
colleagues about what has happened and its impact on us. Others too have 
found that ‘maintaining meaningful contact with others (friends, family, 
professional networks) is one of the best ways to mitigate the potential 
impacts of trauma’ (Loyle and Simoni 2017, referencing Dickson-Swift 
et al. 2008). We would argue that this is all the more important in authori-
tarian contexts, which are already liable to propel us in the direction of 
paranoia and mental isolation. This is borne out, for instance, by the expe-
rience of Begley, who investigated what was behind the apparent popular 
support for the RPF in Rwanda, and not only encountered constant sur-
veillance but also had to worry, more than we have had to do, about the 
risk her interviews posed to respondents. She writes how ‘(t)hese fears 
added to the increasing feelings of frustration, constant mistrust, feelings 
of always being watched, and having no one who understood the situation 
to offer advice or support, essentially imprisoned me, leaving no secure 
way to communicate anything to anyone’ (Begley 2013, 82; see also 
Malekzadeh 2016, 868). It appears to have been this sense of isolation as 
much as the fear itself that caused her to suffer from post-traumatic stress 
after fieldwork.
Apart from recognizing stress symptoms, and finding our own personal 
ways of addressing them, we should also consider how stressful incidents, 
hard stories or traumatic events affect our written work. We should reflect 
on the possible validity gain, but also the risk of bias or self-censorship, 
once we ourselves or people we know personally have suffered from forms 
of repression. The quality of our conversations with colleagues who rely 
on desk-based work stands to gain from such self-reflection. And we 
should reconsider, after stressful incidents, hard stories or traumatic events 
on what fields we are prepared to revisit; what topics we are, and are not, 
willing to explore; and what methods we want to employ, in future 
research.
Then there is physical impact. While our team had extensively prepared 
for the specificities of authoritarian fieldwork, and given some attention to 
potential mental impact, we had neglected to consider the combined 
physical impact of pollution, temperature changes, change of diet, and 
hard work. If we experience stressful incidents, hard stories or traumatic 
events as described above, our bodies take yet another hit from the 
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 psychosomatic effect of such occurrences. All but one of our team got sick 
during recent fieldwork trips, though some of us much worse than others. 
So here we have some very practical advice: do not go on fieldwork unless 
you are in top shape, and plan not just for political but also for medical 
emergencies, determine who you would turn to with simple or complex 
medical problems, and how you would go about getting home early if 
necessary. Lastly, we will consider mental impact in relation to another 
source of stress, which we discuss in our next section “Pressure to Get 
Results”.
PreSSure To geT reSulTS
A subject that has had some attention, but not necessarily specifically in 
the context of authoritarian fieldwork, is the pressure, especially on early- 
career scholars, to get results and publish them. Unfortunately, this prob-
lem has primarily been framed in relation to the temptation to cut corners 
or commit scientific fraud. We have no knowledge, or even suspicions, of 
scholars of authoritarianism who responded to pressure to publish by sim-
ply making up results. But almost all of us have experienced mental stress 
at the thought of a failed fieldwork trip, coming home with insufficiently 
robust findings to publish as an article. We also know instances, in our 
own experience and that of others, where pressure to get results led to 
flawed decision-making in relation to risk. A final concern is scientific: not 
the temptation to invent empirical data but a tendency to prejudge con-
clusions, and to confirm our initial hunches rather than listen carefully and 
with openness to what the field is actually telling us.
The pressure to get results comes from three interrelated sources: from 
ourselves, through informal peer pressure from our colleagues, and from 
our institutional environments. Social scientists are typically self-starters; 
ours is a highly individualist profession that does not suit those who need 
constant external guidance and prodding to get to work. We are often our 
own hardest taskmasters. Especially during fieldwork periods, which are 
expensive in time and money, and hence precious, we are likely to feel 
particular pressure to get results. This may just make us a little overenthu-
siastic and reckless, which is how our Malaysia researcher interprets his 
brush with Malaysian plainclothes police, described in Chap. 2, with hind-
sight. But it may also turn into more fundamental self-doubt about what 
we are doing in the field, and what could be the consequences of ‘no data’. 
Sæther, who did research on critical journalism in China, is a rare voice 
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actually admitting—after the fact—that during her PhD fieldwork, there 
were ‘(d)ays wasted watching American DVDs, reading spy novels or in 
other profitless ways’ and that these ‘empty days made me doubt the entire 
project’ and imagine ‘that my stay would end up as a complete failure’. As 
she explains, these empty days are generally omitted from any description 
of fieldwork, ‘which emphasizes the active approach taken by the field-
worker’ (Sæther (2006), 54–55, 43).
The sense of self-doubt may be exacerbated in contacts with colleagues. 
In our experience, discussing failure and frustration in field research is 
largely taboo. When you meet other researchers in the field, they may 
show off a little about their contacts and all the information they have 
gathered. Nobody will say ‘I don’t get interviews at all, things are going 
badly’. At conferences too, the assumption is always that you have results 
to share, they are not safe spaces to discuss difficulty in getting results. 
And yet, for many reasons detailed in the previous chapters, to do with 
prioritizing our own safety, with shifting red lines, or with reluctant 
respondents, authoritarian field research can simply fail. At least one of us, 
our Iran researcher, has experienced a field trip that yielded negligible 
results: at that time, about that topic, respondents simply would not talk 
to him. Our Kazakhstan researcher has not had such a disappointing expe-
rience in Kazakhstan itself, but hit a brick wall when trying to approach 
Kazakhstani students, and study their organizations, in the United 
Kingdom. Less dramatically, managing fewer interviews than you had 
wanted or expected is actually a pretty common experience.
The most consequential pressure to get results is hierarchical and insti-
tutional. PhD researchers, research assistants, and post-docs may experi-
ence pressure from their supervisor or project leader. They are expected to 
come back from the field with results. In our project, the project leader 
has in some cases put on the table in advance the possibility that, despite 
trying their very best, a researcher might come back more or less empty- 
handed because the ‘field does not yield’, but we do not think this is com-
mon practice. We believe that senior researchers in this field have a 
responsibility to create an environment in which the possibility of disap-
pointing fieldwork can be openly discussed. But beyond a supervisor, 
there are the economic bottom lines of the broader institutional environ-
ment: job security and research funding simply depend on past results. At 
the time of writing, only one of us eight coauthors has a tenured position. 
For the others, failing fieldwork can have direct consequences on the job 
market.
 MENTAL IMPACT 
92 
It is this brute material fact that explains why our Morocco researcher 
went back for a second attempt at doing research on Salafists despite hav-
ing been both traumatized by the stories of victims’ relatives and intimi-
dated by the security forces. She needed money to live and finish her PhD, 
as well as wanting to maintain professional relations with the senior 
researcher who led the project. After months of trying and failing, she 
finally gave up on the project. Today, with much more experience, a doc-
toral title and a lengthening string of publications, she feels she has more 
room for manoeuvre in selecting which topics to work on. A Russia 
researcher one of us heard speaking at a conference undertook an even 
greater risk to continue his research on ethno-religious profiling in the 
Northern Caucasus, in order to ‘come back from my fieldwork and not be 
“ashamed” of my research results’ (Ratelle 2013, 208). Taking advantage 
of his own muscular appearance and adding some details (growing a beard, 
carrying a backpack), he would go through security checkpoints and allow 
himself to be detained and sometimes roughed up, to be able to write 
about it. In this case, apart from some degree of bravado, the perceived 
need to ‘come home with data’ appears to have been what drove this young 
researcher, who now acknowledges suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder. These experiences chime with Loyle and Simoni’s argument that 
graduate students and pretenure staff ‘constitute a high-risk group when 
considering the impact of research-related trauma’ (2017, 142), precisely 
because the impact of exposure to violence and suffering is compounded 
by the pressure to get results. We cannot, and probably do not want to, 
fundamentally challenge an academic system that rewards theory-building 
based on solid data. But we do have a responsibility as an academic com-
munity to teach young researchers that no data-gathering for the sake of a 
career is worth knowingly putting ourselves through extreme treatment.
PoSiTive menTal imPacT
Contrary to what this chapter may have appeared to suggest so far, the 
mental impact of authoritarian field research does not just come in the 
form of frustration, fear, trauma, or stress. It has positive impacts too. 
Malekzadeh describes authoritarian field research as restorative, by which 
he means ‘restorative of “the local” even as it informs nonlocal audiences 
outside of the case’ (2016, 873, see also 862). We agree, but also find it 
restorative in another sense: inspiring and uplifting. We find that speaking 
to many different kinds of people in the authoritarian field has made us 
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question some of our prior assumptions and ideas. It has helped us come 
to the full realization that what we do is social science: the stuff we study 
is about human beings, with all their complexities. Conducting many 
interviews has also helped us to be good listeners, which we find valuable 
not just as researchers, but as people. Fieldwork, in sum, has made us more 
open-minded, humble, and thoughtful.
chaPTer concluSion: Talk aBouT iT
In this chapter, we have discussed a number of issues that are rarely dis-
cussed in authoritarianism research: physical impact, surveillance, fear, 
betrayal, hard stories, traumatization, and pressure to get results. We want 
to stress that some of the events we have described are relatively rare. 
Authoritarianism research is mostly uneventful, and not particularly grue-
some. But bad things do happen, to us and our respondents, and there are 
no easy fixes for either avoiding or dealing with them. Our best advice is 
to do precisely what we have done in these pages: talk about it, before, 
during, and after fieldwork.
During fieldwork, it is important to invest in ‘warm contacts’. This is 
valuable not only because of the introductions they can make for us, or 
their analytical help, but also for our own well-being. We already discussed 
in Chap. 4 that trust is both a very valuable and a fragile commodity in 
authoritarian contexts. For our own sakes too, without trusting people 
unconditionally or unnecessarily sharing sensitive information with them, 
it can be useful to confide our insecurities and hesitations with a few peo-
ple with whom we feel an easy connection. Some of us have experienced 
that when we isolate ourselves, we start overthinking our situation and 
getting negative thoughts. Our Iranian researcher believes that he would 
have understood the position of his rogue friend better and earlier if he 
had been more willing to discuss the situation with Iranian friends. Our 
China researcher found that it helped to share her sadness over the chilling 
fate of the protesting villagers with her supervisor. Our Malaysia researcher 
recovered his confidence after the incident with plainclothes policemen by 
talking to locals about it. Our Kazakhstan researcher found her severe and 
mysterious health problems in the field easier to bear because she was 
looked after by a friend.
During and after fieldwork, it is also useful to talk to colleagues about 
our frustrations and doubts about our work. When our research results are 
suboptimal, we are easily inclined to think we did something wrong: that 
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we were too naïve, too reckless, or conversely we were too cautious and 
too self-censoring, and we could have had better results if we had acted 
differently. Our academic culture is not such that we readily talk about 
problems in field research. But having tried it, we have found it really use-
ful to share experiences. It makes us feel better, sometimes do our research 
better, and sometimes learn that we could probably not have done it 
better.
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Abstract In this chapter, we reflect on standards relating to writing up 
and publishing research based on authoritarian fieldwork. After briefly 
relating the history of recent transparency initiatives, we first report exten-
sively on our own current practices in relation to anonymization, protec-
tion, and transparency. Then, we make some recommendations regarding 
how the tension between the value of anonymity and the value of transpar-
ency might be better navigated, if not resolved. We make two proposals: 
the first concerns a shift from transparency about the identity of our 
sources to transparency about our methods of working. The second is to 
promote a culture of controlled sharing of anonymized sources. Finally, 
we reflect on trade-offs between publicly criticizing authoritarian regimes 
and future access to the authoritarian field.
Keywords Authoritarianism • Field research • Publishing • Transparency 
• Anonymity • Dissemination
In this chapter, we reflect, and make recommendations, on standards 
relating to writing up and publishing research based on authoritarian 
fieldwork. We do so at a time when many scientists in all disciplines are 
finding their role in society becoming less self-evident, and some feel that 
new measures are necessary to buttress the credibility and legitimacy of 
science. Such measures are intended to make our work more transparent, 
98 
but they raise many questions and challenges, particularly but by no 
means  exclusively for scholars in the authoritarian field. After briefly relat-
ing the history of recent transparency initiatives, which may not be famil-
iar to all readers, we first report extensively on our own current practices 
in relation to anonymization, protection, and transparency. Subsequently, 
we make some recommendations regarding how the tension between the 
value of anonymity and the value of transparency might be better navi-
gated, if not resolved. We make two proposals: the first concerns a shift 
from transparency about the identity of our sources to transparency about 
our methods of working. The second is to promote a culture of con-
trolled sharing of anonymized sources. Finally, we reflect on trade-offs 
between publicly criticizing authoritarian regimes and future access to the 
authoritarian field.
The Call for TransparenCy
In 2017, scientists in 600 cities undertook the first ever March for Science, 
believing that scientific ‘values are currently at risk’, and that ‘(w)hen sci-
ence is threatened, so is the society that scientists uphold and protect’ 
(Principles and Goals, March for Science 2017). Actually, it is not clear 
that there is a general decline of trust in science (see, for instance, Pew 
Center 2017). Nonetheless, social scientists, like others, have felt under 
increased pressure to explain and justify why they deserve public funding 
and how their methods hold up to scrutiny. In political science, one 
response to this has been a change in the Ethics Guide of the American 
Political Science Association in 2012, reflecting the so-called Data Access 
and Research Transparency (DA-RT) principles. Subsequently, a number 
of leading political science journals have adopted a Journal Editors’ 
Transparency Statement (JETS) (https://www.dartstatement.org), which 
constitutes an operationalization of the DA-RT principles form the per-
spective of journal editors. DA-RT states that ‘researchers should provide 
access to … data or explain why they cannot’, and JETS operationalizes 
this by committing journal editors to ‘(r)equire authors to ensure that 
cited data are available at the time of publication through a trusted digital 
repository’. While journal editors would be at liberty to grant exemptions, 
the new standard intended by JETS is full publication of raw data.
From late 2014, these statements became subject to increasing contro-
versy, and a petition signed by many leading political scientists requested a 
delay in the implementation of DA-RT and more specifically JETS. The 
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ethical and epistemological implications of these statements for various 
types of qualitative research, they argued, had not been sufficiently thought 
through. A lively debate on the implications of DA-RT has since ensued 
especially among primarily US-based political scientists (see https://dia-
logueondart.org and https://www.qualtd.net).
Whereas US debates on transparency have been motivated by concerns 
about scientific legitimacy and reliability probes, recent European initiatives 
promoting ‘open science’ have been more government-driven, arguing 
that data-sharing accelerates innovation, and could give Europe a competi-
tive edge. In practical terms, they have focused on developing institutional 
digital storing and archiving capabilities rather than on changing editorial 
practices of journals (Directorate-General, Research & Innovation 2016). 
In a recent position paper, Germany and the Netherlands proposed the 
fast-track development of a ‘European Open Science Cloud’ (EOSC), 
which is to be ‘a trusted, open environment for European researchers for 
the handling of all phases of the data life cycle and generated results’. The 
principle underlying the cloud is ‘to make research data findable, accessible, 
interoperable and re-usable (FAIR)’ (Joint Position Paper 2017, 1). What 
these European policy plans have in common with the US initiatives is the 
sense of urgency and universal applicability with which its proponents con-
tend that all data should become open to all, as soon as possible.
Some scholars have already published their reflections, particularly in 
response to DA-RT, on tensions between transparency obligations and 
protection of respondents in specific authoritarian contexts (Driscoll 
2015; Shih 2015; Lynch 2016). However, these comments tend to focus 
more on why DA-RT and JETS are problematic than on what should be 
considered best practice. And unlike DA-RT and JETS, the European 
‘open science’ initiatives have yet to generate extensive debate within the 
political science profession. Hence, we find more extensive reflection, and 
making recommendations, on standards relating to writing up and pub-
lishing research-based authoritarian fieldwork desirable.
While, as we have reflected in previous chapters, the sources we collect 
in the field are much broader than interviews, we will focus the discussion 
on interview practices, because this is the area where the tension between 
transparency and the ‘do no harm’ imperative is most evident. When we 
conduct interviews, we always begin with a little opening speech explain-
ing who we are and what kind of research we are doing and explaining that 
we will transcribe the interview, the transcript stays with us, but we may 
quote from it in academic publications. We always deal with the matter of 
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informed consent orally. None of us has ever used informed consent forms. 
To our knowledge, they are not customary in authoritarianism research. 
They can cause distrust among respondents (‘why do I need to sign some-
thing?’), as well as bringing about a potentially risky paper trail during 
fieldwork. At this point, our practices diverge, depending on the type of 
respondent. We discern roughly three categories of respondents. The first 
type, ‘ordinary people’, we typically inform that we intend to anonymize 
the transcript of the interview and not use their real name if we should cite 
them. With the second type, ‘expert informants’, we typically have an 
exchange about whether and if so how they would like to be anonymized. 
The third type are ‘spokespersons’, whom we typically ask for their per-
mission to be cited by name.
InTervIews wITh ‘ordInary people’
The default option of anonymity we find most appropriate when we inter-
view certain categories of ‘ordinary people’. Thus, our Kazakhstan 
researcher has used this when interviewing young Kazakhs who had stud-
ied or were studying abroad. Our Malaysia researcher used it when inter-
viewing people about their decision-making as to whether to join a 
demonstration. We find the default option of anonymity appropriate in 
these cases for three reasons. First, as ‘ordinary citizens’, these people have 
typically not chosen to be professionally engaged with politics, they are 
usually not accustomed to being interviewed and cited, and they thus 
deserve a high level of protection of their privacy. Secondly, while some 
respondents might simply refuse to speak to us if we were to cite them by 
name, others might well agree to be interviewed, but we believe that the 
validity of their answers to our questions might suffer if they knew they 
could be quoted by name. This is an issue that is not unique to authoritari-
anism research, it would apply to interviews with vulnerable groups (i.e. 
victims of sexual abuse, undocumented migrants, or drug users) in demo-
cratic societies as well. In an authoritarian context, all ordinary citizens are 
in the ‘vulnerable’ category when we ask them questions that relate to 
their views of their government or dissident behavior. This is not to sug-
gest that they would be in immediate fear of arrest or worse. In both cases 
we mentioned here, Kazakhstani students and Malaysian potential demon-
strators, respondent concerns related more to their professional environ-
ment, their relation to their university, or even their family, all of which 
might disapprove of dissident views or behavior. Finally, we think 
M. GLASIUS ET AL.
 101
 anonymity is not problematic in this particular category because the 
respondents do not have access to unique information as individuals. 
These kinds of interviews are more akin to surveys in that sense. What 
makes them different from surveys is that we do not claim that the people 
we speak to are representative for a broader group, and we do not attempt 
to quantify their opinions or experiences. Instead of reliability, it is validity 
we are after, trying to reconstruct and reflect their thought processes in 
relation to at least somewhat politically sensitive issues. In these instances, 
our sampling method may be questioned, but not the anonymity as such.
InTervIews wITh ‘experT InformanTs’
Most of the interviews we conduct in authoritarian settings fall into a dif-
ferent category, one that leads us to give respondents a choice when it 
comes to anonymity. We find this appropriate when interviewing lower- 
level government or party officials, corporate executives, journalists, local 
academics, opposition politicians, and activists. The reason we want to 
interview these people is usually that they can give us some insight into 
how the authoritarian system works in practice: within the bureaucracy or 
the party, in its dealings with other politically relevant actors, or in its deal-
ings with critics. Revealing such information can make them vulnerable, 
although this does not always need to be the case. By anonymizing them 
(in such a way that they are genuinely unrecognizable, see below) we 
exclude any such risk. But it requires us to relax the ideal of complete trans-
parency in how we come by our findings. If we cannot tell readers who we 
spoke to, they cannot trace whether we quoted and interpreted these 
sources accurately. We will reflect on this trade-off in more detail below.
Our experiences with the degree to which this second, broad category 
of respondents take us up on our offer of anonymity is very varied, depend-
ing on the repressiveness of the regime, the type of respondents, and the 
nature of our research question. Our Malaysia researcher found that the 
activists he interviewed were all but one entirely comfortable with being 
named. Their status as dissidents and members of a social movement in 
opposition to the government was well known, and while the answers to 
questions asked by our researcher were more specific than what they have 
publicly said online, they were not more incendiary. Our China researcher 
by contrast finds that both public officials and corporate employees almost 
always prefer anonymity. She still asks them, but she already knows what 
the answer will be. Most of us have experienced getting mixed responses 
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in this category. When we have a mixed response, we have a difficult 
choice. It is clear that we cannot name respondents who have asked to be 
anonymized, but should we always name the ones who have told us they 
are comfortable with doing so? From the perspective of transparency, this 
would be the best option, but we find that there may be three reasons to 
act otherwise.
The first is homogeneity. In her research on municipal governance, for 
instance, our Morocco researcher felt that it did not make sense to anony-
mize a civil servant for one municipality, but not someone in the same 
position for another municipality. Likewise, our China and Iran research-
ers, who both interviewed people working for Internet companies who 
deal with government agencies, did not believe there was value added in 
providing some of their names but not others. Others in our group how-
ever believe that stylistic homogeneity should not be a priority, and every 
respondent who can be named represents a transparency gain and should 
therefore be named.
A second consideration is whether we sometimes feel that what we are 
being told is quite sensitive, and whether perhaps the respondent requires 
more protection than he or she is asking from us. This was a choice con-
sistently made by Driscoll (2015), who interviewed Tajik or Afghan for-
mer militia members in an authoritarian but also volatile environment. He 
writes that ‘(i)n a few cases, the subject insisted that I record his full name. 
For my own safety, and that of my respondents, I never complied with 
these requests’. If we make such a judgment, we are in effect second- 
guessing our respondent’s own judgment, as well as foregoing transpar-
ency. Nonetheless, some of us have occasionally made such a judgment. In 
the municipal research quoted above, our Morocco researcher came across 
a respondent who gave her highly sensitive information, really explaining 
how the administrative system exerted power over elected officials. He did 
not think he required anonymity, but she believed this was perhaps a little 
naïve, and he was saying things that would undoubtedly make his boss 
unhappy, and his boss’s boss, all the way up to the top. So she decided that 
it was better to be overprotective than sorry and anonymized his state-
ments. Our Mexico researcher has anonymized all journalist-respondents 
in a journal article, whether they had asked him to or not, but has yet to 
decide what to do in his dissertation. On the one hand, as discussed in 
Chap. 5, the context is very repressive, with murder a regular outcome for 
critical journalists. On the other hand, the journalists in question are 
already openly critical of the government and do not reveal much to our 
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researcher that they have not said or written before, so the additional risk 
flowing from his published work may be quite limited. In fact, some activ-
ists actually seek—preferably international—visibility, not only to advertise 
their cause but also because they believe it gives them some level of pro-
tection. When a respondent articulates such a strategy, it would not make 
sense to overrule him or her for their protection.
A final reason to anonymize a respondent without being asked to do so 
can be the long delays in the publishing process, and a change in the situ-
ation on the ground during this process. Information that was not sensi-
tive when provided may become sensitive by the time it is published. One 
of us, for instance, had the consent of (some) Egyptian activists to be 
mentioned by their first name in early 2013, but decided because of the 
subsequent military crackdown, that in subsequent publications they 
needed to be given aliases for their protection.
InTervIews wITh ‘spokespersons’
The third category of interviews is where we speak to high-profile politi-
cians or civil society figures on their official stance, as our China, 
Kazakhstan, and Morocco researchers have all done on occasion. We may 
still put anonymity on the table as an option, especially if we do not know 
in advance exactly how the interview is going to go, but we do not usually 
expect them to take it up. These are public figures who are used to media 
exposure (albeit in the constrained circumstances of their authoritarian 
context), and in some cases, they may have already spoken of the same 
topics on public occasions. They will know exactly what they want to say 
to us, and how to say it. Moreover, their quotes are only meaningful in the 
context of who they are. What they say to us is interesting not because 
they give us insight into their thought process, or into the inner workings 
of the bureaucracy or the political process, but because they are the head 
of the Islamist Party or the president of the biggest women’s rights asso-
ciation. These kinds of interviewees will often give their consent to be 
quoted by name in our published work as a matter of course, although 
they may also give us some off-the-record information at the same time. 
Even if they only give us their official views, this can be of interest, because 
they give us insight into authoritarian legitimation strategies. But they 
typically only give us one face of authoritarian political processes: the 
 public face. For some of our research, that is all we need, but for many 
other research questions, it is not enough.
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proTeCTIve praCTICes
Not mentioning a name in our published work is only a small part of our 
anonymization practices. When we do not use real names, we use different 
kinds of descriptors instead. When respondents have very similar profiles, 
sometimes we just number them. Our Mexico researcher, for instance, just 
refers to journalist 1, journalist 2, and so on. Sometimes, especially when 
it comes to ‘ordinary people’ interviews such as those done by our 
Kazakhstan and our Malaysia researcher, we give our respondents aliases, 
fake first names. This improves readability and makes it possible for a 
reader to track particular respondents in a publication. When we have 
interviewed people in the second category, we try to convey some addi-
tional information, so that the reader can understand why the respondent 
in question would have a uniquely relevant perspective on the matter at 
hand, while still not making them traceable. We might refer to them as 
‘senior manager at Baidu, Beijing’, or ‘journalist, target of phishing 
attempts’. Sometimes, we need to omit more than a name to keep some-
one’s identity a secret (see Shih 2015, 22 for some very concrete examples 
on how to be protective while still conveying to a reader why a respondent 
could be considered as a well-informed source). A Malaysian civil servant 
who had attended an anti-government demonstration, for instance, 
insisted that it was not enough to delete his name; any detailed informa-
tion concerning his workplace could make him traceable, so the researcher 
used the vague reference ‘works for the government’.
But anonymization is not just about what eventually gets published. 
When a respondent asks to remain anonymous, we always keep their real 
names separate from our transcript. The real names may be found in our 
notes, in an old diary, or in a document kept separate from the transcripts. 
Contact details are also kept separate from transcripts (see also Shih 2015, 
22). We are well aware that none of these practices is completely secure. 
While we are in the field, we are in possession both of a set of contact 
details with identifiers (real names or not) and a set of transcripts. If some-
one were to steal or forcibly seize all our notes, transcripts, and recordings 
(which is in some contexts much more likely than high-tech electronic 
surveillance, as graphically depicted in Driscoll 2015, 6), and study them 
attentively, they would probably be able to trace the respondents. In some 
cases, the transcripts themselves are actually revealing, as, for instance, in 
the case of our Mexico researcher, whose journalist-respondents some-
times refer to their own published work. At other times, it would be a 
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matter of putting together the transcripts and our other information. 
None of us have been in a position where our material was taken from us 
during fieldwork (although a bag containing fieldwork material was once 
stolen during transit, see Chap.2), but it can happen. Our protective prac-
tices would make it time-consuming and difficult to trace respondents, 
but we cannot guarantee that it would be impossible.
As Bellin (2016) has pointed out, such risks put us under an ethical 
obligation to be transparent in quite a different way from that intended by 
DA-RT or ‘open science’: transparency to our research subjects (see also 
Loyle 2016), resulting in ‘a negotiation of the level of risk and disclosure 
that the respondents are comfortable with’ (https://www.qualtd.net, 
IV.1). While we endorse the spirit of this, we do not think that her pro-
posal that in the writing-up phase ‘the respondents work with the 
researcher to specify what identifying information can be written about 
and what should be removed or altered’ is always practicable. Precisely 
when working with respondents who may be at risk, we cannot assume 
that our—usually digital—communications with them about such matters 
would be safe. We may sometimes have to take decisions about altered risk 
conditions for them, as in the case of Egyptian activists referred to above.
off-The-reCord InformaTIon
We also come across information in our research that we cannot use at all, 
not even on condition of anonymity. Sometimes, such information is really 
of no interest to us, so we just ignore it. Our Malaysia researcher, for 
instance, found that his activist respondents would sometimes disparage 
each other off the record, but their internal relations had little to do with 
his research question. It becomes more difficult when they do give us 
information that is important, and is either new, or corroborates other 
evidence. Our India researcher has literally had the experience of a respon-
dent who had given permission for a recorded interview changing his 
mind and asking for the recording to be erased. When such a request is 
made, whether we think it is reasonable or not, no visible trace of the 
information should remain in our published work. But what cannot be 
asked of us is that we erase the information from our minds. If it is indeed 
important, it will inform our analysis, and we may look for other sources 
for the same information. In this case, other interviews confirmed the 
story the respondent had told. Our Kazakhstan researcher has likewise had 
relevant information from an opposition source who emphatically asked 
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that what he said be kept confidential, since the information ‘would put 
him in a situation of risk’. She tried to find written sources to corroborate 
the factual information he had given and kept the opinions he had 
expressed in the back of her mind during her analysis. In both of these 
cases, the off-the-record information was of some use to the researchers, 
but in both cases, it resulted in the written analysis looking less solid than 
it actually was, because it rested on an additional source that could not be 
mentioned at all.
anonymITy vs. TransparenCy
The primary reason not to insist on divulging sources has already been 
mentioned and is widely acknowledged as taking precedence over the 
merits of research transparency: respondents in precarious circumstances 
require our protection (Ahram and Goode 2016; Bellin 2016; Driscoll 
2015; Lynch 2016; Shih 2015; Stroschein 2016). The value of anonymity 
is not unique to authoritarianism research, or even to research on vulner-
able groups in the social sciences. It also applies to medical research, or 
public opinion research. In this sense, transparency is never boundless in 
academia. As we have argued above, we think anonymity is relatively 
unproblematic when it comes to research on random members of a sub-
group of the general population. Anonymity becomes more controversial 
when we rely on respondents who have specific, privileged knowledge of 
the workings of the authoritarian system and who are not interchangeable 
with others. Using what these kinds of respondents tell us under condition 
of anonymity poses a dilemma between transparency and anonymity. 
Betraying their confidence goes against the do-no-harm principle and is 
ethically unconscionable. So the only other alternative would be not to 
publish anything that would have to rely on anonymous sources, which 
raises its own ethical challenges, since it furthers the interests of authori-
tarian powerholders in opaqueness and potentially ignores voices that can 
and want to tell us about abusive practices. It is possible in principle to do 
authoritarianism research entirely based on named sources, for instance, 
by focusing on historic cases (Art 2016). But we believe that in our field 
of research—as well as many others—too much would get lost. Each of us, 
in many different contexts, has at times relied on anonymity. In our 
 experience, those of our ‘authoritarianism’ colleagues who rely on field 
research as a primary source have almost all done so too. We believe that 
it is fair to say that the field could not exist without it.
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TransparenCy abouT our praCTICes, noT our 
respondenTs
None of us think reliance on anonymous sources is unproblematic from a 
scientific point of view. Whether or not we believe in actual replicability of 
our kind of research (we are divided on this), we all think that transpar-
ency is required for other academics to judge our work, and to build on it. 
None of us have published work that rests entirely on anonymous sources. 
Indeed we agree with the advice given by Shih (2015) and Bellin (com-
ment on https://www.qualtd.net, IV.1, 2016) that authoritarianism 
research should not fetishize the interview as the only or best source of 
information but triangulate information from interview material with 
public documents or online sources. Some of us even think work that 
relies entirely on anonymous sources should not be published because it is 
not even partially verifiable. Others think that under very specific circum-
stances, when the author can argue why there was no safe alternative way 
of gaining relevant insights, such publications can be permissible. But 
instead of arguing about precisely how much a publication should be 
allowed to rely on anonymous sources, we find it more helpful to shift the 
way we think about transparency from a primary focus on the identity of 
our sources to a focus on increasing transparency about our methods of 
working.
Publications that rely on qualitative research are wildly variable in the 
attention they give to research methods, depending on their disciplinary 
or subdisciplinary traditions and epistemological orientations. In some 
journals, the standard is for qualitative research to be written up in ways 
that approximate as closely as possible the manner in which quantitative 
research is conducted and described, which is not always appropriate and 
helpful. In other subdisciplines and associated journals, there is simply no 
tradition of requiring a methodology section giving attention to how the 
empirical material was gathered and analyzed. We think that there are 
many ways of doing good authoritarianism research, but regardless 
whether it aims to substantiate causal claims or whether it is more explor-
atory or interpretive in nature, it always benefits from transparency about 
how we do things. We would argue for more transparency than is cur-
rently customary in our field of research. The spotlight should be not on 
the identity of the sources but on the practices of the researcher. We 
already typically share when an interview took place (where it took place is 
occasionally sensitive, see Shih 2015, 22), so that at a minimum we could, 
 WRITING IT UP 
108 
when challenged, prove that we were ‘in the field’ on that day, rather than 
behind our desk inventing respondents, but that is just fraud-proofing. We 
can do more: share how we came by respondents, and what biases there 
might be in that process, give insight into the kinds of questions we asked, 
into the informed consent-related conversations we had with respondents, 
whether we recorded, how we treated our material, and so on. There 
should also always be a justification, which can be brief if it is relatively 
obvious, of why certain sources need to be kept anonymous. As Shih pro-
poses, scholars of authoritarianism could also be more explicit about the 
other ways in which research has been tailored to meet constraints imposed 
by the regime, making it clear, for instance, that in undertaking a survey, 
we might ‘ask proxy questions that are highly correlated with the sensitive 
questions’ (Shih 2015, 20–21). Our choices regarding methods, ethics, 
and integrity could all be treated in one section, or if being transparent 
eats too much into our word count, they can be elaborated in an online 
appendix.
a CulTure of ConTrolled sharIng
When it comes to sharing of sources, one might think that while the iden-
tity of our respondents often needs to be secret, the material itself could 
be shared with all, just as the raw data underlying medical research or 
population statistics can be made public. Why do we not just put anony-
mized transcripts online? While one of us has indeed done so in the past, 
we think that too often, doing so would still put our respondents at risk. 
Precisely because they are not random respondents, but people with spe-
cific expertise or privileged information, a good secret service can come to 
understand who you have been talking to, either from the transcripts 
alone, or by combining it with their other information about you, or your 
respondents (see also Tripp’s comment on https://www.qualtd.net, IV.1, 
2016). We also believe it unlikely that respondents who want to remain 
anonymous would readily give their consent to having the entire transcript 
of the interview made publicly available. And if they did, the information 
they would give us might be a lot less valuable: having a conversation with 
us, after carefully having built a relation of trust (see Chap. 4) is not the 
same as making a broadcast—even an anonymized broadcast—to the 
world. Transcripts cannot therefore be available to everybody.
A final reason for not making interview transcripts publicly available is 
that we believe anonymized transcripts would in fact be of limited value to 
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other scholars. Transcripts are faithful transcriptions of a conversation, but 
they cannot be readily interpreted without the requisite contextual knowl-
edge, the relation to off-the-record comments possibly made during the 
interview itself, the connection with other conversations that could not be 
transcribed, and so on. They are not equivalent to quantitative data, and 
our process of drawing conclusions from them cannot be replicated in the 
same way quantitative procedures can be replicated on the basis of the data 
and code by anyone with the requisite methodological skills.
Nonetheless, we think that the current practice of saying ‘just trust us’, 
and keeping transcripts entirely to ourselves, is not good for our collective 
reputation as academics. We believe a culture of qualified sharing of ano-
nymized transcripts should be fostered in our field, and perhaps also in 
relation to qualitative research with vulnerable respondents more widely. 
We will describe two concrete ways in which we imagine that this can 
work, which should be read as complementary to each other.
The first is sharing between colleagues, usually but not necessarily 
within the same department. Within our project, we share all anonymized 
transcripts with each other. We do not share real names with each other: 
the only benefit of sharing real names we can think of would be to further 
reduce the likelihood of fraud, but as we discuss below, we do not think it 
plausible that researchers can and will invent reams of pages of false tran-
scripts. What sharing means to us in practice is that transcripts are all 
stored together on an offline laptop in our office. It is a system to guaran-
tee that a small number of people have seen the interviews and can con-
firm their existence. In case of a doctoral candidate struggling to turn his 
material into an argument, moreover, supervisors can actually review the 
material and offer better advice. This is an obvious and attractive solution 
for research groups such as ours. Such groups are increasingly prevalent in 
Europe due to the current nature of funding, which favors personal grants 
to mid-career or senior scholars, intended for building a group around a 
project. It may also work for region-based research centers, that is, centers 
for Middle Eastern studies and China or Russia studies, where there is an 
institutional awareness of the specificities of our work. We would be more 
hesitant to recommend it as a solution in all circumstances: in general 
political science departments, there may not be the same understanding of 
the sensitivity of the material, or conversely, the practice might lapse 
because nobody polices it. A drawback of sharing within a group or center 
is that, in case there are concerns over authenticity, close colleagues may 
have a personal or institutional stake in covering for each other. But this 
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kind of sharing is still to be preferred over not sharing at all, which we 
believe to be the current standard, and it can be combined with other 
sharing practices as described below.
A second sharing practice could emerge in the context of the publica-
tion process of a journal article or book manuscript. One form this could 
take is peer review: either transcripts could be shared with reviewers as a 
matter of course, or there could be a designated ‘source reviewer’. We 
think most authoritarianism researchers would be reluctant to accept such 
a system: given that most peer review is double-blind, it would require 
authors to hand over transcripts without having any idea to whom, other 
than that these people are presumably also academics. Researchers might 
well feel that submitting transcripts in this way would breach their obliga-
tion to their respondents. Moreover, it would place a heavy burden of 
responsibility on journal editors or book publishers, who would then be 
responsible not only for the academic quality of the reviewer but also for 
her integrity with regard to neither using the transcripts for their own 
purposes nor sharing them with third parties.
A more obvious solution, we think, is that anonymized transcripts can 
be shared with editors. As researchers, we know who the editors are, and 
we have chosen their particular journal or publishing house as our pre-
ferred outlet, so it would not be strange to be asked to share transcripts 
with them. Editors act as guarantors of quality, and this could extend to 
due diligence in terms of checking the authenticity of sources. The exact 
way in which this would work could be a matter of editorial policy. Given 
the burden on editors, we imagine they might not ask for and actually 
check through transcripts for every manuscript that relies on anonymized 
sources. They might check for a random sample, or ask for transcripts 
when they themselves or reviewers have concerns about authenticity, or 
both. We have to admit that sharing with editors is not absolute guarantee 
against fraud: unless recordings are shared, there is always a theoretical 
possibility that a researcher would invent entire transcripts. We think it 
implausible, however, that anyone who had the local knowledge and cre-
ative talent to do so would use their capabilities to diligently conjure up 
lengthy exchanges with non-existent respondents.
In our conception, only confidential materials explicitly referred to in 
publications should be subject to sharing. We concur with Lynch (2016, 
38) and Tripp (https://www.qualtd.net, IV.1, 2016) that it makes little 
sense to share our multilingual fieldnote scribbles, which will not be intel-
ligible to anyone. Nor should we be under an obligation to make them 
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intelligible, any more than we should be obliged to reconstruct inspira-
tional thoughts we may have in the shower before writing them up. We 
acknowledge that editors will not be in a position to fully interpret tran-
scripts. As we explained above, seeing transcripts does not imply that you 
can ‘replicate’ the analysis. Finally, there are practical challenges, for which 
we do not yet have adequate solutions to offer, concerning how to securely 
transmit transcripts to an editor. But our position is that we should move 
toward a culture where it would be considered natural and legitimate for 
editors to ask to see anonymized transcripts that we refer to in publica-
tions, and we would share them on request. It cannot be the case that 
while quantitative researchers are increasingly being asked to make raw 
data publicly available, we will not share any of our material with anyone 
and just insist on being trusted.
arChIvIng our TransCrIpTs
As we explained in our introduction to this chapter, recent European pol-
icy initiatives aim to create a ‘network of networks’ of digital data reposi-
tories. It is still quite unclear at what point a researcher would be expected 
to place data in a digital repository, and to what extent access would 
indeed be open to all. The notion in a recent policy paper that all data 
should be available to all, in all phases of the research cycle (Joint Policy 
Paper 2017) reflects a poor understanding of how scientists work, and 
governmental overreach in terms of transforming their ways of working. 
Nonetheless, social science researchers in Europe may soon come under 
institutional pressure to comply with mandatory data storage in digital 
repositories. Open access repositories are subject to exactly the same 
objections as the DA-RT and JETS initiatives, specifically but not exclu-
sively from the perspective of the authoritarian field, so we need not 
rehearse our arguments here.
But we want to go a step further and state our objections even to digital 
repositories with restricted and/or embargoed access. Again, our primary 
objection concerns risk to respondents. As Marc Lynch points out, ‘the 
difficulty of guaranteeing confidentiality for materials deposited in a 
trusted repository are not hypothetical to those of us who conduct research 
in the Middle East and North Africa’ (Lynch 2016, 37), and the same is 
true for other authoritarian contexts. We discern three aspects to this risk 
of breaching confidentiality, and hence risking harm: political contingency, 
legal risk, and digital risk. The first aspect relates to the apparently very 
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reasonable suggestion that we could place our material in digital reposito-
ries under embargo, to be made public after, for instance, five or ten years, 
subject to our consent. The problem with this is that we cannot predict 
the future, and hence we cannot assume that publishing transcripts would 
gradually become less sensitive over time. It can also become more dan-
gerous. Lynch gives the example of Egypt, already referred to above: what 
were ‘bold but safe’ statements made by activists in 2012 or the first half 
of 2013 quickly became very dangerous from the latter half of 2013. 
Stroschein gives the similar example of Turkey, which has become much 
more repressive after the coup attempt of 2016 (https://www.qualtd.net, 
IV.1). A disembargoed interview with a Turkish respondent from, say 
2011, could well land her in trouble in 2017. And as we discussed in 
Chap. 3, our China researcher has seen a more subtle but discernible shift 
in the ‘red lines’ of permissibility in China over the past years, that could 
have implications for disembargoed transcripts.
Second, there is the possibility of transcripts becoming subject to legal 
subpoena, a particular concern with US scholars (Driscoll 2015, 6; Lynch 
2016). We have not given attention in this book to the risk of legal sub-
poena, because we have no personal experience with it, and it still seems 
to be a rare occurrence. But what we can say is that when we store materi-
als in a digital repository, we give up control: the (difficult) choice of 
weighing responsibility toward respondents against legal obligations and 
possible criminal liability would no longer be ours to make. Driscoll (2015, 
6) records actually having burnt some of his field materials in order to 
guard against the risk of subpoena. None of us have gone this far, but we 
are aware that ethical review boards sometimes insist on the destruction of 
data to protect respondents. A blanket destruction requirement would be 
just as extreme as a blanket transparency requirement, but the fact that 
social scientists can be subject to both contradictory prescriptions at the 
same time illustrates the unhelpfulness of blunt, one-size-fits-all solutions 
to research dilemmas.
Finally, even if deposited transcripts were to remain in restricted access, 
it would be naïve, in the age of hacking, to believe that academic reposito-
ries can be made fully secure. We would like to believe that most secret 
services most of the time have other priorities than getting access to our 
transcripts, but we can never be certain. In Chap. 4, we quoted the forth-
right answer one of us got from a Moroccan activist when she asked him a 
sensitive question: ‘if you can assure me that you can protect me I will give 
you my answer … but since you cannot, I will not’. Here, we paraphrase 
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him to state our position on storing sensitive interview transcripts in digi-
tal repositories: if the institution can assure us that it can protect our 
respondents, we will give it our transcripts, but since it cannot, we will 
not.
wrITIng, dIssemInaTIon, and fuTure aCCess
As academics, we all want our work to be paid attention, by our peers but 
perhaps also beyond academia. We may even dream of being famous as 
academics. But for a researcher on authoritarianism, academic fame is a 
double-edged sword. If more than a handful of colleagues are taking 
notice of our work, the regime may be doing so too. As we described in 
earlier chapters of this book, we all do research in contexts where there is 
some degree of space for, and understanding of, social science research. 
But this space is constrained, and we do carefully consider what we pub-
lish, where we publish, and how we disseminate our work.
Our Kazakhstan researcher suspects that the regime would not be 
happy about some of her work, especially that which focuses on the work-
ings of the party in power. She did consider this when writing, but she 
believes that most political leaders will not read it, and even if they should 
read it, they would still assume that, as an academic paper, it would be 
mostly ignored or considered harmless because it does not communicate 
directly with a large public. She faced a dilemma when an assistant to the 
prime minister specifically asked to be sent a copy of her work on the 
political leadership’s legitimation strategies (Del Sordi 2016). Since the 
assistant had been very helpful and had agreed to be interviewed herself, 
our researcher could not refuse, but she did have some concern that her 
access to the country could be jeopardized by this move. The prime min-
ister in question has a reputation for academic curiosity, however, and she 
has not in fact had difficulties with her most recent visa. She has even seen 
colleagues taking a more public critical position without consequences for 
their access, but as the authorities are always weighing the reputational 
consequences of denying access against those of being criticized, one can-
not rely on being able to combine public criticism with continued access.
Likewise, our China researcher believes that her description of the 
Chinese political system as ‘fragmented’ might not please the government, 
but since it does not aim to undermine the Chinese Communist Party, she 
does not believe she would really be denied access to her home country. 
Again, the relative obscurity of academic work also makes a difference: 
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journalists from the west are much more regularly denied access than 
scholars. This difference seems to be confirmed by the recent experience 
of a colleague in China, who was recently ‘invited for a cup of tea’ by secu-
rity agents because of (English-language) news coverage of an academic 
publication of hers.
Our Iran researcher by contrast has, in the very specific context of the 
repressive aftermath of the 2009 election protests, initiated an activist- 
oriented edited volume (Michaelsen 2011) that he thought could com-
promise future access. He found the situation in Iran so dramatic at that 
time that he wanted to take a position. He decided that the story told by 
this book, edited together with 11 journalists who left the country and 
wrote about their experiences during and after the protests, was more 
important than going back to Iran. The book was published in English 
and Farsi, and he gave interviews about it to Farsi language online media 
in the diaspora considered inimical by the regime. When, six years later, he 
prepared for another trip to Iran, he did briefly wonder whether this pub-
lication might compromise his access to and security in the field, but he 
still thinks that there are times when academic researchers should take a 
clear and principled position.
Another way of disseminating our work, perhaps the most effective way in 
numerical terms, is by acting as commentators in western media. The 
increasing emphasis on societal engagement, moreover, may propel scholars 
to think that all publicity is good publicity. We do sometimes give radio 
interviews, or allow ourselves to be quoted in newspapers, but we are very 
careful about the exact wording. In case of print media, we always insist on 
seeing and being allowed to correct quotes before publication. A more nega-
tive phrasing than we are comfortable with, sometimes desired by journalists, 
not only interferes with the nuance of what we want to say, it can also have 
consequences for our access to the country and to sources in the country.
A final consideration, when it comes to weighing publicity against 
future access, is the extent to which our careers and our lives are bound up 
with one country and its political system. Our India and Mexico researcher 
and our Malaysia researcher have not been much concerned about future 
access to the relevant countries, in part because such denial of access is 
relatively rare, but primarily because, at this point in their career at least, 
they are mixed-methods researchers who think of themselves as political 
scientists who happened to do fieldwork in one or two specific countries. 
Our Morocco researcher found doing research in Tunisia to make a 
refreshing change and is also thinking about broadening her expertise to 
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West Africa. Our Kazakhstan researcher thinks of herself as a country 
expert first and foremost, but has also written on Central Asia more gener-
ally, and considers future research on Russia. Our Iran researcher, while he 
has invested profoundly in learning Farsi and understanding Iran, has 
partly shifted his research agenda, toward studying the Iranian diaspora, 
on the one hand, and a broader comparative focus on media in authoritar-
ian contexts on the other hand. While the primary motivation for broad-
ening our research agendas has not been to mitigate against the risk of the 
authoritarian state obstructing our research, it does make it easier to navi-
gate the dilemmas regarding publicity and access. Our China researcher is 
more exclusively invested in understanding the universe that is China, 
albeit comparatively. Moreover, she is and wants to remain a Chinese citi-
zen, so for her the stakes in navigating what to write, and where to write 
it, are higher, as they are likely to be for any national investigating their 
own country. In sum, we all think of how we couch our criticisms of 
authoritarian regimes and how publicly we do so, in relation to future 
access as a trade-off, but the choices we make depend on our specific pro-
fessional and personal relation to the field.
ChapTer ConClusIon: shIfTIng The TransparenCy 
debaTe
There is an inherent tension in doing, but especially in publishing, research 
on authoritarianism. Ahram and Goode (2016, 838) describe authoritar-
ian regimes as ‘engines of agnotology’, by which they mean that these 
regimes have an interest in maintaining ignorance and uncertainty about 
many aspects of how they function. Hence, publication can raise problems 
for our future access, but more importantly, potential harm to sources. We 
add our voice to the chorus of scholars who have argued that a concern for 
transparency in research cannot be translated into a requirement to make 
transcripts or field notes public, even in anonymized version. Nor should 
they be stored in potentially unsafe digital repositories. Our responsibility 
to do no harm to respondents is simply paramount. But we have also tried 
to go beyond only rejecting inappropriate transparency requirements. In 
this chapter and in this book, we have tried to increase transparency about 
how we do research: by explaining in detail how we have navigated the 
methodological and ethical trade-offs that follow from doing research in 
the authoritarian field, and what general learnings we think may be gleaned 
from our common experiences.
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Chapter 1 IntroduCtIon
• Do not take any of our recommendations below as Gospel. Every 
context, every individual situation is different. Consult others, but 
use your own judgment.
• Do engage in authoritarian fieldwork. It is not always easy, but it is 
much needed, and ultimately rewarding.
Chapter 2 enterIng the FIeld
• Do take ethics procedures seriously, and fight for appropriate ethics 
procedures at your home institution if they are either unhelpfully 
rigid, or non-existent.
• Prepare by reading human rights reports and embassy briefs, but be 
aware of their biases, and triangulate. Consult academics and others 
who often go to your field.
• Don’t act like a spy. Be open about being a social science researcher 
on a fieldwork trip. Carry official letters from your university and 
business cards.
• Practice digital security routines before leaving, but abandon them in 
the field where appropriate.
• Take it slow, especially on a first visit, or when the political situation 
has evolved, or when you have a new, more sensitive topic. Be patient; 
acclimatize to the local politics.
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• You will have preconceptions, but remain willing to revise them 
when faced with surprises. Be critical but not judgmental.
• Be prepared to encounter security agents and answer questions, but 
don’t get obsessed with this risk.
• Think of digital security measures in terms of trade-offs: between 
greater digital security on the one hand and data loss, arousing sus-
picion, or getting paranoid on the other hand.
Chapter 3 learnIng the red lInes
• Get acquainted with the ‘hard red lines’, that is, political taboo top-
ics, of your field before you leave. Stay away from them unless you 
are an experienced researcher.
• Make it boring (Malekzadeh 2016, 865). Do not tell lies about your 
research, but present it in ways that are neutral, non-specific, and 
depoliticized.
• Get locals to vet your wording, so interview or survey questions 
sound harmless enough but still elicit meaningful responses.
• Think through whether you need to adapt your behavior to stay 
within the red lines—but don’t get paranoid.
• Red lines may shift, so what you thought you knew may no longer 
apply. Be prepared to adapt if words and behaviors previously accept-
able turn out to be taboo or vice versa.
Chapter 4 BuIldIng and MaIntaInIng relatIons 
In the FIeld
• Invest time and effort in building a network, so you come to inter-
viewees (‘respondents’) with a recommendation.
• When working with local collaborators, consider the potentially 
greater risks they may run, and their possible dependence on you, 
before making requests.
• Be patient but persistent when trying to get interviews.
• Give potential respondents every reason to trust you, by being pro-
fessional, respectful, reliable, accessible, and discreet.
• Meet in places that are considered culturally and politically appropri-
ate to the context and will make both you and your respondent feel 
most comfortable.
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• When meeting respondents, do not get straight to the point: make 
small-talk, start with innocuous questions, work your way up to the 
more sensitive ones.
• Be aware of, and work with, your ascriptive characteristics (age, gen-
der, national background), your personality, and a respondent’s 
likely preconceptions, as best as you can to establish a relationship 
and elicit information.
• Approach respondents with respect, not confrontation (even if 
they are themselves antagonistic). Treat their perspective as intrin-
sically interesting as well as in need of triangulation and critical 
analysis.
• Acknowledge that collaborators and respondents are giving you their 
time and confidence, and think through what you can do in return, 
without giving offense or posing ethical problems.
Chapter 5 Mental IMpaCt
• Do not be ashamed of being afraid: when doing research in the 
authoritarian field, you may sometimes feel anxious, afraid, even a 
little paranoid.
• Talk openly about your difficulties in getting access to data in the 
field, and you will find them to be widespread.
• Do talk about stressful incidents, hard stories or traumatic events, 
and the impact they are having on how you feel, with trusted locals 
as well as with friends and colleagues, during and after fieldwork.
• Recognize symptoms of stress, anxiety, and possible traumatization; 
take steps to mitigate these feelings, but accept that you may need 
the safety of home, and the distance in time and space, to fully evalu-
ate and deal with them.
• Do not neglect your body: the combined physical impact of pollu-
tion, temperature changes, change of diet, and hard work can com-
pound negative mental impact.
• Do not seek out situations likely to cause trauma: neither data- 
gathering for the sake of a career nor the desire to give voice to vic-
tims is worth knowingly incurring post-traumatic stress.
• When coming back from fieldwork involving stressful incidents, hard 
stories, or traumatic events, consider debriefing, professional coun-
seling, or spiritual (self-)help, whatever works for you.
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• Reflect on how stressful incidents, hard stories, or traumatic events 
affect your written work, considering the possible validity gain, but 
also the risk of bias or self-censorship.
• Do not be deterred: authoritarian field research is inspiring.
Chapter 6 WrItIng It up
• Do not put respondents at risk for the sake of transparency.
• Consider what kinds of respondents you are interviewing, and think 
through what that should entail for whether and if so how to 
anonymize.
• Consult with respondents on exactly whether and if so how they can 
or cannot be cited—but anonymize even despite their permission 
when you think naming puts them at risk.
• Consider everything anonymization entails: omitting other identify-
ing features, keeping contact details separate from transcripts, taking 
digital security measures when appropriate
• Consider sharing anonymized transcripts with close colleagues and 
with editors on request.
• In publications, justify why it is necessary to anonymize, and make 
clear why the anonymous respondents are relevant sources of 
information.
• In publications, be as transparent as possible about your practices: 
how you came by respondents, limitations and biases, the kinds of 
questions asked, informed consent-related conversations, taped or 
written records, how you stored them during and after fieldwork, 
and so on.
• Reflect on the consequences of storing transcripts and other materi-
als in digital repositories for respondent risk.
• Beyond academic publications, consider the trade-off between pub-
lic criticism of the authoritarian regime and future access in relation 
to your own investment in the field.
Do not take any of our recommendations above as Gospel. Every con-
text, every individual situation is different. Consult others, but use your 
own judgment
